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Abstract.  
At present the most powerful and influential 
groups in education see the solution to matters of 
educational concern as mainly falling within the province 
of an educational research which is fundamentally 
scientific. 
This thesis sets out to examine whether this 
assumption can be substantiated and, in the possible 
scenario that it cannot, to look at an alternative form 
of educational research. 
It begins with the philosophical arguments which 
support the view that educational research, where it is 
empirical, should be mainly scientific and continues by 
looking at what contemporary educational researchers have 
said about the nature of educational research. The role 
philosophy of education might take in this context is 
also examined. The thesis continues by looking at the 
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prescribed methodology of educational research and 
examines the philosophical assumptions of such a 
methodology. It continues by looking at the major 
assumption of scientific endeavour which is that it is 
nomological. 
The conclusions drawn from the aforegoing are 
that, for various philosophical reasons, the notion that 
educational research can be founded on scientific method 
and applied through a process parallel to engineering is 
fallacious and needs to be reviewed. 
A review of the philosophical situation with 
regard to understanding human beings as would be 
necessary to understanding them in an educational context 
is undertaken in the fourth chapter. This marks the 
beginnings of an alternative, non-scientific, framework 
for educational research. A case is made for the thesis 
that individual actions are understood properly against a 
background of information which includes beliefs, 
intentions and historical circumstances. Consideration is 
then given as to how this might be put in such a way as 
to be of practical use in the deliberation of how to 
tackle educational issues. The final chapter outlines how 
a possible substantive piece of educational research 
might look. 
CONTENTS  
Title Page 	  1.  
Acknowledgements 	  2.  
Abstract 	  3.  
Table of contents 	  5.  
Prologue 	  6.  
Chapter One 	  12. 
Chapter Two 	  48. 
Chapter Three 	  90. 
Chapter Four 	  148. 
Chapter Five 	  198. 
Chapter Six 	  254. 
Chapter Seven 	  291. 
Epilogue 	  334. 
Appendix A 
	  339. 
Appendix B 
	  
347. 
Bibliography 	  355. 
Prologue.  
My reasons for writing the present thesis stem 
from a fear, which I hope to justify in the first three 
chapters, that educational research, as presently 
conceived, makes certain fallacious assumptions about the 
appropriateness of methods developed within the natural 
sciences to matters of educational concern. Since such 
methods are the basis of educational policy their use in 
education have far reaching implications for all 
concerned. In the thesis I therefore call into question 
the use of scientific methodology in educational research 
and attempt to provide an alternative. Since, however, I 
appreciate that the use of scientific techniques of 
enquiry cannot simply be dismissed I have devoted a 
considerable amount of the thesis to a critical review. 
This exercise has been, in retrospect, useful in a way 
not anticipated at the outset, for, in uncovering some of 
the weaknesses inherent in the attempt to base 
educational research on scientific principles it has been 
possible to see more clearly what the alternatives might 
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look like. It is one of my hopes therefore that the 
critique which forms the first part of the thesis is also 
the basis for substantial progress in the second part 
which looks at an alternative method. 
With the above comments in mind I have started 
the thesis with a chapter which provides an educational 
context to the whole. It focuses on the issues by looking 
at the debate between Paul Hirst and D.J.O'Connor. 
D.J.O'Connor's arguments are particularly pertinent 
because he argues strongly for the use of scientific 
methods in educational research and policy. 
Having opened the topic in this way a critique of 
scientific method in educational research would seem to 
be the next appropriate step. It is, however, deferred to 
chapters two and three. The reason for this is the prior 
need to look at philosophy of education and its possible 
role in providing such a critique and in its relation to 
educational practice. My reluctance to proceed with the 
critique at this point stems from an uneasiness about the 
role and importance of philosophy of education, as it has 
been perceived, and an attempt to set out some of the 
reasons why I consider the discipline to be pivotal with 
respect to other disciplines within what might be more 
widely described as educational research. Insofar as I 
argue that philosophy of education has direct 
implications for the practice of educational research I 
hope that the thesis itself - which has practical 
conclusions - is an exemplar of what I mean. 
I delay a look at science for a second, and 
equally important, reason. This is to establish that 
educational researchers themselves either openly or 
covertly assume that the methods developed within the 
natural sciences are not only an adequate but also an 
appropriate basis for the empirical side of educational 
research. This is to avoid the valid criticism that the 
whole thesis is based on what is normally referred to in 
philosophical circles as an 'Aunt Sally'. I feel that, 
for the reasons given in the first two chapters, no such 
criticism can be made. 
The second chapter opens what I have here called 
the critique by looking at the recommendations of 
educational researchers. The recommendations looked at 
are all concerned with the methodology of empirical 
educational research. The books used were taken at random 
from various libraries, the only factor common to each 
being that the title and introduction indicated that the 
work was devoted to an explanation of the methodological 
techniques of empirical educational research. It is 
surprising, again in retrospect, how similar these 
recommendations were, especially since one or two were 
written twenty or so years before the others. 
The third chapter continues the critique by 
looking in some detail at the major assumption of science 
which is that it is nomological. The various ways in 
which laws connecting antecedent conditions and their 
alleged effects might be formulated are considered and 
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the conclusion is reached that whichever permutation is 
utilised, there remain insurmountable difficulties. 
Failure to come to terms with these difficulties 
constitutes a considerable lack of openness on the part 
of those educational researchers who espouse scientific 
method, a lack of openness which does not conform to the 
spirit of true enquiry which, minimally, must include the 
ability to be critically aware of the assumptions one 
makes and the readiness to adapt to new insights. 
It is hoped that the thesis exemplifies these 
qualities since between chapters four and six it attempts 
to lay the foundations for an alternative research 
methodology which avoids the fallacies of scientism. The 
groundwork for this is found in the fourth chapter where 
the central question concerns how we come to an 
understanding of each others actions and thoughts. The 
conclusion reached is that such an understanding is not a 
private action but is the outcome of the way we construe 
the world and each other - a way which we take together. 
History, convention and intersubjective agreements are 
thus all partly responsible for what we say about each 
other and consequently enter into our concepts, our 
language and, ultimately, how we understand what others 
are doing, thinking or feeling. At the same time we all 
experience the world in different ways; our own 
preferences, perspectives, emotions and perceptions 
giving us a unique view of how things are. This 
uniqueness, together with our common history, give rise 
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to a radically different basis to educational research to 
the atomistic one accepted by science. It contains, 
firstly, a common historical framework and secondly, a 
number of unique perspectives on the human events 
contained within that history which give rise to a 
plurality of possible accounts. The thesis argues that 
any research which deals with human affairs must 
accommodate this. Chapter five attempts to deal with the 
problem by proposing that a narrative which draws upon 
various individual accounts is the starting point for one 
possible form of educational research. Chapter seven 
attempts to further resolve the problem by incorporating 
the possibility, in actual research, of allowing the 
individuals whose initial accounts had given rise to a 
narrative to discuss with each other and with a group 
referred to as the 'panel' both their own perspective on 
events and how or why accounts differed or varied. This, 
seemingly democratic process, does not enter the research 
for undisclosed political reasons but, as is argued, from 
an epistemological concern for objectivity. The 
fundamentals of this concern are dealt with in the fourth 
and fifth chapters. 
Engineering, as a method of applying science to 
human affairs, is rejected in chapters one and two. 
Chapter six thus looks at the possible alternatives. 
Various forms of deliberation are looked at and the use 
of a 'calculus' of pure practical reason is rejected. In 
its place I have suggested a form of deliberation based 
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very much on the actual processes of practical reasoning 
which operate within the daily process of human affairs. 
The final chapter is an attempt to give an 
illustration of how a piece of non-scientific educational 
research might be both formulated and carried out. The 
chapter is intentionally practical. The methods outlined, 
while not the only possible methods, are methods which 
might be adopted by educational researchers without much 
alteration. In other words, the final chapter is a 
substantive proposal for educational research. At the 
same time it is the outcome of a philosophical thesis. 
This reiterates and highlights the thesis stated earlier 
that philosophy of education has a major role to play in 
contributing to the practice of educational research as 
well as its theory. In arriving at this I have had to 
begin with what I perceived to be a major flaw in 
educational practice, examine its claims and then move 
through a more detached philosophical consideration of 
the ramifications and assumptions of such claims and then 
return to practical suggestions which avoid the flaws 
encountered within the process and yet meet the 
requirements of educational research. I hope that this, 
as a method of philosophy of education, as much as the 
actual proposals in the final chapter, will make a 
lasting and fit contribution both to those engaged in 
educational research and practice and those whose lives 
are enriched as a result. 
Chapter One.  
1.0 	 Educational theory.  
This, the first chapter, is an introduction to 
the field which I regard as the problematic and 
therefore, as indicated in the prologue, focuses on what 
others have said about educational research, its 
methodology, its relation to theory and the role 
philosophy of education might take in this context. The 
problem is not a new one for, whilst not thinking 
specifically of education, it was Aristotle who first 
questioned the use of science in enquiries concerning 
human affairs. 
Aristotle thought that deliberation was appropriate 
in certain circumstances and inappropriate in others. In 
this thesis I wish to argue that this fundamental 
distinction is overlooked in what passes for educational 
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theory and its associated research programme, both in the 
de facto sense that research departments are based on the 
sciences and the de jure sense that even those like Paul 
Hirst, who oppose the positivist prescriptions of 
philosophers such as D.J.O'Connor, tacitly assume some 
reliance on the sciences as foundation disciplines. Since 
little of substance has been written on educational 
theory, apart from a long running debate between the two 
above mentioned philosophers, I will make them the 
starting point in a discussion which will examine the 
main issues and problems raised by the notion of an 
educational theory together with its research programme. 
Before I do, however, I wish to look a little more 
closely at what Aristotle had in mind when he spoke of 
the inappropriateness of deliberation to certain things, 
for it is in his comments that we may find the basis, as 
I have indicated, of a critique of the de facto notion of 
educational theory and its associated research programme 
which has become orthodox. The reason, which will become 
clearer, is that what is received as orthodox in 
educational research is precisely what Aristotle warns 
against. What therefore was it that Aristotle thought 
wrong about doing research in areas like education with 
methods appropriate to the sciences? He says:1 
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Surely nobody deliberates about what is eternal, 
such as the order of the universe or the 
incommensurabilty of the diagonal with the side of a 
square; nor about eternal regular processes whether 
they have a necessary or a natural or some other 
kind of cause...for none of these results could be 
effected by our agency...Nobody deliberates about 
the past either, but only about a possibility in the 
future. 
The sphere about which one deliberates is a sphere 
which is concerned with actions and with the future, in 
other words, with what is under our control. It is not 
concerned with what is outside that control which 
includes: 'those branches of knowledge that have precise 
rules of their own'2. In the category of 'those 
branches' Aristotle includes science which he describes 
as follows:3 
We will assume that all we know cannot be otherwise 
than it is...therefore the object of scientific 
knowledge (episteme) is of necessity...it is 
eternal, because everything that is of necessity in 
the unqualified sense is eternal. It (Scientific 
Knowledge) proceeds either by induction or by 
deduction. Induction leads us to first principles 
and universals, while deduction starts from 
universals...Thus scientific knowledge is a 
demonstrative state (and) a person has scientific 
knowledge when his belief is conditioned in a 
certain way, and the first principles are known to 
him... 
Science, then, for Aristotle, finds its proper 
objects in the sphere of invariable objects, an 
investigation of which gives rise to 'scientific 
knowledge' or 'episteme', while deliberation finds its 
proper objects in human actions and the future and does 
not give rise to 'episteme' but practical wisdom or 
'phronesis'. At the same time scientific knowledge is 
knowledge of universal principles or laws and is not 
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concerned with prediction and control of the future of 
human actions, this being the task of human deliberation. 
Since this is not a thesis on Aristotle, I will not 
labour the point. The question, however, which he raises, 
cannot be ignored by anyone seriously concerned with 
educational theory and its research methodology, since it 
is obviously within the province of deliberation with its 
reliance on 'phronesis' rather than science and its 
associated methodologies. 
Even a cursory glance, however, at the structure of 
educational research programmes will reveal the absence 
of prudential wisdom in its method of enquiry and its 
almost complete reliance on science. Further, science is 
asked to produce predictions about the future of human 
events and not merely content itself with the formulation 
of universal principles. In the educational system we 
therefore either have an excellent means of understanding 
and controlling our schools, teachers, classroom 
behaviour, examination results and so on or we do not. If 
we have, and even scientific evidence points to the fact 
that we have not, then most certainly Aristotle was 
mistaken. I, however, agree with Aristotle's insight into 
the division of research methods and therefore intend to 
show that Human Science, as commonly understood, i.e, as 
covering those sciences which use methodologies developed 
within the tradition of the physical sciences, is not 
merely an inadequate tool for dealing with pressing 
educational problems, but is completely inappropriate. I 
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argue that there are far better means at our disposal and 
those means I spell out in the final chapters. The first 
chapter acts as an introduction to the main debate. It 
outlines educational thought concerning educational 
theory and research as it developed over recent years 
under the following headings: 
1.10 Educational Theory and the practice of research. 
1.11 The debate between D.J.O'Connor and Paul Hirst. 
1.12 The contribution of Philosophy of Education. 
1.20 The Technico-Rational Model 
1.21 The Process Model 
1.10 Educational Theory and the Practice of Research.  
One of the characteristics of the debate over 
educational theory and the type of research most 
appropriate to it, is its lack of consensus. This, 
perhaps, stems from the various groups involved in the 
debate, and the vested interests they have. Very 
generally, those engaged in the human sciences see 
themselves as supplying the hard data upon which 
educational practice is grounded via an intermediate or 
applied science such as management. On this view teachers 
are aided in the classroom by having a background stock 
of knowledge supplied by the sciences. Given that they 
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are adequately trained as managers, they may apply that 
knowledge in the expectancy that whatever objectives they 
have defined for themselves, they will be reasonably 
confident in their achievement. Against this is a variety 
of stances which see the teacher as the main source of 
information either through reflection on their own 
activities or through active engagement in research. In 
the philosophical world the champions of the scientific 
viewpoint have been philosophers such as D.J.O'Connor, 
T.Moore and Brenda Cohen. O'Connor, for example, says 
'Education, like medicine and engineering, is a set of 
practical activities and we understand better how to 
carry them out if we understand the natural laws that 
apply to the material with which we have to work.'4 He 
admits that practice comes first, 'but its theoretical 
justification has to wait for the scientific development 
that can explain its success.'5 The wait, apparently, 
is to be relatively brief, for he adds that 'the 
development of a scientific psychology has put us in the 
position where we no longer have to rely on practice to 
suggest theory.'6The same line is taken by Terry Moore 
who says that, 'Educational theory...is a field in which 
all the main disciplines of educational study may be used 
to support practical recommendations.'7 Brenda Cohen 
takes the argument a little further by 'rubbishing' the 
alternatives to science and Paul Hirst as the 
alternativist's champion. She says,8 
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By deliberately cutting off education from 
anything resembling scientific standards of truth 
or validity, Hirst is, in fact, returning the 
subject to its traditional status as a field where 
all may propound their ideas with as complete a 
freedom and as much imagination as in the past. 
Remarks such as these are probably responsible for, 
and explanatory of, William Guy's comment9 that 'One of 
the most surprising features of the literature concerned 
with educational theory is the scant reference one finds 
to theories which are implicit in the classroom teacher's 
actual practice.' Today, however, such is not the case 
and various alternatives to the scientific-cum-managerial 
model espoused by the positivists have been put forward. 
These are prominent in the work of Castell and Freeman, 
10 	 11 Carr, 	 Stenhouse, 12Elliott, 13Schon 14and 
Hirst.15 I will say more about these alternatives, some 
of which are referred to as 'Action-Research', in 1.21 
and so I will not comment at this point on either its 
proposals or its relation to my own conclusions. Instead 
I will concentrate, as indicated, on the crucial debate 
between O'Connor and Hirst which, in many ways, 
exemplifies the major disagreements between the two main 
'camps' which might be broadly characterized as 
positivist and non-positivist or scientific and holistic. 
1.11 	 The Hirst/O'Connor debate.  
I have chosen the debate between Professors Hirst 
and O'Connor for an extended exegesis both because it has 
been influential in polarizing thought over educational 
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theory and because it raises most of the questions which 
I am attempting to answer in the thesis as a whole. I 
will begin with a fairly detailed account of O'Connor's 
arguments as put forward in his paper 'The Nature of 
Educational Theory'.16 I will follow these with Hirst's 
replies both from the same journal17 and from a chapter 
entitled 'Educational Theory' written some eleven years 
later.18 
O'Connor's main aim, it seems, is to clear up 
some of the 'muddle' and 'twaddle' which is talked about 
educational theory. 'The study of education', he says, 
'is analogous to economics' but,'differs from' it in that 
while, 'it draws its factual basis from scientific 
disciplines, it does not have a clearly marked and well 
defined subject matter.'19 This, however, is seen as a 
temporary problem for, 'we have to wait upon the relevant 
developments in the appropriate sciences,20  to sort it 
out. This raises the question of what the appropriate 
sciences are and O'Connor gives psychology, economics, 
sociology and human biology as 'the most obvious ones'. 
Economics, again, provides the closest analogy because, 
like economics, 'education aims at optimizing the 
efficient use of scarce resources'.21 Indeed, 
continuing the theme of efficiency, 'we might regard the 
educational system of a given society as the product of 
social engineering whose construction is guided by the 
currently accepted concept of human welfare and made 
possible by knowledge of the sciences which make it 
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possible (sic) to realize this ideal. O'Connor sees two 
aims of educational theory: 'the explanation of the 
workings of the educational processes and the system it 
operates in' and 'their improvement in the light of our 
knowledge of these workings...'22  
From this point on the paper takes a different 
turn. Firstly it tries to restrict the notion of theory 
to one with two conditions, and secondly it attempts to 
show why Hirst is wrong about his notion of theory and 
about the way in which values enter theory. I shall not 
dwell on the 'arguments' brought for restricting the term 
'theory' to its positivist sense for the 'arguments' 
simply and dogmatically state the criteria to be  
accepted. The two conditions are of more interest 
because O'Connor cannot see why educational theory should 
(i) want more or (ii) need more. The two conditions 
which, given (i) and (ii), would appear to be sufficient 
for a 'genuine theory' are that,'it should be (a) 
explanatory and (b) refutable.'23 
 Two important 
features of explanation are noted and, says O'Connor, 'If 
educational theories did no more than conform to these 
standards...they would indeed be a kind of scientific 
theory'.24 These important 'facts' about explanations 
are that, '(i) No true explanation can be given to one 
who lacks the necessary background knowledge' and,'(ii) 
An explanation is a conclusion arrived at by inference 
and so must conform to the requirements of any valid 
inference.'25 The second of these is further explained 
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as one in which we know the 'premisses are true' and that 
the 'inference is a valid one.'26 This, if I am not 
mistaken, is more or less, what is meant by the words 
'nomological' and 'deductive' and is straightforwardly 
'Hempelian'. 
Having thus outlined his view of the role of 
educational theory, O'Connor turns his attentions to 
Hirst's 'serious objections' to it. The first objection, 
that educational theories are radically different from 
scientific theories in that they concern themselves with 
guiding practical activities, is neatly avoided by 
O'Connor who states his absolute agreement. Applied 
sciences, he says, do just this - like engineering they 
apply the knowledge of the pure sciences and use the 
principles gained 'as a guidance system'.27 The 
disagreement is located in the 'additions' Hirst would 
make to the two 'criteria for a genuine theory' that 
O'Connor has isolated. What more Hirst would add, 
O'Connor suggests, is that the 'theory (shall) determine 
precisely what shall and what shall not be done...in 
education.'28 Further, because of the nature of the 
addition, 'Hirst wants to import value components into 
the theory itself.'29 This seems to be the main 
stumbling block for O'Connor who sees the system guided 
from the "outside" by such factors as 'the currently 
accepted concept of human welfare'.30  Hirst is 
criticized on two grounds, first for thinking that in 
aiming at educational goals we require a 'logic of moral 
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reasoning', and secondly for assuming that anything of a 
factual nature can follow from such moral reasoning. The 
first argument is backed up by the valid suggestion that 
there is no such thing as a worked out moral logic and 
the onus is on Hirst to show that there is or could be. 
The second argument challenges Hirst to demonstrate the 
'logical relations between...statements of value and 
statements of fact'.31 
In concluding, O'Connor makes two bold claims: 
first that 'we have no good reason to suppose that a 
purely empirical basis for educational theory would be 
inadequate'32, and secondly that the value of the 
'methods of science...is that they rest on the belief 
that reason (that is, tested methods of assessing and 
evaluating evidence) is our only guide in problem 
solving'.33 
In the course of this thesis I shall challenge 
the second of these claims head on: for the first part of 
the thesis is concerned solely with such claims. The 
first claim is the one Hirst feels most compelled to 
meet.34 He begins with what he perceives to be their 
apparent agreement over the concern educational theory 
has with 'improving and guiding practice', but says that 
'His account of the guidance the theory offers is that of 
the technical means the sciences can provide for 
realizing ends coming from outside the theory - from 
society at large and its 'currently accepted concept of 
human welfare. To my mind (however)', Hirst continues, 
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'the theory is itself concerned with determining ends as 
well as the means of education, the answers to all 
questions about what ought to be done, moral as well as 
technical.'35 In support of this contention Hirst 
questions O'Connor's, 'fear of having a theory whose 
logic we cannot at present satisfactorily elucidate' and 
the consequences this has for a theory which has as its 
proper object the reasons and values of practioners. The 
consequence, for Hirst, is that whatever empirical basis 
or empirical theory O'Connor is proposing, it will be, 
'quite inadequate for practical judgements'.36 Besides, 
he adds, science developed quite independently of a fully 
worked out 'logic of scientific explanation': 'indeed 
...it developed in spite of gross confusion.'37  
On O'Connor's point about the relation of values 
to facts, Hirst brings forward a number of significant 
features.38 First the dissociation is, 'contrary to 
their relationship in the actual conduct of educational 
debate'. Secondly, 'the means often involve activities 
that must be assessed not merely as efficient means but 
also in moral terms as ends in their own right.' Thirdly, 
they,the means, 'can be constitutive of certain ends and 
so on.' Fourthly that, 'society's notions of general 
welfare are far too general to enable those in education 
to derive detailed principles from them'. Fifthly and 
finally, 'the conflict of values...creates endless 
problems on which even individual teachers must make 
value judgements for themselves.' 
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I make no personal comment on the debate at this 
point except to say that I broadly agree with Hirst's 
position. I do not think the argument will be resolved, 
however, while the Human Sciences themselves remain 
unchallenged within educational theory. That, and a 
proposed scheme to replace the positivist element in 
research, is the substance of the present thesis. As far 
as values are concerned in this thesis, they will form 
the basis upon which educational research is undertaken 
in all but a few cases. They are thus, on the view I will 
adumbrate, not merely part of Educational Theory, they 
are central to it. 
1.12 	 The Contributions Of Philosophy of Education.  
The debate, as I have outlined it, is unresolved 
today. It is unresolved in the sense that educational 
institutions carry on as if there had been no debate. 
With the possible exception of the 'Centre for Applied 
Research in Education' in East Anglia (in this country) 
most schools of education involved in research rely on 
the technico-rational model which utilizes the methods 
developed within the natural sciences on the assumption 
that these are going to provide the data which will 
improve practice. Correlated with this is the growth of 
various sciences dealing with efficiency and management. 
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These 'applied sciences' perform the necessary function 
(on the model's assumptions) of transforming the hard 
data into rational procedures which, they hope, will 
bring about an educational revolution. It is my opinion 
that this is an unlikely dream because of the dubious 
status of the human sciences. The debate will, I think, 
only be finally resolved when it has been conclusively 
shown that the human sciences are fakes: empty replicas 
of natural science which can neither produce the general 
laws they need nor even assume that they are there to be 
discovered. I have devoted Chapters Two and Three to this 
task. 
The task I have set myself involves a mode of 
philosophy which has not been too prominent in recent 
philosophy of education. In the two chapters just 
mentioned which question the status of human science I am 
performing a critique with Kantian underpinnings: the 
question I am asking is, 'How are these sciences 
possible?' In the last chapter however, where I am 
concerned with putting forward an alternative 
methodology, my philosophical 'model' is not quite so 
clear. Indeed, the question of which role philosophy 
takes in making substantive proposals is not one which 
has received much attention. This lack is unfortunate in 
an applied philosophy such as philosophy of education. I 
will take up this matter again after I have looked at 
some of the claims philosophers of education have made 
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about their role in education and in its research. 
Castell and Freeman divide these into two broad 
categories.39 The first is conceptual analysis and the 
second is the justification of social practices. This 
division is readily supported by statements by the role 
descriptions of Philosophy of Education offered by the 
philosophers themselves. My interest is to see whether 
these roles are adequate to the task of resolving the 
debate which is fundamental to educational research: is 
the scientific model correct, and if not how do we go 
about constructing a new one? 
R.S.Peters, for example40, says that 'What 
distinguishes the philosopher is the type of second order 
questions he asks..."What do you mean?" and "How do you 
know ?"' and that this involves him in a 'search for 
criteria (which) is the kernel of philosophical inquiry.' 
In so doing, ' they make explicit the conceptual schemes 
which...beliefs and standards presuppose; they examine 
their consistency and search for criteria for their 
justification.' Ultimately, the ' philosopher's task...is 
to apply analyses of concepts and theories of 
justification...' with a view to clarifying the 
scientific or moral discourses which form, for the 
philosopher, the first order of enquiry. Much the same 
explanation is given in the 'Logic of Education' produced 
by both R.S.Peters and Paul Hirst41  , but here just what 
is involved is made a little clearer, for example, 'What 
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we do is to examine the use of words in order to see what 
principle or principles govern their use...( and )...in 
attempting to make explicit the rules...(we) get clearer 
about our concepts.' And this, they add, is a preliminary 
to answering other philosophical questions. Glenn 
Langford42adds his support saying that, 'Philosophy as 
a second order discipline...concerns itself not with the 
subject matter of first order disciplines, but with the 
medium in which they are conducted; that is, with the 
discourse peculiar to them and the procedures implicit in 
them.' 
Not every one agrees however. A.O'Hear, for 
example43, says that while, 'The tendency has been to 
say that it is not the philosophers job to lay down 
prescriptions, but rather to adopt a second order 
stance...philosophy of education (should be) concerned 
with educational aims.' This feeling of frustration is 
reiterated by John White44who says, in the introduction 
to his book on the aims of education that while 'until 
recently it has been analytically oriented...(and while) 
...it has been interested in aims...(it has been 
interested) almost as much in how the concept of an aim 
is to be understood as in substantive questions of what 
aims should be.' The reason for this is that, 
'philosophers of education...(have) been chary of saying 
what they think aims ought to be because they have felt 
this kind of question lies outside their discipline: 
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philosophy does not prescribe what ought to happen; its 
job is to clarify, in a second order way' the concepts, 
arguments and assumptions embedded in theories, in this 
context educational theories.' Exactly, in fact as Paul 
Hirst45and Terry Moore46 respectively say it should 
be: 'Philosophy, I shall take it, is above all concerned 
with clarification of...concepts 'and 'It is not the 
philosopher's job to set the educational aims of a 
society, but he may show how the various ways in which 
value judgements may be supported.' 
The contribution which conceptual analysis and 
the justification of social practices make is looked at 
in greater depth in a paper by Richard Peters and John 
White. I will look at each in turn together with Peters' 
remarks in his book 'The Concept of Motivation' where the 
recommended techniques are applied. 
In a section entitled 'Philosophical Research not 
geared to Social Science and Psychology' the authors 
argue47that since 'educational research' is concerned 
to provide 'new knowledge which is...relevant to 
initiating people into what is thought worthwhile' it 
'cannot be restricted to empirical enquiries.' Curriculum 
design, for example, raises questions fundamental to 
ethics such as why some activities are preferable to 
others. There have, therefore, to be,'good reasons for 
having some things on the curriculum' otherwise there is 
'no rational basis for deciding on priorities.' 
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Educational practices, such as that of punishment, need, 
the authors argue, to be looked at philosophically 
'before the relevance of psychological research into the 
effects of punishment can be shown.' 
Ethics thus has a central role in educational 
research - but this is not the only contribution 
philosophy makes. Various examples are given of 
psychological theories - such as those of Freud and 
Piaget - which have crept into educational thinking 
without much prior thought about the relevance of such 
theories to specifically educational contexts. Similarly 
there are 'countless questions' which cannot be simply 
answered empirically: 'What is a school subject?' and 
'What degree of "specialization" should there be at 
secondary school?' are just two examples. 
The authors then move on to procedures such as 
activity methods, learning by experience, discovery 
methods, indoctrination and so on which are brought in or 
out of educational practice in the wake of a new report 
or slogan without reflection as to what they mean or 
indeed whether they are educational. Further to this 
there are, 'embedded in these procedures...principles 
which prescribe how children should be treated' but which 
are nonetheless unexamined principles, principles for 
which no justification has been given. Here, just as with 
the justification of the principles which govern 
education provision and distribution, there is a need for 
philosophical contribution. 
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Where educational research is geared to the 
sciences, the authors argue that 'the philosopher might 
be able to help the social scientist in the clarification 
of his aims.' More radically they might ask whether the 
social sciences 'can be theoretical sciences, in the 
sense that physics is...'. Such radical work is instanced 
by D.W.Hamlyn's 'dismissal of theories of perception in 
psychology', a dismissal the authors feel might 'be 
generalized to cover all social and psychological 
phenomena' on the grounds that 'the phenomena of human 
behaviour requires logically disparate types of concepts 
for their description and identification, and hence for 
their explanation.' The reason given is that the concepts 
describing human actions cannot be reduced to 'mere 
bodily movements': they cannot, therefore be adequately 
dealt with by a general theory. Less radically 
philosophers can point to the flaws in experiments - 
point out, for example, that intelligence tests may 
in fact measure a lack of interest in doing the sorts of 
things intelligence tests demand. Or, again, less 
radically still, they might point out that what appears 
to be an empirical discovery is no more than a conceptual 
truth derived from the meaning of the words used to 
describe the experiment and its findings. An example 
given of the latter is Hamlyn's criticism on the 'figure 
ground hypothesis': 'we would not call anything an object 
unless it could be distinguished from everything else 
that forms its background.' 
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Richard Peters applies these types of methods to 
psychological work on motivation in his book on that 
subject.48 Here, his main line of attack is from the 
perspective of ordinary language and its concept of 
motivation as compared to the 'technical' use of the word 
in various psychological theories. Space prohibits a 
lengthy exegesis but some of his concluding comments are 
interesting in that they throw light on the way he sees 
conceptual analysis as a critical tool. 
My interest in the type of philosophy used in the 
above stems, as I have indicated, from concern over its 
critical bite. Peters claims, on 'logical' grounds, that 
highly generalized theories are impossible. But it is 
worth asking just what these logical grounds amount to. 
He says they derive from the distinctions we make in 
ordinary language from which we see that action is rule 
governed and conventional. 'The job', therefore, of the 
human scientist is consequently, 'to exhibit the 
structure of goals and conventions in unfamiliar 
societies.'49 Leaving aside the complication of Quine's 
injunctions of doing this at all well and leaving also on 
the side the rather strange remark that the sciences are 
concerned with 'unfamiliar societies', let us look at 
what is being assumed. Logic, as it is here used, is 
ambiguous between that which refers to something like 
deductive laws and that by which 'family resemblances' 
are seen to exist between words or their uses. Since, 
Peters does not mean the first and since the second is 
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said to be contingent on history or culture, nothing 
which needs to worry the scientist is said. The scientist 
is free to go on looking for better descriptions of human 
actions. 
I conclude from this that conceptual analysis is 
an inadequate tool for Peters' purposes. Its 
clarificatory role, whether in a familiar or an 
unfamiliar society, amounts to anthropological philology 
and a syntagmatic one at that. This has a fatal 
consequence as Charles Taylor, Paul Feyerabend and 
Richard Rorty all admit: science may, in the future 
replace our 'common sense' concepts. Those who resist 
include Norman Malcolm and I put my own arguments 
favouring his views in 3.8. For the moment I am merely 
concerned to spell out the problem. It is: science can 
claim to be able to offer better explanations of human 
behaviour because it can (in the sense that it is not 
logically impossible) reduce our present, contingent and 
conventional descriptions of ourselves to more 
fundamental descriptions which are not conventional nor 
are they 'intentional' or purposive. My own arguments 
concerning this problem agree with Peters about the 
'intentionality' of action descriptions and in the fact 
that they are contingent on our historical practices (the 
argument for which forms the first part of chapter four). 
My departure is that the statement that our languages 
contain these conventional elements is non threatening to 
science for the reasons I have stated. A critique of the 
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sciences must show also that while such descriptions are 
contingent they are irreducible to non intentional 
descriptions. Consequently while I accept that the 
scientist may produce descriptions of ourselves which are 
not like those we have I reject the possibility of their 
identification with our intentional descriptions which 
leaves a referential mismatch. I also reject the 
possibility of semantic synonomy between intentional and 
non-intentional descriptions which leaves truth 
conditions intact. The argument thus concedes to science 
the possibility of alternative descriptions but denies to 
it the very means - i.e. translation between the two - 
which would render it possible to talk of the same thing. 
In the absence of identifiable instances of the same 
event: actively or neurologically described, the 
scientific enterprise runs into a seemingly insuperable 
problem for, it cannot talk - across the intentional / 
non-intentional divide - of the same event again. This is 
so because it is axiomatic to the scientific enterprise 
that (i) correlations are made between independent 
variables which are identifiable as the same in an all 
possible worlds scenario and (ii) that the variables 
concerned are seen to correlate again and again. Where 
science cannot talk of the same event it cannot talk at 
all. 
I move now to a consideration of the scientist's 
view of what should happen in educational research. Since 
there is a growing 'movement' towards involving teachers 
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in research I will divide this section into two halves. 
The research described in the first, which most closely 
resembles O'Connor's 'science', is fairly typical of the 
type of research carried out in both Britain and the 
United States. I refer to this approach as the 
technico-rational model and distinguish it from what 
Stenhouse and others refer to as the process model. Both 
models, I argue, even in their most modern forms, are 
'positivist': that is they rely ultimately on the methods 
established by the natural sciences and as a consequence 
fall within the unification of science programme which, I 
believe, is the real heart of positivism. The following 
two sections provide an introduction to a more 
philosophical consideration in the following two 
chapters. 
1.20 	 The Technico-Rational Model.  
The technico-rational model is characterized by 
the testing of formulated hypotheses which are based on a 
collection of data. Supported hypotheses are perceived as 
being useful in educational settings because of the way 
they can be used to underwrite policy and thus support 
technologically construed managerial decisions which 
seeks to manipulate behaviour in ways thought desirable. 
This 'interest in behaviour modification in education', 
has, according to Schwieso and Hastings50, seen, over 
'recent years...an increase of interest.' As evidence 
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they cite the greater use of behaviour modification 
techniques 'within special and ordinary schools and 
through the publication of a spate of books urging the 
use of such procedures by teachers.'51 My object in 
this section is not to make any particularly telling 
philosophical comments on that model but merely to 
indicate the sort of direction this form of scientific 
thinking has taken and is still taking. 
I begin with some remarks about Professor Hazel 
Francis' inaugural lecture at the London Institute of 
Education not because she represents the tradition, but 
because she says she does not,as indeed is indicated by 
the catch phrase of the address - 'Winds of Change'. I 
find this interesting because, as I hope to show, its 
contents are well within the tradition and not, as is 
surely intended by the obvious rhetorical ploys in the 
title, well away from them. In fact we have to look no 
further than the second paragraph to find her warning 
against 'undervaluing psychology as a means of providing 
an information base from which policy makers may 
act'52and, further, advocating that it (psychology) can 
'also be the basis for evaluating tentative theoretical 
models of defined real-world domains.'53 What is even 
more telling are the scientists with whom she allies 
herself. She quotes approvingly, for example, work by 
Pask54who 'used the term conversation for learning 
mechanism' and argued that learning mechanisms 
(conversations) consisted of at least two levels of 
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processing, the first of which includes 'responding to 
feedback from ...effects' while the second requires 
'action...on processes...to alter them in the light of 
feedback from the effects of such alteration.'55 This, 
adds Francis, extends, 'research methods and thinking 
well beyond those of behaviourist and experimental 
cognitive psychology.'56 Perhaps I am peculiarly blind 
to the meanings of words, but if, by some mischance, I am 
not, then I seem to discern, in Pask's work, as retold by 
Francis, the ghost of Skinner clothed deceptively in the 
form of a computer. 
Professor Francis's own work is not so clothed: 
it is, for all its rhetoric, openly scientistic. She 
says, for example, that after making 'observations 
(which) included examples of children with some explicit 
knowledge of letter-sound correspondences...' she made a 
'hypothesis (which) suggests probabilistic and analogic 
strategies on coming to know about English spelling'.57  
Although she does not spell out, perhaps advisedly - 
given the very 'radical' views she is putting forward - 
what is to be done with a hypothesis, it is a fair, a 
probabilistic, guess that it will be put to the test. 
Another psychologist well known in educational 
circles is David Child. One merit of Child's book58is 
that it does not attempt to fudge the issues: it is 
downright abusive about the 'anecdotes' of children and 
teachers concerning their own experiences in the 
classroom. It is straightforwardly and unapologetically 
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positivist. I quote from the section entitled Educational 
Psychology:59 
We cannot rely on our independent observations 
alone. When we observe children in class or at 
play, it is deceptively easy to draw conclusions 
based on isolated incidents and to make 
gereralizations about all children from these 
incidents. This is called anecdotal evidence. It is 
sometimes helpful as a starting point for more 
systematic observations or as confirmation of a 
general principle, but anecdotes cannot serve as 
the sole criterion for making decisions about 
children's education. Instead psychologists try to 
formulate generalizations based on representative 
groups of people...or in animals where...the 
findings can be validly transferred to human 
situations. 
The only problem he sees in this - including his 
use of the word 'valid' in the case of transferring 
generalized animal behaviour to humans - is how, 'to 
convert a generalization into a form which makes it 
useful in individual cases.'60 
This lack of critical awareness amongst 
educational psychologists is not helped by some 
philosophers who heap esteem on science. Moore, for 
example,61says that while philosophers can show 'how 
value judgements may be supported' the 'assumptions made 
about children will be primarily the province of 
science.'62 Consequently he sees the need, for 
Educational Theory, of 'specialists like Piaget, Freud, 
Kohlberg and Bernstein, to give (sic) accurate up-to-date 
knowledge of what children are really like.' Not just 
that, however, for, we are also told that in order to 
make 'assumptions about the effectiveness of methods we 
need help from psychologists,(and) learning theories like 
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those of Skinner and Bruner...'63The lack of awareness 
shown in these comments of the different or even 
conflicting accounts of how children 'really are' is 
indicative enough of the inadequacy of the account. Even 
if Moore's comments were to be taken seriously we would 
still need some way of telling, from among the differing 
accounts of children, which best approximated to their 
'reality'. I wonder if Moore would consider this a matter 
for science or common sense to decide? 
1.21 	 The Process Model.  
The work on "Action-Research" by Lawrence 
Stenhouse, John Elliott and others is often considered as 
an alternative to the scientific or technico-rational 
method of research. In this section I will review some 
of what these authors have had to say on the subject and 
offer a few comments of my own. In accord with the 
introductory nature of this chapter, I will refrain from 
specific philosophical difficulties which I leave to 
other chapters. 
Since Stenhouse's work is considered an 
'alternative' to the positivist approach it comes as 
something of a surprise to read what he says. In a 
sustained section entitled 'Towards a Research 
Model'64  his main thesis is remarkably close to the 
scientific model just discussed. The main difference 
being the way in which hypotheses are arrived at: through 
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teachers' own reflections on their practice. Apart from 
this however we find that, 'research must aspire to 
situational verifiability' which involves teachers in 
'mounting a verification procedure in his own 
situation.'65 Ignoring a previous observation to the 
effect that teachers and pupils often perceive the 
situation in differing ways he adds that, 'data drawn 
from such studies...are useful (as) hard data. They are 
rooted in real situations and allow of a high degree of 
verisimilitude.' When talking of the data itself he is 
hardly, if at all, distinguishable from the positivist. 
For example he says of the 'measurement results of the 
Humanities evaluation' that 'the most robust results were 
correlated shifts on the Manchester Reading Test, The 
Mill Hill Vocabulary Test and measures of pupil self 
esteem.' In the next sentence he argues that,'the 
hypothesis that the three variables correlate' is 
explored in a 'wider setting.'66 Now, not so 
unexpectedly, we find him explaining the causes of change 
in schools in a thoroughly scientific manner: 'changes 
will take place as a function both of the experimental 
treatment and of the contextual treatment which the 
school is offering at the same time.'67 Worried by the 
variables which might influence and thereby render 
invalid the test he advocates the use of a 'battery 
which, placed alongside tests orientated on a particular 
programme, give an indication of the contextt4 al 
variables in any one setting. Well-standardized tests 
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exist which would be strong candidates for inclusion in 
such a battery.'68 In concluding, he remarks that (the 
above) is an attempt to,'integrate action and evaluation 
research into a unified research model.'69 I leave my 
comments on the evaluation side of this unity to chapter 
two. 
What then of action-research: the first stage in 
Stenhouse's programme? He says that, 'the idea is that of 
an educational science in which each classroom is a 
laboratory, each teacher a member of the scientific 
community.'70 Each teacher will have 'a research 
stance': 'a disposition to examine one's own practice 
critically and systematically.'71 However, research 
cannot take place unless the classroom is 'open'. It 
needs to be so in the sense that the teacher can both 
negotiate his role and progressively work towards a 
redefinition of it - as researcher. The necessity of this 
derives from the fact that the 'teacher needs to teach 
that definition of himself to the pupils...he makes it 
clear that the reason he is playing the role of 
researcher is to improve his teaching and make things 
better for' his pupils.72  
Thoughts such as these are fairly representative 
of those interested in action-research. In their interim 
report on the Ford Teaching Project, for example, Elliott 
and Adelman state that,73 
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The central conviction behind much of our work with 
teachers has been the importance of helping them to 
develop greater autonomy and control over their 
performance in classrooms by reflecting on the 
consequences, both intended and unintended, of 
their actions. 
However, as with Stenhouse, the links with straightfor-
ward positivist research are espoused in the later stages 
of research. Teachers make and reflect upon their 
practices but,74 
(while) action-research aims both to contribute to 
an understanding and solution of the practical 
problems faced by teachers in the classroom 
situation (it also aims to add) to the development 
of a theory of teaching. 
Teachers' reflections, they add, more revealingly, 
'contribute to the development of social science 
theory'75: it is there that the 'theory of teaching' 
is developed. 
Talk of 'theories' brings us back to the debate 
between O'Connor and Hirst and to the heart of the 
controversy. While we have seen that Hirst is openly 
opposed to an unashamedly scientific approach, a glance 
at his own notions of what good theory should be reveals 
an ambivalence not unlike that in Hazel Francis. While 
positivism is not openly espoused it is latent in his 
later work76and especially in his concern with the 
development of 'practical principles' 77derived from 
teachers' operational educational theories'.78 Unlike 
Stenhouse and Elliott he is coy about what to do with 
'operational theories'. He says, for example, at one 
point that 'educational theory...draws of course, on 
all the theoretical knowledge available in the social 
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sciences'.79 A little later, however, he says, 'it is 
the job of such disciplines as psychology, sociology and 
philosophy...to provide a context of ever more rationally 
defensible beliefs and values for the development and 
practical testing of practical principles.'80 
 The 
coyness is perhaps due to the unemphatic place given to 
the sciences: what, for example, does 'context' mean? At 
the same time Hirst does seem to be saying that the 
theoretical knowledge 'available in the sciences' has the 
last say in rationally defending practice. Why else 
does he use the word 'testing' in the context of the 
rational defense of practical principles? It is worth 
noting, in passing, that Hirst had earlier argued as 
follows: 'Explanation in terms of beliefs and values, of 
reasons as well as causes, seems to me to be logically 
necessary (for educational theory) and explanations of 
this kind do not, to my mind, fall within the pattern of 
explanation in the sciences...'81 One cannot but be 
left wondering, given the intentional nature of human 
actions, exactly what role science would play for Hirst 
in providing a rationally defensible practice. 
I should say, in conclusion, that I do think that 
there is a way of providing a rational framework for 
educational practices, but I do not think it to be the 
way of O'Connor, Stenhouse or Hirst. What that way is I 
leave to the final chapters. Before that I provide what I 
hope are some philosophical reasons for entertaining a 
degree of scepticism over the whole project of 
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understanding human beings scientifically. 
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Chapter Two.  
Experimental and Evaluational Research in Education.  
2.0 
In the first chapter the psychologist Child 
characterized the scientist's work as the 'formulation of 
generalizations.' These 'generalizations', or 
'principles', as D.J.O'Connor calls them, may then be 
used as 'systems guidance' instruments in educational 
policy implementation. In my view these two authors 
represent a tradition of scientism which conflates 
'phronesis' with 'episteme'. In order to show that this 
is a misguided and possibly fruitless enterprise I intend 
to look in more detail at what the scientists do when 
they formulate 'generalizations' and attempt to 'guide 
systems'. The first of these activities is normally 
referred to as 'experimental research' while the second 
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as 'evaluational research'. Since, however, both employ 
the same basic methodology I shall concentrate on that. 
Our first task is thus to discover what 
scientists involved in educational research say about 
their methods. I should say also, at this point, that I 
am concentrating on methods which aredescribed as 
scientific and do not wish that anything I say is seen to 
apply to other forms - many of them valid - of 
educational research. In order to find out what 
scientists mean by experimental method I have selected a 
number of textbooks on the subject.1 These, while 
chosen randomly, show a remarkable uniformity in what 
they prescribe showing both that they are fairly 
representative and also how strong the scientific 
tradition is. 
2.1 
I will begin with a comment by De Groot on the 
way in which applied research is located in the overall 
scheme and then pass on to look at the detail of the 
experimental situation and its evaluating procedures in 
order to see more closely what sort of research is 
carried out, what it hopes to gain for those to be 
educated and possibly identify some areas in which there 
may be room for philosophical assent or dissent. 
In his work on methodology Adrian De Groot 
explains the relationship between applied Human Science 
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and its theoretical background as follows:2'A theory 
together with its ramifications, insofar as these have 
been empirically worked out and tested, may be designated 
as the then available nomological network ...Such a 
network may naturally be at different stages of actual 
realization'. Ideally, it would provide 'complete' 
coverage of the area of reality with, preferably, nothing 
but positive confirmation outcomes. Such completeness is 
said to have been attained when,'the theory is confirmed 
as such by a forum of co-scientists as a system of laws.' 
He then explains just what the nomological network of a 
theory comprises: a 'theoretical model,' he says, which 
has 'purely deductive consequences...; derived hypotheses 
and predictions...and "evidence", (which is) the factual 
empirical outcome of investigative procedures.' It is the 
lower level of scientific research - the 'evidence' and 
the investigative procedures which produce it, together 
with the predictions made on the basis of it to which we 
will confine our attention in the present chapter. 
De Groot puts experimental research in its 
theoretical context. But what are the 'investigative 
procedures' which form its basis? Most of the literature 
on this subject is in considerable agreement, and that 
agreement has changed little over a twenty year period. 
Best,3for example, writing in 1959, says of an 
experiment that it: 
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involves the comparison of the effects of a 
particular treatment with that of a different 
treatment or of no treatment (in which) the 
experimental group is exposed to the influence of the 
factor under consideration; (while) the control group 
is not. Observations are then made to determine what 
difference appears...in the experimental as 
contrasted with the control group. 
In 1983 Mark Abrahamson4 writes, 
In most cases (of experimental research) there is an 
experimental group corresponding with each 
independent variable that is to be manipulated 
...subjects...are 'exposed' to the independent 
variable, (while)...in the control group they are 
treated identically except that they are not exposed 
to the independent variable. 
On the previous page he gives us an example of the sort 
of result which this type of ivestigation has produced: 
...it is commonplace to find that education, 
occupation and income are all interrelated. The 
question then becomes, which variable is independent 
(that is, cause) and which dependent (that is 
effect)? 
I will deal with the notion of cause in greater depth in 
the next chapter. For the moment, and in order to avoid 
lengthy philosophical excursions, I will add one final 
view from Verma and Beard,5who say: 
In...experimental research, through manipulating an 
experimental variable, attempts are made to determine 
how and why a particular condition or event occurs. 
This manipulation is deliberate and systematic. So, 
for any experimental study, there has to be an 
independent variable that is manipulated by the 
researcher under highly controlled conditions. 
I think we can say - without reviewing endless 
volumes - that scientists are fairly well agreed over 
what to do in an experiment. We can now, therefore, move 
on and look at some of their terms a little more closely. 
The variables are the most obvious candidates and of 
these, while many others, such as the extraneous 
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variables are mentioned, the two most important are the 
dependent and independent. Putting together what has been 
gathered from various sources, the main scheme which 
emerges might be summarized as follows: by excluding all 
conditions bar one, an observer may see any correlation 
there might be between this condition, referred to as the 
independent variable, and another referred to as the 
dependant variable. The effect, let it be stressed, is 
only observable where all other conditions are held 
constant. While this might summarise the main lines of 
agreement, it is, however, a little unfair. Firstly, 
because after Fisher's research scientists say they have 
found a way to measure the effects of multiple variables 
on a dependent variable using a technique referred to by 
Dennis Child6 - and not without a hint of admiration - 
as 'factor analysis'. Secondly, because research workers 
themselves are acutely aware of the problems inherent in 
keeping tight control over the variables. Ethical 
considerations are sometimes cited as a reason why 
perfect conditions cannot be met, but, as I argue later 
in the chapter, the problems may transcend ethics and 
point to a more obdurate, problematic subject. 
From what has been said we can now divide up the 
area of experimental research and look at the following 
items. I include the notion of validation although not 
much has been said about it above. Its importance, 
however, is simply that its procedures 'validate' the 
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experimental findings. Inasfar as this is the case they 
form an indispensable part of the experiment. I shall, of 
course, say more about what such procedures are in the 
relevant sections which are as follows: 
	
2.20 	 What are variables? 
	
2.21 	 The attempt to measure the variable. 
	
2.22 	 Units. 
	
2.23 	 Operational Definitions. 
	
2.30 	 Validation.(Internal) 
	
2.31 	 Validation.(External) 
	
2.32 	 Validation.(Repeatability) 
	
2.40 	 The notion of applied science: Engineering. 
	
2.41 	 Problems with the analogue. 
	
2.20 	 What are Variables? 
I begin with a few more details concerning the 
variable before attempting to take a philosophical 
overview of the it. Best,7 writing over twenty years 
before Verma and Beard, describes variables in virtually 
the same way. He says that they, 
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are the conditions or characteristics that the 
experimenter manipulates, controls or observes. The 
independent variables are the conditions...that (the 
experimenter) manipulates...(while)...the dependent 
variables are the conditions that appear, disappear 
or change as the experimenter introduces, removes or 
changes the independent variables. 
De Groot voices the same opinion, but adds8'that the 
variable (as operationally defined) must adequately 
represent the construct-as-intended...'. By this addition 
he brings in another factor which we will later examine. 
For the moment, let us be content to see what has been 
added. It is that the variable - which might be something 
like personality - must, in order to be quantified 
(although so much is not yet apparent) be given an 
operational definition, which must 'adequately 
represent'. This further complicates an already complex 
situation for, as Hoover points out, 'The variable 
"personality"...is reputed to have over four hundred 
definitions in the professional literature'9  the 
professional researcher having to adopt, without 
plumping, for one which is both quantifiable (a condition 
of the experiment) and is adequate (a condition of saying 
anything appropriate about its subject.) 
2.21 	 The attempt to measure the variable.  
The central feature of the experimental situation 
as we have outlined it above entails, for Abrahamson, the 
measurement of the effects of one variable, the 
independent, on another, the dependent. In order for this 
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measurement, whichl°, 'entails measures of central 
tendency (mean, median, mode) and dispersion (standard 
deviation, deciles and other percentages)', to take place 
it is crucial that other possible variables be kept 
constant. Further, 11a scale must be adopted which, 
'implies the choice of a particular mathematical model 
(in which)...the phenomena of the outside world, the real 
world, are represented in analogue.' 
This 'analogue' which Abrahamson regards as 12,  
a map of the real object system' seems to be a model 
based on, or closely related to the vector analysis of 
forces in physics. This insists that if two equal forces 
act on a point in opposite directions the point remains 
where it is. Increase one force, or alter its direction, 
and the point moves. Where it moves may be directly 
plotted mathematically without a 'real' experiment ever 
taking place. The reason is that the point's movement 
varies with the two forces in an entirely predictable 
way. The reason for the extreme predictability in 
variation in these cases is due to a number of factors. 
The first is that the forces acting in the same 
circumstances always act in the same way. The second is 
that the amount of force exerted is completely 
quantifiable. In both cases the resultant is predictable 
from the measured quantities. 
The question is whether the conditions which must 
be satisfied in order to obtain such precision obtain, 
even approximately, in educational experiments. In order 
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to gain some insight we must fistly enquire which 
conditions must be satisfied for it to be the case. 
Before we can answer this, however, we must ask just what 
it is that has to be satisfied. According to Abrahamson, 
it is the mathematical analogue of the 'real object 
system': the mathematical abstraction representing the 
statistical dependency of one variable on another. If we 
return to our vector example the equivalent would be the 
statement of real forces acting on a point in quantified 
mathematical terms. The forces, for example might be 
represented as 140 kilogrammes and 95 kilogrammes while 
the direction as a number of degrees. In this way a real 
system of forces (such as those acting on the span of a 
bridge) may be exactly replicated analogically. 
The conditions of this replication must involve, 
firstly, the nature of the material (which must be such 
that it acts in a constant way) and secondly that the 
variable must be redescribable in a way which allows for 
its exact quantification. Given these two conditions the 
interaction between two or more variables may be 
replicated analogically in mathematical terms. This is 
supported by both De Groot, who says of measuring that 
it, 'is assigning numbers to objects on the strength of 
certain empirical observations.,13  and Hoover for whom 
it is the, 'counting the units of a thing. '14In either 
case, whether 'assigning numbers' or 'counting units', 
there is the presupposition that whatever is the object 
of assignation it is the sort of object which takes 
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quantificational adjectives without provoking serious 
semantic doubts. In Human Science the objects of 
quantification are always either humans or human related 
and thus when Abrahamson says that,15'The calculation 
and interpretation of specific tests of significance and 
association are contingent upon the level of measurement 
of the variables in question' he necessarily presupposes 
that the object, the person, or group are, without 
stretching our semantic sensibilities, the proper objects 
of measurement. If he does not he admits that the 
'calculation and interpretation' of such events is 
impossible. 
2.22 	 Units.  
I move now to a more direct consideration of just 
what is entailed by the necessity of quantification. In 
the attempt to make a mathematical analogue of real world 
systems two things seem necessary and both are readily 
admitted by scientists. The first, as we have just 
mentioned, is that of maintaining some form of semantic 
equivalence. This raises questions concerning the 
possibility of appropriate operational definitions. The 
second concerns the more fundamental question about the 
attribution of numerical adjectives to some nouns. This I 
simply call the problem of units and it is to this which 
I move first. 
De Groot16 says of measurement that,'it has 
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become equivalent to mapping into an objective scale...it 
is assigning numbers to objects on the strength of 
certain empirical observations.' In order for this to 
come about there must be 'operational definitions' for 
the variables in question and units into which a scale is 
divided. In certain areas, of course, these cause no 
particular problems; those in which the objects 
themselves come in discrete units, for example: the 
number of people unemployed, the number of deaths, the 
number of children,etc. Each of these takes a number 
unproblematically as an adjective. Units for this type 
are unproblematic as well since they are the object of 
what is counted. The fact that these can so readily be 
quantified means also that operational definitions for 
them are also generally unproblematic. Such is not the 
case with much that forms the object of study in the 
educational world however since they are neither in 
readily operisationable form nor are they readily 
quantifiable. These are separate issues and I shall deal 
with them separately. 
Firstly those not obviously quantifiable. In this 
group I include all those variables which do not readily 
take a number as a predicate. For example: one 
personality, three character, six intelligence, two 
satisfied and so on. In order, however, to meet the 
criteria set out by Mark Abrahamson17, for whom as 
already noted 'The calculation and interpretation of 
specific tests' are contingent upon the level of 
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measurement' such variables as these must be treated in 
some way so that they do take a number predicate. The 
first problem then is how to make them more amenable: the 
problem of units. 
In Physics, as in the other natural sciences, 
units are arbitrarily defined. Their arbitrariness does 
not matter: we use a metre as well as a yard and there 
are rules which govern their translation. It is also 
usual for the quantities themselves to be conventional. 
This sounds strange until it is remembered that units 
such as a kilogramme, a pound, a foot,etc all have no 
other meaning than the one we give to them and define for 
them. Let us look at the yard.18 
We need to ask what being a unit presupposes. 
Certainly, something's being a yard long does not 
presuppose its being a stick or a piece of metal - for a 
yard can be defined and reproduced as either. It would 
seem therefore that straightforward material things are 
not necessary conditions of being a yard: it can be a 
particular wavelength. Detection of wavelengths however 
does seem to presuppose, for us, some more material 
things: oscilloscopes and the like. In a sense we could 
say that being a yard presupposes a universe with size: 
something we can measure, define and reproduce. 
Then again, if we said a yard was such and such a 
length - defining it, say, as the length of a piece of 
wood - and then proceeded to give directions for building 
a house with a different length piece of wood, or wood of 
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differing lengths - calling them all yards, we should 
simply reject the notion of a unit and give up the 
building. 
Here then we have a number of notions all of 
which seem to be important to being a yard. The first is 
that it is reproducible as the same length in some 
'substance'. The second is that it must perform a 
function in a wider system - such as building a house - 
and be, in the context of that system, adequate to the 
job. 
The project envisaged by a human science demands 
that its variables are quantified in such a way that they 
meet the two criteria outlined above: their units must be 
reproducible and must function in a wider system. The 
question is whether human science can claim this. 
Typically the variables are described as some form of 
action, intention or state: lazy, motivated to learn or 
disadvantaged for example. These or variables like them 
are tested to see whether there is a significant 
relationship between them expressed by their repeated 
correlation in the experiment. High correlations are 
expressed as high percentages or decimals approaching 1. 
Now, reverting to our vectors, if it is found 
that a force of one hundred pounds pulls a weight a 
distance of ten yards against an opposing force of fifty 
pounds,I can verify this by repeating the experiment as 
much as I like. If the variation in distance pulled is 
1/100th of a yard, I explain this by the slight variation 
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in conditions (temperature affecting friction etc) and I 
can express this variation as a percentage over a given 
number of pulls. In the above experiment, if the 
deviation of 1/100 was constant, I can say that it was 
0.01. I might want to add that, given the minor changes 
in temperature, this was of no or little significance. 
Further, if I wish, I can subject the experiment to a 
'validating' procedure by applying the two criteria 
outlined above. I can, that is, 'reproduce' the forces in 
a different scale and substance and try again. Providing 
I change my scale in a consistent way - e.g. tonnes for 
pounds and steel rope for twine - I can expect the 
mathematical relationships expressed to remain relatively 
constant. This would also be the case in a wider but less 
predictable system where a team of horses were expected 
to pull a tractor out of some mud. In principle, the 
forces - and the possibility - could be calculated before 
the horses ever start to pull. 
Whether the 'paradigm' holds across intentional, 
social or psychological states, of course, is the crux of 
the present problem. For Abrahamson19 it must do so. 
The 'must' implied here however needs qualification: it 
'must' if the mathematical analogue of human 
interaction is to be 'mapped'. If is pivotal however, 
for if the paradigm does not cross over then no such 
analogue is possible. The question thus becomes: 'Do 
ordinary purposive and intentional descriptions of human 
actions and states take descriptions which are 
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transferable to other 'substances' and are the 
interactions observed between them such that they will be 
transferable to and useful in other systems?' 
One simple answer is that they obviously do not: 
that is why human scientists ask for such intention-
alistic descriptions to be 'operationalized'. This raises 
further questions of synonomy which I shall look at in 
the next section. For the moment, let us deny the 
scientist the luxury of translation. The scenario the 
scientist is faced with is the measurement of certain 
aspects of the person or society without recourse to more 
obviously quantifiable 'equivalents'. This denies him or 
her the possibility of atomistic tendencies such as 
analysing a term such as personality into its 
'constituents' such as extrovert - which is again 
'analysed' as a willingness to lead groups, not minding 
what others think and so on. Notice that the last group 
are much more amenable to numerical qualification than 
the original. It is the original 'holistic' description 
which presents the problem for while a willingness to 
lead is transferable across people,a personality is not: 
at least the idea causes some resistance. Why is this so 
- if a person is extrovert why is his personality not 
'the same' as another extrovert? The answer seems obvious 
enough: extroverts vary in their extroversions. But, if 
this is so, two things seem to follow: (i) analysis, even 
in terms of 'typical' tendencies, seems hollow and 
(ii) transference of the original description is simply 
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wrong - there being simply too many 'types' of behaviour 
associated with each. 
What then of units? The conclusion is that while 
it is feasible to say that a particular person takes the 
lead in eight out of ten situations and is therefore 
likely to take the lead in other situations it is not 
possible to quantify in a similar way for many of the 
ways we have of describing people. We cannot, for 
example, without semantic abuse assign numerical values 
straightforwardly to terms such as personality, 
character, courage, virtue and so on. This is also the 
case for social descriptions such as volatile, harmonious 
and so on. This is why there is a need for operational 
definitions. That need is indicative enough of the force 
of my point. What then of such 'definitions'? 
2.23 	 Operational Definitions.  
Having outlined some of the problems concerning 
the use of units we are now in a better position to see 
just how that problem leads into the field of 'operation-
alized' - or 'transferred' deinitions. 
It should be recalled that for Abrahamson it is a 
necessary condition of measuring the effect of one or 
more variable on another that they be quantified. I have 
suggested that this entails some sort of unit, it also 
presupposes that these are the same across substances and 
useful in some system. I have tried to show that for some 
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central descriptions of ourselves neither condition is 
met: personality, for example, cannot pass in an 
unqualified way across individuals nor is it useful to 
say, per impossible, that people with the 'same' 
personality will behave in predictably similar ways in 
the future. What is now left to show is that the attempt 
to make the project possible - by 'operationalizing' such 
descriptions - is nothing more than changing the topic: 
that is why some have said that intelligence tests 
measure what intelligence tests measure. Obviously the 
crux of this argument hinges on a semantic point. Before 
I go into that however let us see what researchers say on 
the topic. Best indicates that he sees it as a tool for 
making 'vague' variables observable. De Groot, in his 
more thorough exposition, expands this to spell out in 
fair detail exactly what this entails. I quote at length 
to give the full flavour of his thought20: 
whenever a concept or construct is to be used in an 
empirical investigation, a minimum of empirical 
specification is needed...this boundary line must be 
marked clearly enough to enable the investigator to 
discriminate - objectively, adequately and with 
sufficient reliability between A and non A; e.g. 
between boys and girls, intelligent and non 
intelligent children, social groups and collections 
of people not to be included in the construct group, 
democratic and non democratic formswf government 
etc. Frequently a graded scale willLdrawn up to 
'measure' intelligence quotient, price index etc. To 
these ends are needed one or more empirical 
specification statements providing an objective 
instruction on how to proceed in given empirical 
cases, so as to effect the distinction between A and 
non A, or between different scale values...the 
instruction then specifies the operations to be 
carried out...to determine the...'value' of the 
variable. Thus in a psychological investigation, for 
instance, the concept 'intelligence' is empirically 
specified by the set of instructions for the 
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operations of administering and scoring test X, 
calculating the IQ, and possibly classing the subject 
under 'high' or 'low' intelligence ...such a set of 
instructions defines the concept. A definition on 
this basis is called an operational definition. 
There are a number of important aspects to this 
process. The philosopher has to keep in mind that while 
the end result of the experiment is supposed to relate 
two variables what has in fact been measured are their 
operationalized translations. In order to bring this out 
more clearly consider the actual operationalization of 
the word 'alienation' as carried out by Seemen. 
Abrahamson sees it as, 'a good example' of Factor 
Analysis.21  In the first step Seeman divides the 
concept into four 'subconcepts' viz:22  
1 Isolation from others. 
2 Powerlessness in the face of world events. 
3 Normlessness,or nonadherence to conventional 
procedures. 
4 Meaninglessness,a sense of confusion and uncertainty. 
Following this initial division of alienation a number of 
further steps are needed before it is observable in 
discrete items however. In the next step, Seeman says, 
...it is necessary to develop items which will 
operationally define each of the subconcepts...the 
degree to which an item indicates the underlying 
dimension is expressed by a factor loading. (This) 
expresses the degree to which a factor, or dimension, 
explains the variance in that item. The final 
step...involves developing a composite index for each 
dimension. 
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These 'final steps' have been 'worked out' by Zellor, 
Neal and Groat,23 whose analysis of the 'normlessness' 
dimension is indicated by the positive replies given by 
candidates to the following statements. (Listed under 
Item). 
Item 	 Factor loading 
1. In order to get elected ...a candidate 
must make promises he does not intend to 
keep. 
2. Those running our government must hush 
up many things if they wish to stay in 
power. 
3. Having 'pull' is more important than 
ability in getting a government job. 
4. Those elected...have to serve special 
interests as well as the public's interest. 
0.63 
0.51 
0.49 
0.32 
Now it is not my intention to get entangled in 
the problems of factor analysis itself. The point I wish 
to stress is the way in which a word, alienation, is 
taken, divided into four 'subconcepts', and then 
'operationalised' into 'items' which are both observable 
and quantifiable. Further, they are 'weighted' against 
each other; number one, for example, carrying twice the 
'weight' of number four. 
We began by noting that equivalence of meaning 
must be preserved if the test or experiment is to say 
something about the 'real object system' which it 
measures in pre-operationalised and post-operationalised 
form if it is to conclude with as much confidence as 
J.Asher does when speaking of intelligence tests:24  
'Intelligence is what all valid intelligence tests 
measure.' The notion of validity hangs on equivalence of 
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meaning. Alienation therefore must mean in part that 
people are cynical about the way in which others get 
government jobs, it must mean that those who are not 
cynical about how government jobs are got (given its 
'factor loading') are, to that degree, not alienated. In 
fact the complete meaning of 'alienation' must be 
exhausted in a complete list of the items constitutive of 
the four dimensions of it. Yet isolation and powerless-
ness need have nothing to do with alienation, whatever 
their operationalised 'items'. Irish monks and St. 
Augustine were 'isolated' as are Faroe islanders and 
astronauts. Yet Irish monks were not alienated, Faroe 
islanders not cynics, astronauts not without power and St 
Augustine not without norms. On the other hand this may 
be unfair; perhaps those who are alienated need all the 
subconcepts and items to qualify. So, for example, since 
monks may be isolated but not without norms they need not 
be alienated. Who then are alienated ? The answer can 
only be: 'Those who satisfy the whole list of 
conditions.' They must be Cynical, Normless, Isolated and 
Powerless people who also find life meaningless. If one 
were to be discovered however, and this point is more 
serious, would they be described as alienated ? I think 
not; seriously depressed perhaps but not necessarily 
alienated. A king may be alienated from his people by not 
caring for them, yet not lack power or friends. A 
worker, according to Marx, may be alienated yet not lack 
power, norms or comrades. Man may be alienated from 
himself, or God and meet none of the conditions laid 
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down. So, at least in one case, it seems that the 
condition of semantic equivalence is not at all met. The 
definition is merely stipulative and no guide as to who 
are alienated, nor to how they would act. Consequently 
the test is invalid. 
Is this an isolated case? In order to make a more 
general point something else needs to be said about 
intelligence, personality, self esteem, character and so 
on to show that there are other reasons why these sorts 
of terms cannot, in principle be 'operationalised' in a 
way which preserves meaning. In order to look for this we 
need to outline two types of theories of meaning. We need 
not, for our purposes, show that one or the other is 
better. Two widely held theories are (a) that meaning is 
given by truth conditions which are verification 
transcendent and (b) that meaning is given in use. The 
first stresses context independence, the second,, context 
dependence. On the grounds of the latter it is easy to 
see why a term cannot be operationalised in the required 
way. It lacks both context, use and, consequently, sense. 
This seems to be the problem with alienation: the 
word takes a meaning in a context such as 'Black South 
Africans are alienated from their political rights by a 
repressive white regime.' ( Yet they are not 'isolated', 
'lack norms' nor do they find life meaningless.) Without 
such a context, words hang in a vacuum, no sense being 
attributable to them. The same is true of 'intelligence'. 
We say, 'He used his intelligence to solve the problem' 
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without inferring that 'Intelligence' is a thing, that it 
has quantifiable characteristics or that it is 
independent of contextual factors. And here, there is 
also a further problem: the reification of the object. 
This problem raises pertinent questions in the other 
theory of meaning mentioned: for according to this theory 
the word 'intelligence', to be meaningful, must be true 
in terms of its truth conditions. If, however, it is true 
that intelligence is what is measured by intelligence 
tests then intelligence is an ability - the ability to 
perform well at intelligence tests. What this shows 
in terms of truth conditions is just what the cynics say: 
intelligence tests measure what intelligence tests 
measure. If, on the other hand, intelligence is a 
structural feature of the neurological system then the 
ability to perform in intelligence tests must be shown to 
have the same truth conditions as that structural 
element. This identification between performances and 
states will take up a considerable part of the next 
chapter so I will postpone comment on it at this point. 
There are, however, two points which need to be 
stressed in conclusion. The first is that the 
quantification of variables requires, because of 
intransigent features of many ordinary descriptions, a 
translation into descriptions which are more amenable to 
taking number predicates. Consequently whatever is 
measured, in the end, is not exactly what was of interest 
in the first place. Secondly, if what is measured is to 
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'correspond' to what there is in the 'real world system' 
it must be shown to be so by rigorous semantic argument 
and not, as is the case with the term alienation, merely 
concocted to allow the 'experiment' to take place. 
2.30 	 Validation Procedures: Internal.  
If there were no problems with the measurement of 
variables we might have been able to conclude that an 
experiment could be carried out. Even if this were so, 
however, scientists stipulate a further demand on the 
testing procedure. This extra element is usually referred 
to as validity testing. Normally there are three forms of 
it. 
I start with the first: Internal Validity. This, 
according to Best25, is achieved when, 'the factors 
that have actually been modified actually have a 
systematic effect...and...when all extraneous factors are 
excluded.' In other words when it has been concluded that 
it is the independent variable that systematically 
affects the dependent, and not some other cause. I want 
to ask a simple sounding question concerning the 
possibility of altering the independent variable while 
all other 'extraneous' variables which might otherwise 
affect the dependent are excluded. I shall argue that it 
cannot be isolated from its context in the way required 
and that therefore internal validity is at most an 
unobtainable goal limited to all but the simplest 
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experiments. The reason for this is to be found in the 
nature of the variables themselves. We are not dealing 
with inanimate objects but human beings. Variables 
include people's personality, environment, political 
views, class, intelligence, self-esteem, ability to cope, 
teaching technique, classroom efficiency, race, 
character, gender, self-view, gender and so on. The 
experiment demands that one of these, or a combination, 
if we believe in factor analysis, is isolated from other 
possibly influential variables so that it alone accounts 
for a change which is systematically observed in the 
dependent. This brings up the problem of repeatability, 
which we will examine later. There are, I contend, 
problems related to the nature of the 'extraneous' 
itself, for everything which may be called historical 
context might arguably be included. The problem then can 
be stated like this: to what degree is it possible to 
exclude factors 'external' to variables under experiment 
so that we are 
	 in a position to state 
categorically that they are not operating as extraneous 
factors? A few examples should suffice to show the 
enormity of the problem. If, for example, what is being 
looked at are the effects of a particular type of 
teaching method on children's attitudes or learning, how 
are such factors as particular teachers personalities, 
the social and hereditary background of the teaching 
group, the weather, the previous relationships and 
experiences of the class and so on, to be held either 
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constant or in such a state that they have no 'effect'? 
In this type of situation the real rift between the human 
and natural sciences is at its most clear. The physicist 
does not need to worry about the feelings of molecules 
towards the tin can that contains them: they hit it all 
the same. Human 'molecules', however, may take certain 
'extraneous' parts of their context as relevant and react 
to it in a quite unpredictable way. 'Unpredictable', 
however, not in a sense which may be allowed for by 
making 'technical' adjustments but in another, far more 
difficult sense; a sense in which it is always 
undecidable what aspects of a context will, on any given 
occasion, be relevant to what people do. A child might 
succeed in a class using a particular teaching method 
because he liked the teacher. 'Liking a teacher' thus 
becomes an extraneous factor. What must the researcher do 
to ensure that the observed effects are systematically 
related to the teaching method ? In this case, it seems, 
he must control the likes and dislikes of the children 
under observation. To do this he must first find out why 
they did well. Then, if he finds that one did so 'because 
I liked the teacher' he must exclude the child. There is 
something logically fishy about this however, for only 
after 'doing well' is the child isolated. In order to 
counter this the researcher must exclude all children 
from a proposed experiment who are going to be influenced 
by factors other than the teaching method. These might 
include whether they will have a cold, whether they are 
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going to like the teacher and so on. In other words a 
condition of excluding extraneous variables and ensuring 
internal validity of an experiment is that prior to the 
test situation the extraneous variables are identified 
and excluded. A further condition, which involves the 
procedure by which such extraneous variables are 
identified, makes the situation more complicated, 
however, for in order to know what affected the children 
in the experiment, the experiment must have taken place. 
A presupposition of internal validity is thus either 
foreknowledge, which is, at best, difficult to obtain, or 
time reversal which is, at present, impossible. 
2.31 	 External Validity.  
Having established internal validity, the 
scientist must, Best insists, 'also determine whether the 
systematic relationships that have been identified, 
isolated and measured can be generalized - used to 
predict relationships outside the experimental setting. 
The extent to which this goal is attained is a measure of 
the external validity.'26If we assume that some degree 
of correlation has been found and that an experiment is 
internally valid we are further exhorted to test the 
validity 'outside the experimental setting.' A simple 
example of this sort of procedure in an educational 
context would be one in which a particular teaching 
method had been found to produce high levels of 
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achievement and was subequently tested in more schools to 
see its more general application. External validity in 
this context would be satisfied if the higher levels of 
achievement were reached in the other schools. In this 
way the method can be used to predict future performance 
to within certain limits. It will be noted that we have 
now moved away from a strict experimental situation to 
one in which all the parameters have been loosened. Gone 
are the controls on external factors, gone too the 
careful manipulation of the variables. Thus, to an 
extent, no real comparison is possible. The 'outside' 
does not, or need not, resemble the experimental 
situation at all as is implied by the notion of 
'generality' envisaged. Validity in this context is 
therefore I suggest a very weak term carrying little, if 
any, weight at all and doing very little work as far as 
the experiment is concerned. Any teacher knows, for 
example, that one method may work with one class and not 
another. Spread evenly across different classes, 
therefore, one can expect a certain amount of improvement 
in some classes, none at all in others and a backward 
step in others. One might wish to translate these 
findings mathematically and calculate some increase or 
decrease against some standard, but I am not sure what it 
would show. Scientists themselves have voiced these 
doubts as well as others. De Groot cites personnel 
selection as an example. He says,27'If it is attempted 
to solve this problem (of selecting suitable personnel) 
- 75 - 
by advance personnel selection, a valid predictor must be 
found, e.g.,an aptitude test.' The problem however is 
with the 'criterion of validity'. De Groot gives an 
example of the problem. Briefly, it involves an 
independent test to validate the accuracy of Carbon 14 
dating. The independent criterion is the age as given by 
historical experts who have agreed upon an exact date for 
a particular object. The question thus becomes how well 
the C14 method will agree. It is supposed that it agrees, 
but, De Groot asks, with what has it agreed ? It cannot 
be assumed that the historians who set the criterion are 
correct. Indeed, as is in fact the case, the accepted 
criterion today is the C14 test. What 'validates' on one 
occasion may, at some later date, be the subject of 
validation. This reversal, De Groot reports, is a common 
phenomenon as in the case of intelligence and neuroticism 
tests. In the same way the outcome of a prediction needs 
an external test. In the case of personnel selection, 
perhaps, these would be the report of colleagues, 
managers and so on. However, the criteria they set would 
parallel that of the historical experts, their ability to 
judge being limited to a certain amount of time. There is 
a sense therefore in which external validity is self-
validating or self-invalidating since both standards of 
validity internal to it and external to it are no better 
and no worse than each other. There is therefore no 
'independent' standard of external validity. 
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2.32 	 Repeatability as a condition of validity.  
IS De Groot, says that 'empirically, one can 
determine the accuracy of a measurement only by repeating 
it a number of times.' 
This brings problems of its own however: mostly 
turning on the problematical way, absent in the physical 
sciences, in which experiments can be said to have been 
repeated at all. The notion of repeatable, for example, 
entails the sameness of that which is to be repeated. 
Similarly the repeats must occur in the same conditions. 
In either case the human scientist faces philosophical 
problems. The first concerns the identity criteria by 
which two or more human events are said to be the same. 
The second, points at the possibility of historical 
conditions being the same. To take the first. Actions, 
even those recorded under experimental conditions, are 
governed by criteria which are either not available to 
the scientist or part of the 'environment' in which it is 
performed. In neither case (in the former I am thinking 
of intentions which, in the absence of a means of 
checking, are always liable to some degree of 
interpretation) is all the necessary data unambiguously 
observable. 
In the second place actions which have identical 
physical movements may be quite different given the 
indefinite ways in which contexts and intentions enter 
into there descriptions. If the scientist observes A at 
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time t doing x, and again at time ti, how does he know 
whether the conditions are the same? The quick answer is 
that he does not know unless they are either specified or 
controlled. But by what criteria, other than an arbitrary 
one can he specify, from the total historical context, 
which particular circumstances are relevant to A's act? 
By what manipulation does he control the historical 
circumstances? Does the observer presuppose a knowledge 
of which historical conditions are pertinent for each 
individual in the experiment, and if not how are the 
conditions to be held constant known to be conditions? In 
the absence of such knowledge or such control how are 
conditions supposed to be held constant? 
These points are not meant to be conclusive: nor 
be 
will they taken to be. I will not continue with them at 
this juncture, however, because they receive greater 
attention in the following chapter. The points made 
there, however, may be seen as pertinent to this aspect 
of validation. 
2.40 
Engineering as a paradigm of applied human science.  
In the final section of the present chapter I hope 
to indicate some of the difficulties which are inherent 
in the second aspect of the scientistic enterprise which 
hopes that some of the 'knowledge' gained through 
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experimentation is useful in 'guiding systems' - or 
practice as we might prefer. While this aspect might be 
treated by itself it is interesting to note that it is 
very similar indeed to 'external validation' in the sense 
that what is presumed to have been gained 
epistemologically from the experiment is actuated in 
other contexts. The main difference is merely the context 
of testing. In engineering the 'tests' have presumably 
been completed satisfactorily: what is left is to control 
the environment on the basis of the findings. 
Since I think it would be a nonsense to use a 
word like 'engineering' and then talk of some way of 
systematically 'mapping' experimental findings onto a 
real world which bore no relation to the systems 
developed within the natural applications of 
'engineering', I will assume that these are what is 
intended by authors such as O'Connor and Popper. Because 
of this I shall start (2.41-1) by a consideration of a 
purely, I hope, physical type of engineering problem. I 
shall then, as with my use of vector analysis, above, 
attempt to see whether such a system is useful or 
applicable in the human contexts one would find in 
educational situations. Before that, let us remind 
ourselves, briefly, of what O'Connor recommends. 
O'Connor's sentiments and expectations of 
engineering (see 1.11) comes close to that expressed by 
R.J.Smith, quoted from Asher's work on educational 
research:29 
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Education's purposes are comparable, particularly in 
research functions, to other applied fields such as 
engineering. According to Smith 'Engineering is the 
professional art of applying science to the efficient 
conversion of natural resources to the benefit of 
man.' Educational research is the professional art of 
applying science to the efficient use of man's inner 
resources as well as for his educational benefit. 
Asher suggests, for example,30 that, 'there is no 
reason why a satisfactory scientific background to 
education should not enable us to bring about those 
educational outcomes which are accepted as desirable in a 
given community.' An optimism which he thinks is 
supported by such factors as the undoubted fact that 
'the growing points of medical knowledge lie largely in 
pure science...'. There are no factors, apparently, to 
give rise to any suspicion that their might be reasons 
why this analogue might prove inappropriate. On the 
contrary, the idea is grasped as a solution - by O'Connor 
- to an inefficient use of resources for since, 'the 
practice of education may be compared with the practice 
of medicine or engineering...(and)...engineering consists 
almost entirely of the use of scientific knowledge in 
determining efficient means to agreed ends'31  so 
educational ends, set by the community are most 
appropriately and efficiently achieved by applied 
educational theory conceived as science. I argue in the 
next section that the analogy does not hold and the 
optimism is misplaced. 
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2.41 	 Problems with the analogue.  
Let us look at the notion of engineering 
contained in O'Connor's account of applied science. 
Imagine the following situation. A crane has to lift a 40 
tonne piece of concrete and place it at the bottom of a 
deep hole to act as the foundation for a tower. The crane 
can lift 80 tonnes vertically, but when the 'arm' is at 
45 degrees, it can only lift 25 tonnes. The piece of 
concrete we have needs to be lowered into a hole twenty 
yards from the crane. The question an engineer is faced 
with is whether the crane will topple as the arm is 
lowered, a question which entails calculating the degree 
to which the arm needs to be lowered in order to drop the 
concrete twenty yards away. Without performing the 
calculation, let us briefly follow the steps required. 
Firstly there are two parameters, (a) maximum vertical 
lift (i.e 0 degrees) = 80tonnes, (b)Maximum lift at 45 
degrees = 25tonnes. Somewhere between these two is the 
maximum angle for a weight of 40 tonnes. The question is 
the angle demanded by twenty yards. This can easily be 
worked out knowing the height of the crane, the top of 
which follows an arc as it moves out. Let us say that it 
comes to 30 degrees. The next question is therefore what 
is the maximum lift at 30 degrees. This can be calculated 
using a graph in which the x axis records the angle, 
while the y axis records the maximum weight. 
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The graph shows the approximate points between 0 
degrees of crane 'outswing' and 80 degrees at 
which the crane will overbalance. It shows 
that the when the crane swings out to 30 
degrees the maximum weight it will 
carry is in the region of 32 tonnes. 
Thus it will not carry 40 tonnes at 
the required angle. 
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In performing this small exercise - which is not 
important in itself - I hope to gather together some of 
the principles of mechanical engineering. Firstly, the 
whole idea of transporting a piece of concrete to a hole 
twenty yards away using a crane was 'mathematicized'. In 
order to do this we needed certain pieces of information 
about the crane: its height, and its weight carrying 
characteristics. We also needed to know what was being 
asked of the crane, and then we were able to see if this 
came within the limits of the cranes possibilities. We 
found that it did not and make the practical conclusion 
that this crane will not do the job. In a practical 
situation what we have shown will be enough information 
to let an engineer know that he needs to order a larger 
crane. 
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O'Connor sees the relationship between scientific 
research and educational practice in terms of 
engineering. Let us therefore see what this entails, (a) 
in our example and (b) in the human context. 
(a) I shall ask what are the necessary conditions 
which enable the engineer to conclude that he needs a 
larger crane. Put more simply, how does he know that the 
crane will fall over if it carries 40 tonnes to a 
distance of twenty yards from the crane. One answer, is 
that he knows because he has just confirmed our 
calculations. What therefore, must be the case,(i) in 
order for mathematicization of a system to occur and (ii) 
for the analogue to act as a predictor in a real system? 
Taking (i) first, let us consider some situations in 
which it would not - in order to see what differential 
criteria are involved. To begin, let us imagine that the 
system of weights for cranes was not that for concrete. 
Twenty tonnes for a crane was not equal to twenty tonnes 
of concrete nor is there any way of directly translating 
one system into the other because the weight of concrete 
lumps was decided by a throwing contest by giants. The 
ones which the giants threw furthest were the lightest, 
and those they could not throw far, the heaviest. There 
were, however, different sized giants and this has no 
effect on the weighting system, even though some can 
throui much further than others. Given this, our 
engineer could not make a mathematical analogue of the 
problem. This could be characterized as a problem of 
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variable units. Secondly we might enquire about the 
material out of which the crane was constructed. Suppose 
that because of a completely unknown property of the 
material, its breaking point varied unsystematically so 
that on one day it could support virtually any weight, 
while on another, it snapped quite easily. Again, our 
engineer would be at a loss. This could be characterized 
as the problem of variable material. Suppose, lastly, 
that a general law which normally held was given to 
sudden an unexplained lapses. Take the law, for example, 
of angular momentum. As a mass moves further from its 
pivot its potential angular momentum increases: 
0 	 10 	 20 	 30 feet 
pivot xgm xgm xgm 
So that, for example, at 10 feet, x grammes has a 
potential angular momentum of 20 units. At 20 feet this 
increases to 40 units and at 30 feet to 80 units. This 
law is presupposed by the mathematics we used earlier. 
But, in our imaginary situation, it holds according to a 
random feature which we cannot explain. Here again, the 
engineer's attempts to mathematicize are thwarted. This 
could be characterized as the problem of undependable 
laws. In asking for circumstances under which a 
mathematical analogue could not be made we have provided 
conditions necessary to its holding. Briefly, invariable 
units, predictable material and dependable laws. 
We shall, I think, touch on all three of these 
'unpredictable' aspects in the next chapter and so I 
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will not labour the consequences they have for human 
science at this juncture. I shall, instead, content 
myself with a few, perhaps, introductory thoughts on 
their implications for the use of engineering as a means 
of policy implementation. 
(b) Since O'Connor sees engineering as the 
paradigm method of implementing educational policies 
those methods must in some sense parallel our example of 
the crane, and, further, they must have similar necessary 
conditions. It will be my contention that these 
conditions cannot be met and that therefore the notion of 
engineering, even if there were no problem with the 
sciences which he mentions, is inadequate to the task he 
sets for it: the formulation of practical policies and an 
efficient means of establishing them. 
We could leave the onus on those wishing to 
support this view to provide grounds on which it is 
acceptable to utilize the idea of engineering to human 
situations. There are, however, a number of points to be 
made before this. Firstly any defence must entail a 
dehumanized anthropology since it must consist in showing 
that humans act in ways which are invariable to a degree 
which allows for specifiable and quantifiable units (we 
have already questioned these) to be allocated. Yet this 
seems to fly in the face of experience - it being 
commonly accepted, for example, that toleration to pain 
varies considerably; factors affecting motivation vary 
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from individual to individual; what counts as an 
achievement for one need not be for another and so on. 
All this points to the absence of any parallel means of 
allocating units between the human and the natural 
sciences. This is because of the problem of variable 
units. The same applies to the material, which unlike the 
steel of the crane is not given to precise description 
whether in terms of flexibility, breaking point or 
structural characteristics. When our imaginary engineer 
calculated the weight the crane would carry, it was not 
part of his assumptions that it might not. It either, 
because of our knowledge of steel, will, or will not 
carry a certain weight. A hint of bivalency informs our 
expectations of the natural world. No such hint is 
apparent in our expectations of each other, however. Such 
assertions as, 'He can lift 160 kilogrammes but he cannot 
lift 180 kilogrammes' are usually 'softened' by comments 
such as, 'Well, not in his present form' or, 'At least 
not until he puts his mind to it'. The 'material' of the 
human being simply does not have the analogous nature it 
must have in order to make the notion of engineering 
plausible. Least of all when it comes to the laws which 
must be assumed in order for mathematecization to be 
carried out. Since most human scientists argue that the 
basis of research is empirical, it is for them to bring 
forward one law of human behaviour under which another 
action may be subsumed and hence explained. The 
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empiricist demand has not been met by empiricists and 
consequently the third condition of engineering in not 
met. Nor is it ever likely to be met, for such a law must 
hold counterfactually. While this condition holds, any 
general statement concerning human behaviour which 
purports to have the status of a law must prove itself to 
hold, given the circumstances, in any possible world. 
That any law holds in any posssible world is a 
metaphysical thesis. Of the scientists who have tried to 
show that the laws of physics hold throughout the 
universe only Einstein seems to have come close to a 
theory in which they do. Yet even he agrees that in the 
'singularity'31it would be quite impossible to give a 
definite answer to the question as to whether the laws of 
physics still hold. 
Far from the physics of the singularity, however, 
lawlike human behaviour seems to give out in rather more 
mundane situations such as sensory deprivation, extreme 
pain, anxiety, stress, love, fear and so on. In case the 
rejoinder is that these cases can be cited, proves the 
opposite case, let me add that just where, on the scale, 
people go mad, give in, commit suicide, fall head over 
heels, run away or take arms and fight against a sea of 
troubles cannot be stated. Nor, as O'Connor wrongly 
assumes, can they be predicted, for a condition of 
prediction is that certain features remain constant and 
it is just those features which resemble the weights 
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assigned by a nation of giants quantifying concrete in a 
throwing competition. 
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variables) can be seen as representing constructs of a 
causal or fundamentally structural nature'. Best (p92) 
explains that, 'factor analysis is used for dealing with 
more than one variable and is associated with R.A.Fisher 
whose concept of achieving pre-experimental equations of 
conditions...and his concepts of analysis of variance 
and...covarience...made possible the study of complex 
interactions through factorial designs in which the 
influence of more than one independent variable upon more 
than one dependent variable could be observed.' See also 
Ando, Fisher and Simon. 'Essays on the structure of 
social science models', MIT, 1963. 
(22) Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation", in the 
'American Social Review', No. 24, 1959. p48. 
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(27) De Groot, op cit, p249-51. 
(28) ibid, p246. 
(29) Asher, op cit, p7. 
(30) ibid, p7. 
(31) See 1.11 
(32) The 'Singularity' is a term of art used by 
cosmologists to refer to the theoretical single object 
which pre-existed the big bang. The problem it poses for 
physics concerns whether or not the 'laws' of physics 
operating in the present universe were the same as those 
in the singularity. 
Chapter Three.  
3.0 	 The Attempt to Establish Nomological Laws.  
The Positivist typically claims to establish 
connections of a causal type which constantly conjoin a 
set of antecedent conditions with another set of events 
which, when experimental data has confirmed the constancy 
of the conjunctions, are said to be effects of the 
former. When experimental findings are such that a firm 
relation between the antecedent set and the set said to 
be the effect is established then their relationship is 
said to be governed by a law. The verification (or 
falsification) of such laws (framed initially as 
hypotheses) are enough (following Hume) to satisfy the 
positivist in as far as causality is concerned. (Though 
attempts are made to fit newly discovered laws with other 
ones to form a theory of events which is explanatory of 
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them.) 
Although I have outlined the methodological types 
generally recommended for research in education I have 
not, as yet, said much about the possibility of 
validating laws of human behaviour which the positivist 
expects to discover. Since this is a very large topic in 
itself, and since it is implicitly central to the thesis 
we are opposing (the thesis which D.J.O'Connor put 
forward as outlined in chapter one) I have devoted the 
third chapter to an examination, far from adequate, of 
the issues raised by the notion that one can subsume 
human activity under laws. My main concerns will not be 
with the notion of law itself - for I am going along with 
the positivists in their acceptance of Hume's formulation 
outlined in the first paragraph - but with the 
possibility of formulating a hypothesis which when tested 
under the experimental conditions prescribed in Chapter 
Two has a chance of verifying a law. 
The central theme of the present chapter is how 
might a (hypothetical) educational scientist defend the 
notion of a hypothesis which contains the assumption that 
there is a causal relationship between two sets of human 
events? I shall assume that whatever sentence formulates 
the hypothesis,the hypothesis is testable and that a 
condition of testability is that some observable 
event(s)/change(s) in events occur. It will also be seen 
that on the whole I shall deal with arguments which would 
normally fall within the province of psychology. This 
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restriction is purely (again) one of space. I do not 
think that sociology or economics escape the kind of 
arguments I shall be putting forward - the multiplicity 
of individuals with which they are concerned tend to 
exacerbate rather than ameliorate the difficulties. This 
is especially true where the 'unity of science' programme 
attempts to 'reduce' the social sciences to the 
psychological - and these to the physical. 
The chapter attempts to present arguments to show 
that whatever defence the hypothetical educational 
scientist might make that these are either fraught with 
difficulties which need to be met or that they are 
unsustainable. As stated earlier thepositivist views 
sets of non-accidentally conjoined events as constituting 
laws. These laws are causal in nature and are said to 
obtain between discrete, contingently related sets of 
events. This appears to give the scientist four options 
in setting out his hypothesis. He might attempt to 
formulate it in terms of (i) Mental events causing mental 
events (ii) Mental events causing physical events (iii) 
Physical events causing mental events and (iv) Physical 
events causing physical events. 
In order to keep the chapter as brief and to the 
point as much as possible I shall not discuss what is 
meant by event or whether the categories 'mental' and 
'physical' are the most appropriate. This is simply 
pragmatic because of the potential proliferation of 
problems inherent in these areas. Nor shall I discuss (i) 
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and (iii): (i) because it has not played a significant 
part in educational research and in areas where it has 
(as, for example where one thought causes another and 
leads to a chain of thoughts) it is uncontroversial; 
(iii) since it is generally agreed that physical things 
such as drugs, do causally effect mental events and that 
they do so in various ways from LSD hallucinations to 
concussion after a fall. I freely admit that there are 
borderline cases such as the connection between lead 
poisoning and academic performance or a lack of vitamins 
and concentration. Research in these areas seems to be 
possible although rendered difficult because of the 
intentional features encapsulated in the mental effects. 
Even omitting these, the remaining two 
relationships generate a surprisingly wide variety of 
problems and positions. I shall try therefore to tie down 
the number of possible moves open to the advocate of 
positive educational research in as simple a way as 
possible. Basically there are two broad options: the 
phenomenalist and the materialist. The phenomenalist 
typically tries to keep the 'intentional' features of the 
mental and separates actions from behaviour or movements. 
The materialist typically attempts to do away with 
intentionality (I use the term in the tradition following 
Brentano, Chisholm, Quine and others) and reduce actions 
to movements. It does not follow, however, that the 
phenomenalist is anti-positivist or that the materialist 
is pro-positivist; indeed A.J.Ayer, a phenomenalist is 
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also a positivist while the materialists McGinn and 
Davidson are against the possibility of anything 
resembling positive psychology - and that would include 
educational research along those lines. Other 
materialists however, especially the behaviourists such 
as Hull, Watson, Pavlov and Skinner do believe in the 
usefulness of positive science as an aid to various 
social and psychological problems as do the 
structuralists such as Marx, Dennett, Harre, Chomsky, 
Piaget and Fodor. 
Space also demands that I narrow my focus as far 
as possible on that form of science which I outlined in 
the second chapter. For various reasons this excludes the 
Realists 1  who oppose positivism in following Hume's 
idea of causality and do not formulate hypotheses in 
quite the same way preferring to talk in terms of 
'analogues', 'models', 'necessities', 'structures', 
'mechanisms' and the like. 
Restricting myself thus to the type of 
methodologies put forward in the previous chapter the 
field is still enormously broad. Consequently I have 
tried to keep to the more 'classical' moves our 
hypothetical educational scientist might make if he is to 
sustain and defend the type of research he recommends. As 
in the second chapter I shall assign section numbers and 
provide a brief indication of the broad movement of the 
chapter through a summary of their contents. These are as 
follows: 
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3.1 The general scheme espoused by positivists. 
3.2 A.J.Ayer's attempt to provide grounds for the 
possibility of a Human Science from a phenomenalist's 
point of view. 
3.3 The rejection of the possibility of psychology from 
a materialist's point of view. Argument 1 - reasons 
are causes but no laws can be deduced from mental 
phenomena. 
3.4 Davidson's argument against the possibility of 
psychology on the grounds that mental and physical 
predicates are such they would not allow for the 
formation of psycho-physical laws. 
3.5 Conclusions. 
3.6 Reductionist Stategies: 1. 
The possibility of an all embracing extensionalist 
logic in which 'intentional' descriptions are 
translated into extensional equivalents. 
3.7 Reductionist stategies: 2. 
'Molar' behaviourism in which the mind (and with it 
intentional states) is denied and actions are reduced 
to physical movements. I include Rylean 'logical 
behaviourism' as a variant from the more standard 
forms. 
3.8 Reductionist stategies: 3. 
The Central State Identity Thesis. 
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In accord with the general scheme of the chapter, 
3.2 to 3.5 deal with theories which allow for a causal 
relationship between the mental and the physical while 3. 
6 to 3.8 deal with theories which allow for a causal 
relationship between the physical and the physical. 
Before looking at Ayer's arguments that the mental can 
cause human actions and that laws can be derived from 
0. 
this (in principle) I want to make1brief comment on the 
place this sort of work has in the overall positivist 
scheme. This is an important comment in the context of 
O'Connor's remarks about a 'theory' of education in that 
'theory' - at this level - is, for the positivist, 
derived from a consideration of a number of established 
laws. The importance of this, as I see it, is that 
educational science is still in the position (from the 
positivist's own perspective) of still having to 
establish its first law and, in consequence, cannot, on 
its own terms talk of educational theory. 
3.1 
	 The Positivist Scheme.  
C.G Hempel2says of explanations that they, 
...may be conceived...as deductive arguments whose 
conclusion is the explanandum sentence, E, and whose 
premiss-set, the explanans, consists of general laws, 
Li, Lii,....Lr and of other statements, Ci, 
Cii,....Ck, which make assertions about particular 
facts. The form of such arguments, which thus 
constitute one type of scientific explanation, can be 
represented by the following schema : 
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Li,Lii,....,Lr 
D-N ] Explanans sentences 
Ci,Cii, 	 Ck 
E 	 Explanandum sentence 
Explanatory accounts of this kind will be called 
explanations by deductive subsumption under general 
laws, or deductive-nomological explanations. The laws 
invoked in a scientific explanation will also be 
called covering laws for the explanandum phenomenon, 
and the explanatory argument will be said to subsume 
the explanation under those laws. 
Here is a rather famous statement of the method of the 
physical sciences. There will not be universal assent to 
this view, but it is commonly accepted as a paradigm of 
research methodology in 'normal' science. Its ancestry 
takes us back to Aristotle who, in his analysis of 
science (quoted in the introduction to chapter one) tells 
us that scientific knowledge involves us in Induction 
'which introduces us to first principles and to 
universals' and to deduction which 'starts from 
universals.'3 As indicated, I feel that it is important 
to see what follows in the context of the whole scheme of 
positive science, if only to see that for the positivist 
nothing of educational significance has so far been 
explained in the sense in which 'explanation' is equated 
with an 'explanandum' sentence. 
The first alternative which the educational 
scientist might resort to in this context is that mental 
events cause physical events such as human actions and 
that from the observation of these it is, in principle, 
possible to discover the laws under which they are 
subsumed. A.J.Ayer presents a clear defence of this view. 
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3.2 	 A Phenomenalist defence of Human Science.  
A.J.Ayer's paper4offers a clearly stated and 
unapologetic argument attempting to show that general 
laws of human behaviour are at least a possibility and as 
such allow for the possibilty of the deductive - 
nomological scheme as a method of explaining that 
behaviour. We shall therefore cast a critical eye over 
this defence with a view to seeing whether it really 
holds up. 
Ayer starts with the assumption that the 
methodology developed in the history of the physical 
sciences is appropriate to the study of human beings. 
Indeed, he asserts that science of either (any) type is 
to do with the discovery of empirical regularities which 
then form covering laws through the application of 
inductive techniques. Events, including human actions, 
which can be demonstrably shown to be subsumed under 
those laws are thereby said to be explained. 
Even if we leave aside the spurious assumptions 
(see footnote 5) built into such a view we still have 
grounds for questioning the possibility of such a scheme. 
Ayer's own argument6  is that given a Humean 
view of causality, actions are related to their 
antecedent conditions, (which he isolates as motives) in 
much the same way that events are related to effects in 
the natural world. Assuming therefore, what is already 
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controversial, that motives and the actions they are said 
to bring about can be independently and correctly 
described, he argues that the fact of a motive caused the 
fact of an action. His peculiar use of 'fact' is 
apparently necessary he says because on an orthodox 
reading of Hume the argument fails. Leaving aside the 
obscure question of how something which is not a state of 
affairs can be said to be in any sense the cause of 
something the argument still leaves much unanswered. 
First Ayer uses the only available criterion he 
has to identify the efficient motive, namely the overt 
behaviour. This surely is unwarranted not only because of 
the philosophical assumptions in making such a link but 
also because of the necessity of accepting that behaviour 
is an adequate criterion of the motive. There are good 
reasons for rejecting the second of these. First it 
certainly has not been shown that the overt behaviour is 
a correct indication of the motive. Second, motives often 
have no outward counterpart at all as when I am afraid to 
do what I am motivated to do or when I lack a sufficient 
skill to perform. Third the meaning of a piece of 
behaviour is given, not only by the 'inner' cause but by 
the outward circumstances of its performance: I may have 
a motive to do something but when I do that precise thing 
I am told that I have done something quite different. An 
example might be when a chess novice wishes to mate and 
moves his Queen only to find that he has lost his Queen. 
Fourth, human nature being what it is, we often act in a 
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contrary fashion: we do not always put on a coat to keep 
warm so 'wanting to keep warm' (one of Ayer's examples) 
is not a sufficient motive for putting on a coat. We 
often act 'in spite of ourselves' and so our actions, 
while identifiable themselves are not always adequate to 
identify our motives. Ayer's argument, if it is to hold 
up, must show however not only the action to which a 
motive gives rise (say putting on a coat) but must 
specify how this motive is independently identified. If 
this is in behavioural terms, as Ayer suggests it should 
be, it cannot be in terms of the action it allegedly 
brings about. But, if I want to keep warm, and this 
brings about my putting on a coat, what other behaviour 
is manifest upon which I correctly identify my motive? 
Perhaps Ayer is thinking of my shivering or my grumbling 
about the temperature. If so how do we legitimately 
deduce my motive 'want to be warm' from my behaviour 
without making other assumptions about human beings such 
as when they shiver they want to be warm etc? One only 
has to look at human actions 'out of context' (i.e. 
without any knowledge of what happens before or after) to 
see how obstinately difficult it is to correctly ascribe 
motives, intentions or whatever one likes to the person 
one observes. 
Unperturbed, Ayer presses on to give a rough 
indication of how laws may be established given such 
regularities as may be observed between independently 
identifed motive-events and action-effects. His 
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suggestion I paraphrase as follows: A motive is 
sufficient for the performance of an action if, and only 
if the actor holds that that action (call it A) is the 
only method for bringing about a desired state of affairs 
S where there is no other state of affairs Si - Sn 
desired in preference to S. Ayer makes little claim for 
this however for he admits (i) that listing all the 
necessary conditions for the performance of A is 
problematical, (ii) that no examples of strictly regular 
and lawlike actions can be found and (iii) that even the 
humble hypothesis put, which is merely intended to show 
that the actor will always perform A, contains a 
stipulation which in practice cannot be met. (Which is 
that there is usually a list of alternative actions ai - 
an which provide the actor with alternative means of 
achieving S. (The choice is made non arbitrary on the 
account by adding further conditions, which, while making 
the process even more impractical, nevertheless do not 
hinder the principle.) We might feel as if, given all 
these admissions as riders that what is left is a fairly 
harmless piece of rhetoric on the art of the possible - 
for in the end that is all Ayer claims for it. He 
declares that, for all its practical difficulties it 
allows for the possibility of a human science based on 
the same principles as those outlined by Hempel - and 
that that is all that needs to be shown. Ayer may indeed 
be right: but since we all continue to act in spite of 
ourselves and since we all do daft things and take 
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the wrong course of action we may rest assured that what 
may indeed remain a perpetual possibility does so only in 
a world of speculation. Speculation, however, is hardly 
the hard rock upon which our hypothetical educational 
scientist is likely to find solutions to pressing and 
very practical problems. 
3.3 	 Reasons, Causes and Laws.  
The educational scientist might take a second 
route together with partners who also argue that reasons 
are the causes of actions, thinking that they might 
provide a more satisfactory basis for the laws he seeks. 
If he does so, however, he will find that for one of two 
reasons his presumed allies turn out to be foes. In 
either case he will find himself being drawn towards a 
materialist thesis where what appeared to be reasons or 
motives in the fully intentionalistic sense Ayer uses 
themp turn out to be nothing more than physics under a 
different description. This, at least as far as Colin 
McGinn and Donald Davidson are concerned, is not the 
beginnings of psychology but its very death knell. McGinn 
and Davidson, however, come to the same conclusions but 
for different reasons. 
McGinn7  sets out to show that reasons can be 
explanations of actions but, unlike Ayer, is forced to 
the conclusion that this does not mean that they can be 
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used to form the basis of a human science. 
Actions might have intentions, he asks, but does 
this require that they are necessary? We can, as we know, 
pour Vodka down the drain, thinking it to be water, and 
perform an unintentional action but this does not entail 
that the action was unintentional under one of its 
descriptions. He argues then that actions are intentional 
under some description. Intentions are then analysed as a 
'reason-for' which is further construed as a combination 
of a desire (comparable to Davidsons 'pro attitude'8) 
and a belief. The action itself being the result of a 
piece of practical reasoning on the part of the agent in 
which the means (which must be believable - as possible) 
are worked out by which the end (the desire) is best 
attained. 
The nub of the argument is reached in the second 
section where the 'intentional' features of actions - 
including reasons - are said to be 'rational causes'9 
but that they (reasons) cannot causally explain 
actions.10  The reason given is that the concept of 
causation is extensional and hence true under all its 
descriptions while that of explanation is not, it being 
intensional and true in virtue of some descriptions only. 
For a reason to be fully causally explanatory both cause 
and explanation would have to be extensional. As he 
explains 11 
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...just as events are explained by other events only 
under some of their descriptions, so they instantiate 
laws only as described in certain ways...What is 
notable here is that reasons explain actions under 
descriptions which do not bring them under laws. 
Nevertheless, they must fall under laws as described 
in some vocabulary or other...by elimination it seems 
that the only kind of law this could be would be a 
physical law, they must be physically describable, 
i.e, they must be physical events. 
This leaves our educational scientist in something of a 
quandary for, if he wishes to work with the ordinary 
descriptions we give of ourselves and continue to carry 
out research in the vocabulary of the teacher, parent and 
child then he is being told that this will lead to a dead 
end as far as his project to uncover laws is concerned. 
Whether intentional talk or description is indeed 
irreducible to extensional logic I discuss in 3.6. 
Perhaps, however, he sees hope in preserving his science 
by following the inexorable path towards physicalism. If 
he does so, however, McGinn has this warning:12 
...the move to antecedent causally operative brain 
states as the explanatory correlates of reasons 
requires a radical redescription of the event to be 
explained... since these are quite new descriptions 
to which action descriptions are irreducible (vide 
infra), such a move is open to the charge of simply 
changing the subject. 
This, as might be expected, is not universally accepted 
and I explore the possibilities of taking this route 
under section 3.8. 
There does, however, seem to be one further 
possible option open before the educational scientist is 
forced to either examine the compatibility of 
intentionality with extensional descriptions or the 
possible option of going for doing away with the 
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troublesome intentional features altogether. This is 
to return to the 'rationality' of the subject and attempt 
to salvage some universal features at this level. This is 
indeed the path taken by Hempel (despite Ayer's 
reservations about alternative strategies) in 'Rational 
Action'13. Here Hempel tries to subsume individual 
desires (together with the necessary beliefs) under a law 
by the additional condition that the agent, at the time 
of acting be in a rational frame of mind. This results in 
some such formulation as: Any so and so having such and 
such a desire and the belief that they have the means to 
achieve that desire will, if they are rational, do so and 
so. Does the addition of the condition, 'if they are 
rational' help the researcher avoid the pitfalls inherent 
in Ayer's account? I think not and for a number of 
reasons. First we are not rational all the time and 
Hempel is trying to account for all, not some human 
behaviour. Second, philosophers, who have a professional 
interest in saying just what rationality is have come to 
no consensus over the matter. Third because, in an 
extraordinary way, the end result of such a procedure 
would be that a so called 'law' of human activity would 
covertly prescribe what rationality meant. 
One way out would be to empirically discover how 
human beings actually come to make decisions and then 
build the findings into the hypothesis. There is a great 
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irony (at least, as far as Donald Davidson is concerned) 
in this for it was his (empirical) work into just such a 
theory that led him to give up psychology as an empirical 
science. He recounts that the research he was engaged in 
attempted to overcome simplistic notions of rationality 
by 'preferencing' desires in a weighted system. The 
result, 'Decision Theory', attempted to systematically 
predict which action would be taken given probable 
preferences. He notes that apart from its inability to do 
so, some interesting philosophical questions arose around 
the area of preference. One of the most interesting was 
that in practice people's preferences changed in 
'irrational' ways. They changed, for example, in 
different contexts: a wager to win being a higher 
probability after a series of wins (whereas, infact, the 
odds remain the same), and so on. To make the 'theory' 
more reliable,extra information would have to be added, 
for example, which individuals tended to bet more and 
more after a series of wins, and which would leave with 
their winnings. What does this show? Davidson's 
conclusions are that the more information we have about 
an individual's desires and beliefs, the more we are able 
to predict his actions, but not those of others. The 
moral:14 
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...no single action can prove that a disposition like 
a desire or a belief exists; desires and beliefs, 
however short lived, cannot be momentary, which is 
why we typically learn so much from knowing about the 
desires and beliefs of an agent. This is the point, I 
suggest, where general knowledge of how persistent 
various preferences and beliefs are apt to be, and 
what causes them to grow, alter and decay...Hempel 
set out to show that reason explanations do not 
differ in their general logical character from 
explanation in physics or elsewhere. My reflections 
reinforce this view. On one point I am not persuaded, 
however: the laws that are implicit in reason 
explanation seem to me to concern only individuals -
they are generalizations embedded in attributions of 
attitudes, beliefs, and traits. 
If our educational researcher is really determined to 
carry on with this line of thought and attempt a 
formulation which is true of all individuals then further 
to a study of how individuals make decisions he must add 
all the conditions which explain how and why individuals 
vary. Whether this is possible, in Ayer's sense, I do not 
know but it seems on the surface to be the sort of 
undertaking which could never be achieved in practice and 
consequently of no value to pressing educational 
problems. 
3.4 
Davidson and the possibility of Psycho-Physical Laws.  
If such a course of action seems too impractable 
the researcher has few options left. Materialism, in one 
of its forms, is a possibility, but, if the researcher is 
determined to retain intentional features in his 
hypotheses and insist that laws can somehow be made of 
them then he is faced with the problem of cross 
categorial laws. If he does then he might wish to 
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consider Davidson's arguments15for the coherence of 
three principles. To hold out for the possibility of some 
form of human science along these lines he would have to 
support the first two of the principles and deny the 
the. 
third. It isAthird which raises the problem of cross 
categorial laws. 
Davidson's principles, each of which he regards 
as true, are: (i) 'that some mental events interact 
causally with physical events'; (ii) 'that where there is 
causality, there must be a law' and (iii) 'there are no 
strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental 
events can be predicted and explained`. Not wishing to 
entertain a mind/body dualism, Davidson admits that (i) 
and (ii) jointly require some identity thesis and some 
form of materialism, both of which he is prepared to 
defend. We will consider the identity thesis later (3.7) 
as it might well be a 'last resort' for our determined 
researcher. 
For the moment we will imagine that he wishes to 
retain the intentional features normally attributed to 
the mental and consequently commit himself to the 
possibility of psycho-physical laws denied in proposition 
(iii). Needless to say the nub of the argument for the 
coherence of the three principles turns on whether there 
are strict psychophysical laws under which mental events, 
described as mental, may be subsumed. This, it might be 
recalled, is what Colin McGinn denied because of the 
incompatibility of the intentionality of 'explanation' 
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with the extensionality of 'cause'. Davidson's argument 
gives ground to this point. 
Davidson's argument is presented in his article 
entitled 'Mental Events'.16 I will attempt to show that 
Davidson is correct to reject the notion of such laws. If 
this position can be maintained then I see no alternative 
for the educational scientist but to give up the idea of 
formulating a hypothesis in which the mental is 
predicated of events listed under antecedent conditions 
and replace them by physical events. This raises problems 
of its own but for now I will concentrate on the case in 
hand. 
Davidson begins by stating that 'nomological 
statements bring together predicates that are made for 
each other'.17As an example of this he argues that 
certain predicates such as 'grue', which is a predicate 
of emeralds meaning green if examined before t and blue 
if examined after t, are unsuitable nomological 
candidates because we cannot form the lawlike statement 
'All emeralds are grue' from its combination with 
emeralds. The argument, therefore, is that mental and 
physical predicates are nomologically unsuited. Firstly, 
however, we must see just what Davidson means by lawlike 
and then ask just what it is that makes grue-like 
predicates unsuitable, when in combination with physical 
subjects, for the formation of lawlike statements. 
Of the lawlike he says that they,'are general 
statements that support counterfactual and subjunctive 
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claims, and are supported by their instances.'18  
Support by their instances is illustrated by 'All 
emeralds are green'. Green is therefore taken, in 
combination with other conditions, as inductive support 
for something being an emerald. This is not true of 
grueness, which is both green and blue at different 
times. It therefore does not support the induction 'X is 
an emerald' as an instance. The example, Davidson admits, 
is too strong for the case in hand, for, having observed 
that a certain mental event is followed by a physical 
event, we often make rough generalizations about what to 
expect in the future. We thus use mental predicates as 
rough inductive evidence or support for underlying 
regularities. This is not true of grue-like predicates 
which offer no such support. Thus there is what we 
ordinarily refer to as a rule of thumb. But, thinks 
Davidson , there is an important distinction to be made 
between rules of thumb. There are those generalizations 
whose instances give us reason to think that by the 
addition of further conditions and provisos stated in the 
same vocabulary we approach a more exact law. Davidson 
contrasts this, 'homonomic' generalization with 
'heteronomic' generalization in which when instantiated 
'give us reason to believe there is a precise law at 
work, but one which can be stated only by shifting to a 
different vocabulary'.19 Physics is mostly homonomic 
whereas biology, geology and meterology are mainly 
heteronomic. The reason is that physics forms a closed 
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theory whereas the others utilize theories other than 
their own to express whatever laws they may have. Plate 
tectonics, for example, while descriptively remaining at 
the level of large movements of the earth's crust 
simultaneously explains such movements in the language of 
physics. 
From this point the argument starts to take grip 
on the possibility of compatibility between intentional 
predicates with those of physical predicates in the 
formation of lawlike statements. Davidson argues, I think 
quite correctly, that physical concepts such as length 
and laws dependent on the idea of length themselves 
depend upon certain other elements within the same theory 
holding constant. One may paraphrase his point by asking 
what is presupposed by measuring a length. There must be, 
Davidson insists, a law of transitivity which asserts 
that x is longer than y for all conditions of x and y. 
For example, x is not shorter than y when shortened by 
its approach to the speed of light, for y is not in the 
same condition. But being in the same condition involves 
a further set of assumptions, taken from the theory, 
about the effects of velocity on length as well as the 
effects at high velocity of the effects of the time taken 
to measure length where length is defined in terms of an 
amount of time taken to travel from one end to another. 
(A time, which Einstein showed, varies with velocity.) 
Put in Wittgensteinian fashion, it is a rule that one 
meter is a rule and that rule is held in place in a 
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complicated web of concepts and agreements which 
constitute a form of life. There is no length 
simpliciter. 
It is a thought similar to this that prompts 
Davidson to say that 'the whole set of axioms, laws or 
postulates for the measurement of length is partly 
constitutive of the idea of macroscopic, rigid, physical 
objects.'20 But it is just this 'background', hinted at 
in 2.22, which holds concepts in particular sciences 
together allowing the possibility of measurement, 
weighting and quantification in general which precludes 
heteronomic translation into an intentional language 
because, like 'grue', the latter has its own peculiar 
(in the sense of specificity) 'background' against which 
its concepts are held in place. 
To clarify the point, and I feel it to be an 
essential one in the argument, let us consider an example 
intended to bring out the 'grueness' of the intentional. 
To make the point as strong as possible I will choose an 
intentional concept near to the borders of non 
intentional, reflexive behaviour. Take the intention of 
exclaiming that I am in pain. Pain, considered as an 
experience, we might wish to correlate with some form of 
physical state; an electric shock for example. Now we 
might want, as scientists to measure the amount of pain 
required to make a person exclaim that he was indeed in 
pain. Too much of it in fact!21 To 'weight' the 
electrical input, or calibrate it, if that sounds more 
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scientific, a necessary condition would be to ask the 
subjects taking part to report when, for example, they 
first feel pain and when they cannot stand any more pain. 
Call these 1 and 10 respectively. Now, given that the 
electrical charge is defined in terms of a physical 
theory similar to the one outlined for length: a theory, 
for example, allows one to say unequivocally that the 
same amount of electrical charge was delivered to a 
certain number of people and given that the avowal 
responses are part of intentional behaviour, we may ask 
of this concrete example, exactly what is grue-like about 
the avowals which make them unsuitable as instances of a 
general, albeit heteronomic law? 
To answer this we need to return to Davidson's 
point about the interdependence of theory and instance. 
Electrical charges are rated against a vast background of 
theory which ranges from a theory of ionisation in 
chemistry to conductivity and resistance in physics. In 
our experiment we may assume that similar humans have 
similar skins and therefore similar resistance and 
conductivity. We may assume therefore that whatever is 
the cause of their pain experience, it is, electrically 
speaking, the same. However, and we do not need an 
experiment to bear this out, the avowals 1 to 10 will not 
be the same across subjects. What counts as an instance 
in electrical terms is not what counts as an instance of 
the same thing in experiential terms. Notwithstanding, we 
can stipulate that people who are given the same charge 
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of electricity experience the same thing, even though 
they do not agree in their avowals. This agreed, what can 
be profitably made of the avowals themselves? We might 
wish to say that some people are mistaken about the 
amount of pain they experience, in which case their 
avowals are wrong. This begs the question, however, and 
holds out the spectre of everyone being consistently 
wrong about what they say about their experiences. Since 
this position is untenable we must assume that there are 
individual differences either in pain experience or in 
the willingness to avow. The possibility of formulating a 
lawlike statement relating electrical imput and a certain 
avowal thus depends upon our ability to decide just how, 
or by what criteria, experience of pain and its 
expression varies. This brings in Davidson's 'other 
theory': the theory we have about ourselves, our 
intentions, beliefs, desires and so on. 
To illustrate the problem, and I believe it to be 
an insurmountable one, consider what is involved. 
Consider, for example, the contents of a questionnaire 
designed to eliminate individual differences. It might 
include questions such as: Do you feel inferior? The 
intention being to discover which subjects might not say 
that they feel pain until it is rather intense and resist 
saying that they cannot stand more until past the point 
at which they would normally stop. A consideration of 
this one question alone will suffice to show that the 
project is not feasible: the 'inferior' person might well 
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'give up' all the more quickly! A further test is 
therefore needed to discriminate between people with 
inferiority complexes who are trying to prove that they 
haven't and those who have them and don't mind admitting 
it. But what about someone who has an inferiority 
complex, admits it, usually acts in a timid way and yet 
is secretly trying to overcome it: the test being a good 
opportunity (since there is direct comparison with 
'normal people') to prove otherwise. Tests proliferate on 
an exponential curve of which Malthus would have been 
proud and this shows that attempts to standardize tests 
on intentional behaviour are subject to an infinite 
regress. 
No correlation between electrical input and the 
intentional expression of pain could be made without a 
further condition which is that the the reputed relation 
is already quantified. This, however, is precisely what 
cannot be had for the necessary correlation presupposes a 
standard test by which other tests are validated. Such a 
standard would constitute the knowledge acquired through 
a series of tests: it would be the end product of 
inductive investigation. It cannot, therefore, without 
circularity be used as one of the initial requirements. 
Therefore no inductive support can be gathered for a 
psycho-physical law and a law with no instances is no 
law. 
3.50 	 Conclusions.  
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The options open to the determined positivist who 
still insists that educational research can be carried 
out along the lines prescribed by his science are now few 
indeed. In fact, if the arguments we have explored on his 
behalf prove to be correct then he cannot formulate a 
testable, practical hypothesis in which the antecedent 
conditions retain the intentional features attributed to 
them in ordinary speech. He is thus forced to reformulate 
the antecedent conditions in physical or behavioural 
language. If he admits this then there are still options 
open to him all requiring some form of reductionism. 
There is, of course, one great drawback with proceeding 
along these lines and that is that the physical causes of 
behaviour are not those talked about by those engaged in 
the practice of education, nor are they immediately 
observable. This puts the scientist at a great 
disadvantage if his work is to remain relevant to 
educational research simply because of its practical 
nature and the intentional language in which such 
practice is couched. 
These considerations, the researcher might reply, 
are indeed practical difficulties, but they do not 
constitute insurmountable problems. The reason might be 
the belief that the language of physics employed can be 
translated into an intentionalist vocabulary and hence 
both scientific and beneficial to practical problems. It 
might be recalled, however, that Colin McGinn's argument 
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denies the possibility of a science of psychology on 
precisely this point. Ordinary explanations of human 
actions are explanations only under particular 
descriptions and hence fall under an intensional logic 
while the physical descriptions of causes in which laws 
are formulated are true under all descriptions and fall 
under an extensionalist logic. To defeat this argument 
our educationalist must show that intentional 
descriptions are redescribable in such a way that they 
are semantically equivalent (that no change of meaning 
has occurred) and that their truth values have not been 
altered. To see if this argument can be sustained I will 
look at the history of the argument and then at a more 
recent attempt to get around it which is most notable for 
its failure. 
3.6 	 Reductionist Stategies 1: Extensionality.  
Historically, intentionality has always been a 
problem for the 'logical positivists' for it seemed to 
threaten their twin theses of extensional logic and 
atomicity. Indeed, the early Wittgenstein thought the 
matter so crucial that he gave considerable attention to 
it in the Tractatus and attempted to 'write out' the word 
'belief' from his vaunted logical calculus altogether. In 
this he was supported by both Russell and Carnap and it 
is not without irony that Wittgenstein became, 
eventually, the great defender of intentionality: not 
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least, because of the evident failure, in his own eyes, 
of the arguments he had used to eliminate it. I will 
recount part of that argument as an introduction to what 
I have to say on the subject. 
Russell puts the problem presented by the 
intentional - which he refers to as a 'propositional 
attitude' - for the thesis of extensionality as follows. 
There are, he says, two 'principles' of 
extensionality:22  
The first part of the principle of extensionality ... 
says that all functions of propositions are truth 
functions, i.e. that, given any statement which 
contains as a part a proposition p, its truth-value 
is unchanged if we substitute for p any other 
proposition q having the same truth value as p...The 
second part...states that this is always the case, 
i.e. that, in any statement about a propositional 
function, any formally equivalent function may be 
sustituted without changing the truth-value of the 
the statement. 
The problem caused by intentionality is that 23  
...the thesis of extensionality is not true of 
propositions asserting propositional attitudes. If A 
believes p, and p is true, it does not follow that A 
believes all true propositions; nor, if p is false, 
does it follow that A believes all false 
propositions. Again: A may believe that there are 
featherless bipeds that are not human beings, without 
believing that there are human beings who are not 
human beings. 
thus, 
those who maintain the thesis of extensionality have 
to find some way of dealing with proposional 
attitudes. 
The thesis of atomicity is stated by Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus as,24 
Every statement about complexes can be analysed into 
a statement about their constituent parts, and into 
those propositions which completely describe their 
complexes.' 
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Russell again supplies the problem posed by intentional 
descriptions25 
...in 'A believesp', p is complex; the4fore, if 
Wittgenstein's principle is true (it) must be 
analysed into a statement about the complex p 
together with propositions describing p. Put more 
loosely, this means that p as a unit does not enter 
into 'A believes that p', but only its constituents 
enter in. 
But, as Russell points out, there are two ps: the first 
is the proposition p while the second is the object of a 
propositional attitude. The first is subject to the 
principle of extensionality while the second is not: it 
may have a different truth function. 
The problem this presents for our scientist is 
that since the principle of extensionality is a 
presupposition of subsumption he cannot claim to have 
provided a reduction of intentional language without 
first showing that truth conditions of the whole sentence 
have been preserved. But, as Russell points out, the 
preservation of truth conditions is exactly the problem: 
the part proposition 'believes that p' has not, or need 
not have, the same truth value as 'that p'. This shows 
that mental descriptions are not formally equivalent to 
state descriptions: the 'complex' to which he refers 
contains both. 
I have provided some historical background not 
only to highlight the problem, but also to show how 
central the argument is in the history of the attempt to 
formulate a logic which is suited to both science and to 
the 'anomalous' mental. In the thirties supporters of the 
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so called 'unity of science' programme were optimistic 
about the resolution of the the problem. Carnap, for 
example26 thought that, 'for every given (non-
extensional) language Si, an extensional language Sii may 
be constructed such that Si may be translated into Sii.' 
It is just this however, which has proved so 
intractable that modern exponents of the unity of science 
programme have given it up. To see why I will restate 
what the thesis of extensionality demands as put in a 
more modern, and available, form and then look at just 
why translations between it and sentences containing 
'propositional attitudes' does not work. 
Margolis27 
 summarises what it is for a language 
to be extensional: 
1. in its sentences the substitution of codesignative 
expressions does not alter the truth value of the 
resultant sentences when compared to the original; 
2. for its compound and complex sentences, truth values 
are a function only of the truth values of its 
constituent clauses; 
3. for those clauses the substitution criterion is 
satisfied. 
Sentences containing intentional clauses such as28 'Tom 
believes that Cicero denounced Catiline' fail to satisfy 
the first two conditions although they satisfy the third. 
Such constructions (typically containing verbs such as 
believes, wishes, urges and fears) Quine refers to as 
'opaque'. Of such 'opaque' constructions Quine29 
 says 
that they are those in which one 'cannot in general 
supplant a singular term by a codesignative 
term...without disturbing the truth value of the 
containing sentence.' The problem for a science requiring 
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the reduction of intentional descriptions to extensional 
ones is obvious: unless some way of 'translation' is 
found which preserves extensionalilty then no reduction 
is possible. This is therefore what Quine, following in 
the footsteps of Carnap, attempts to do, believing with 
his predecessor and mentor that the disposal of 'opaque' 
constructions would forward the march of science. He does 
this in a rather paradoxical manner, for instead of 
showing how intentional sentences can be adequately 
translated into extensional ones he argues, adamantly, 
that they cannot. 'Even', he says, 'indirect quotation, 
for all its tameness in comparison with other idioms of 
propositional attitude, and for all its concern with 
overt speech behaviour, seems insusceptible to general 
reduction to behavioural terms; the best we can do with 
it is to switch to direct quotation, and this adds 
information.'30 From this he concludes, 'If we are 
limning the true and ultimate structure of reality, the 
canonical scheme for us is the austere scheme that knows 
no quotation but direct quotation and no propositional 
attitudes but only physical constitution and behaviour of 
organisms.'31 This conclusion, however, does not 
follow. Nothing relating to the 'true and ultimate 
structure of reality' is entailed by the opacity of 
certain verbal constructions. What is entailed is the 
defeat of the extensionalist thesis which is that 
intentional idioms are reducible to extensional ones and 
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this is enough for my case against this form of 
reductionism. 
Educational Science, if that is an appropriate 
description, has, traditionally, followed Quine's advice 
and gone ahead with a reductionist programme regardless 
of philosophical difficulties. In the final section of 
this chapter I will show why reductionism - whether in 
the traditional guise of behaviourism or in the more 
recent garb of materialism - offers no way forward to the 
educational researcher. I begin, for historical reasons 
with what is now generally felt to be an inadequate form 
of research: behaviourism. Because of its long history 
and the infamy of some of its findings - I refer to that 
of Cyril Burt - I will not tie myself closely to the work 
of any one behaviourist but concentrate on the general 
themes to be found in their writings. 
3.7 	 Reductionism 2: Behaviourism.  
The second reductionist stategy our hypothetical 
researcher might try to make is to take Quine's option 
and drop all talk of intentional idioms altogether. This, 
quite familiar, path is usually charact4zed as 
ontological behaviourism. Its premisses are well 
entrenched in all of the methodologies discussed in the 
second chapter and it is possibly the most potent form of 
positivism. In a sense it 'resolves' the problem of 
reductionism by ignoring it. That is, while Quine and 
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others admit that no translation is possible between 
'ordinary' language and the language of movements, the 
programme proceeds regardless. This does not of course 
either vindicate it or allow it to avoid the general 
anti-reductionist arguments. I believe that the 
ontological behaviourist, whether he likes it or not, 
still has to justify his ontological stance and this 
entails meeting the arguments brought for the 
ineliminability of the intentional. 
This having been said the problem posed by 
ontological behaviourism has to be met from a different 
angle. This is perhaps best formulated in the form of the 
question, 'How well does the non-intentional language of 
the behaviourist cope with the creature with which it 
deals?' This broadens the scope of the enquiry for the 
notion of 'coping' is, for the behaviourist, something 
entirely to be understood in the context of science. This 
aspect of behaviourism has been referred to as 
methodological behaviourism. Although there is some irony 
in the fact that ontological behaviourism is the belief 
that intentional phenomena are nothing more than 
idiomatic conveniences (the choice to ignore arguments 
favouring the importance of the intentional hardly 
constituting hard hitting reasons on which to base that 
decision) it is with its methodological counterpart we 
must deal. What, it must be asked, does a non-
intentional, fully extensional 'thing' language look like 
and what philosophical problems arise from it and the 
- 124 - 
project of methodological behaviourism in general? The 
first of these questions is answered by the fact that 
classically it has tended to replace the whole range of 
intentional verbs associated with our desires or reasons 
for action with 'response' and the intentional content of 
the desire with 'stimulus'. Causal relationships, on 
this view, are expected to be discovered particular 
'stimulus conditions' and particular 'responses'. The 
answer to the second arises in the context of the attempt 
to carry out the experiments themselves. Methodological 
problems, that is, arise within the context of the 
attempt to work within such a restricted language and 
thus the problems become inextricably linked. 
The philosophical problems they give rise to fall 
into two main categories. The first concerns what I shall 
call the 'externality' of causation. The second concerns 
the so called neutrality of the data language. Of the 
first I shall make three points. Unlike the Central State 
theorist or his functionalist counterpart the 
behaviourist has to explain behaviour as effects 
('responses') to external causal antecedents. This raises 
a number of thorny issues. One of them is analogous to 
the problem of dualism in that it is not at all 
transparent how an independent environment can be 
causally efficacious with regard to other systems (living 
ones) with which it is not (except in some particular 
circumstances) literally in contact. The behaviourist 
cannot resort to some intermediate factor - such as a 
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mind - since this is what is explicitly denied. If the 
behaviourist is arguing that some form of causal 
relationship exists between two physical entities, one a 
'stimulus' and the other a brain,then the causation 
concerned is presumably both physical and is restricted 
to the impact of millions of photons on the retina - 
photons which act as a 'stimulus'. 
This seems to me to be an intolerable state of 
affairs and one which can only be resolved by the 
admission that something more than bare physical 
relations is necessitated by the notion of 'taking 
something as a stimulus'. Certainly the mere impacting of 
photons alone will not do the work of explaining either 
the notions of being stimulated or responding to or by 
something. Indeed the very idea of seeing something as a 
something given only photons, retinas and nerves gives 
rise to insurmoutable problems explored by the later 
Wittgenstein in the latter part of his 'Investigations'. 
Put simply these criticisms amount to the fact that 
something's being seen as a something (a duck, rabbit or 
stimulus) presupposes an interpreting mind in order that 
it is seen as that something at all. Behaviourism, rather 
cleverly, has attempted to avoid this by experimenting 
(typically) with stimuli which have psyco-somatic 
effects on their subjects: food, for example, causing 
salivation. What they do not so readily admit to is that 
most stimuli in the human environment are not related to 
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us in quite such an intimate way. I 'take' the various 
signs on a motorway to 'mean' something and whatever that 
something is, affects my driving. I might, for example, 
stop or look in my mirror. How might the behaviourist 
explain this phenomenon without (again) recourse to some 
central organizing principle in me which 'understands' 
both that the sign was to be taken as a sign and that I 
understood what it meant? This point will be taken up 
again in the last section. 
Another, parallel, argument stems from the 
apparently creative ways animals and humans have of 
'responding' to the stimulus. This may not be quite true 
in the very simple, but also very unnatural, case where a 
rat has been 'conditioned' to follow a particular path 
through a maze to find food. It is however true - as 
Kohler showed - that monkeys used an extraordinarily wide 
variety of ways of obtaining their goal. Kohler's 
comments on his findings (that some 'organizational' 
principle is involved) are echoed in Daniel Dennett's 
question as to how, non-intentionally, the behaviourist 
specifies just what it is that is learned.32 How, that 
is, does the behaviourist say that the rat performs 
certain movements which are related to certain stimuli 
without the use of such terms as 'believes that', 'knows 
that', 'remembers that' and so on? It seems that the 
behaviourist is committed to the unconvincing thesis that 
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the rat's skeleton moves appropriately - a thesis which, 
incidentally, is easily questioned by asking how people 
with muscular disorders ever obtain the 'goal' they 'aim 
for'. The thesis is 'unconvincing' simply because what 
constitutes 'appropriateness' of movement can only be 
defined in terms of aims, goals or purposes and yet these 
all have intentional connotations. Intentionality, 
therefore, is not actually dispensed with: it is a 
presupposition of behaviourism. 
The second set of questions revolve around the 
language - supposedly topic neutral and physical - in 
which such behaviour is couched. A familiar but powerful 
criticism is that behaviourists simply cannot account for 
actions which are given significance by social 
convention. Signing a cheque, for example. The reason is 
that any particular movement is meaningless unless the 
rules which conventionally govern its interpretation are 
given. It follows both that actions, properly described 
are irreducible to movements and also that the movements 
observed by behaviourists are (whatever they might claim) 
are totally opaque to them. A corollary of this is that 
one and the same action might be performed by an almost 
infinite (given human invention) number of movements. An 
example which comes to mind are the movements made in 
making a bid at an auction. Some of them are agreed by a 
majority but some are defined by as few as two people - 
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one of whom is the auctioneer. The behaviourist not only 
has problems explaining these sorts of movements but also 
explaining away actions which are properly characterized 
by their motive or purpose. I might, for example, want to 
buy a particular painting at an auction. The method by 
which I secure it is covered by a rule known only to me 
and the auctioneer and agreed between us - I have a 
reason for wanting the painting, an agreed action 
(putting out my tongue) for securing it and the reason I 
have explains, in these circumstances, my action. For the 
behaviourist, however, I do not have reasons or wants, 
only responses. My response (putting out my tongue), 
which, for the behaviourist is merely a movement, is not 
only opaque but no purpose can be derived from it alone 
which gives it any sense. Indeed, it might be the case 
that I hate the auctioneer, put my tongue out at him and, 
unknown to me my great aunt buys me the painting which 
the auctioneer then gives me. The behaviourist simply 
cannot deal with the whole gamut of human actions 
because they only make sense given our purposes, reasons, 
conventions and the like. In fact, the behaviourist 
quickly finds himself in a circle in this regard, for, in 
order to be able to say what movements relate to what 
stimulir he must revert to conventional and intentional 
signifiers. Without that, as Dummett argues, the whole 
science (so called), of behaviourism is indeterminate. 
There is, however, a further, and equally interesting 
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problem facing the determined behaviourist at this point. 
How does the behaviourist account for what is going on 
while he is making inferences about the way various 
movements are related to various stimuli? Given the very 
obscure movements taking place in the auction room the 
ready answer cannot be supplied by reference to any form 
of conditioning - the situation is completely unique. 
Taken one stage further this raises the serious question 
as to just how the behaviourist explains - within his own 
framework - the very complex set of movements involved in 
his doing science and what stimulus is there for it? 
Surely the behaviourist cannot, in all authenticity, 
state that the stimulus for research is the need (drive?) 
to understand the nature of human actions - for what kind 
of stimulus is that if not an intentional one? It 
therefore seems to me that the whole project presupposes 
the intentionality of the subject - who might be the 
behaviourist - and then proceeds, systematically, to 
ignore it. Quine's methods seem central to all 
behaviourist enterprises: first discover the very central 
core of philosophical problems that stand in the way of 
human science and then, in the interests of science 
carry on as if they did not exist. If behaviourists would 
entertain the intentionalistic notion of 'bad faith' they 
might discover that they suffer from it. Luckily for them 
they do not. 
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One way of avoiding 'bad faith' is to show that 
when intentional terms - including the notion of mind as 
anything over and above the body - are 'analysed' they 
turn out to mere bodily dispositions. For support in this 
'analytical behaviourism' our researcher might turn to 
Gilbert Ryle. Ryle's famous thesis is that Descartesr 
'Ghost' is exorcized when it is realized that it is 
simply a 'category mistake' to view the mind as something 
over and above the machine which it supposedly inhabits. 
The mind is a reification of machine parts, and mental 
ascriptions are dispositions to behave in certain ways. 
Ryle says summarily:33, '..."my mind" does not stand 
for another organ. It signifies my ability and proneness 
to do certain things...'. 
This 'logical behaviourism' might well appeal to 
our scientist since it essentially dismisses the mind 
leaving only the physical performance of actions. Ryle's 
'analysis' is surely wrong however. Thinking, for 
example, cannot be simply spirited away as some form of 
internalized saying - however many centuries this might 
have taken to develop - for the concept of thinking is 
used to distinguish what is said from what is merely 
thought. Even Pooh knew the difference between just 
standing and standing and thinking. 
There are three forms of argument against Ryle's 
position. The first two question the correctness of his 
analysis while the third raises serious ontological 
questions about just what it is which develops the 
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capacity to internalize its sayings and, indeed, just 
what it is that is subject to proneness and which is 
disposed. The 'analytic' type fall into two 'categories'. 
The first is that it is perfectly permissible, 
linguistically, to reply to a question concerning what 
one is doing with answers such as 'Just thinking', 'Just 
resting' or, indeed, 'Nothing'.34 Secondly, there are a 
whole variety of mental states or events which either do 
not have or need not have any overt behavioural 
manifestation. Thoughts, for example, need never be 
expressed. A pointed silence can speak a thousand words. 
Moreover it is simply not possible to express all of our 
thoughts either because of the time it would take or 
because many of our thoughts are half formed, vague or 
even, inexpressible. Finally the emphasis Ryle - and 
behaviourism generally - puts on physical movement brings 
up the problem of solipsism. It does so in a form in 
which there is a disparity between first person 
assertions and third person accounts. Wittgenstein, when 
he said that the inner stood in need of outward crieria, 
was referring to the plain fact that we ultimately rely 
on some observable phenomena if we wish to try and 
interpret a person's mind. He was not saying either that 
'outward criteria' were sufficient conditions for that 
interpretation, nor was he commiting himself to 
behaviourism. He was pointing out that in the case of 
other people we have only the observable evidence of 
their actions to go on in asking what is on their mind. 
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This, however, is not the case in the first person. If I 
experience pain I do not mean by it that I am behaving 
in a particular fashion. I mean that I have an experience 
within me which, qua experience, is not publically 
available. Ryle's thesis ultimately cannot allow for the 
translation of private experience into public 
performance. For him it is what I do and am prone to do 
which arbitrates upon what my 'internal' experiences are. 
Thus the 'outward' becomes criterial in a non-defeasible 
way and consequently defines what the mind is. The 
behaviour of others, however, is rendered completely 
opaque by this since the thoughts, desires and projects 
of individuals which, in ordinary life, explain and 
interpret those actions are explicitly denied that role. 
Where behaviour becomes the criterial arbiter of action 
then action becomes indeterminate. 
The third argument is broadly ontological. 
Descartes, for all his mistakes, at least allowed the 
cogito to have a place. Ryle's thesis, however, does not 
seem to allow for a 'centre of activity' which 
co-ordinates any idiosyncratic proclivities the person 
(if that is not another 'category mistake') might have. 
This notion - that thoughts and other mental goings on - 
are properties of something is central to Ryle's critics. 
Among these, and interestingly, is D.M.Armstrong. I say 
interestingly because Armstrong finds the lack of a 
central controlling factor a serious flaw in Ryle's 
philosophy of mind. At the same time, however, Armstrong 
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does not want to bring back the 'ghost'. Thus while his 
main criticism 35  of the thesis is that dispositions 
entail some state which is disposed such a state is a 
material state: a state of the brain. This idea has, in a 
historical sense, taken over from behaviourism and for 
the very good reason that central controlling states do 
seem to be required by the very complex nature of our 
behaviour. There is a sense therefore that more recent 
work in the philosophy of mind has taken note of 
Gestaltist criticisms of behaviourism but which has, at 
the same time, been wary of the problems posed by ontic 
dualism. The result has been the attempt to keep the 
mental but only as an epiphenomenon of the physical. The 
mind and mental events, it is argued, are identical with 
states of the brain. This line of thought might provide 
educational research with the nomological base it 
requires. I shall argue, however, that it will not. 
3.8 Reductionism 3: The Central State Identity Thesis.  
The Central State Identity Thesis, as it has 
become known, might be attractive to an educational 
researcher because of its philosophical respectability. 
This is not to say, of course, that it has no problems: 
it does and I shall be at pains to point them out later. 
Its initial attraction is in its apparent ability to talk 
of both minds and brains and at the same time explain the 
causal relationship between mental events and action. It 
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does this, as I have mentioned, by arguing that mental 
events are identical with physical events. Thus the 
mental is ultimately neurological or chemical in nature 
and perfectly well able to cause other physical events 
such as actions. Before exploring this intriguing thesis 
I should comment that there are various forms of it - 
forms, incidentally, which have evolved in response to 
philosophical pressure. To ease matters I shall deal with 
two forms only. The first, weaker form, argues that the 
tangible internal goings on - such as pains and 
sensations - are in fact identical with brain states 
while the second, stronger form, argues also that such 
things as thoughts and the mind itself are identical with 
brain states. From a historical perspective it is the 
latter which predominates. 
Both forms of the thesis are held by J.J.C.Smart 
- the stronger form coming as he and Armstrong became 
more confident. I will begin then with Smart's account of 
identity in both forms and then concentrate on the 
problems posed by the stronger, since this is the sort 
which would interest the educationalist. Smart says that 
the identity in question must be 'interest free' and 
'strict' in the sense that 'Sensations are nothing over 
and above brain states'.36 The strong version37  goes 
further and talks not only of sensations but of thoughts: 
'I wish to elucidate thoughts as inner processes and to 
keep my thesis compatible with the physicalist viewpoint 
by identifying inner processes with brain processes.' The 
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sense of strictness here is the kind expressed in 
Leibnitz's Law or principle of indiscernibles. On this 
principle any discernible difference is enough to 
disallow identity. 
If this thesis can be sustained then, perhaps one 
might have to concede to our hypothetical defender that 
there is a road for science to follow. I think, however, 
that there are a number of reasons why the thesis cannot 
be sustained and that (on a pragmatic level) even if it 
could it is a thesis which could not (even on its own 
terms) be of any possible use to educationalists. I begin 
with reasons why I don't think that the thesis is 
sustainable. The first is a reason stemming from 
Wittgenstein's comments on the seeming impossibility of 
squaring the temporal and spatial characteristics of the 
physical with the lack of these in the mental. Since the 
physicalist thesis states that the identity in question 
is contingent it should therefore be open to the scrutiny 
of an empirical test. 
Norman Malcolm argues that such a test is 
impossible.38He supposes that Smart has to accept, as a 
necessary condition of identity, that x is only strictly 
identical with y if and only if x occurred at the same 
time and place as y. He argues that this condition cannot 
be satisfied empirically: 'indeed,' he argues, 'it does 
not even make sense to set up a test for it.' The reason, 
he claims, is that even though we may have determined 
that a certain process occurred at the same time as a 
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particular thought occurred , we could not make the 
further test of whether my thought occured inside my 
skull. At the same place, in fact. The reason: 'that no 
one has any notion of what it would mean to test for the 
occurrence of the thought inside my skull independently 
of testing for a brain process.' This objection, as far 
as I can see, stands. Smart's thesis holds the 
correlation to be a contingent one: hence the tests have 
to be independent. Therefore an independent test for the 
location of a thought does seem to be entailed by an 
empirical proof of the thesis. 
What if, however, it is the case, as Rorty39and 
Feyerabend40suppose, that ordinary language is 
contingent and changes with scientific discovery. It may 
be true now that no one now 'has any notion' of how to 
make a test and it might be a conceptual confusion now to 
talk of the location of mental events - but if language 
is contingent and changes with science - it would seem to 
be open to Smart to defend his position by arguing that 
this situation might change. Malcolm would then have to 
argue either for some reason why this language now has to 
be taken as having some superior status vis-a-vis 
scientific advance or, that there is some language 
transcendent reason for thinking the notion 
'unintelligible'. Malcolm's answer, in part, is that the 
word 'thought' is part of our language now and it is that 
we are debating. Any future change in conceptual schemes 
therefore would not affect this, particular, historically 
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bound, dispute. Another dispute, in another language, 
would simply be a different dispute. In this language, 
Malcolm argues the Wittgensteinian point that thoughts 
are only the thoughts they are against a practice. He 
gives an example of my thinking of a milk bottle. The 
idea of a milk bottle derives from its role in a practice 
of drinking, delivering and milking: social phenomena 
which cannot be reduced to anything 'inside the skull'. 
This, he suggests, does not square with Smart's thesis in 
that the brain state is a sufficient condition of the 
thought while a necessary condition of the thought is a 
social practice. A defender of the identity theory and 
scientific materialism, if he wanted to be consistent, 
would be forced to reduce social practices to physical 
states and while this is posssible for milk bottles it is 
difficult, for perhaps language transcendent reasons, to 
hold that 'the rule that milk bottles will not be 
collected unless they are placed outside the door is a 
configuration of particles.'41 I think that the 
reduction of such a rule to a physical thing language is 
an intractable problem for Smart and for the central 
state identity thesis in general because the identity of 
(a supposed) brain state which was 'identical' with a 
belief state with an intentional object such as a social 
rule would indeed entail the identification of physical 
states. Rules, however, are conventions, and are 
therefore indefinitely replaceable. A condition of asking 
what rule is enshrined in a brain state would be a 
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question concerning what rule people had agreed to or 
believed to hold and this creates an inescapable circle 
in which rules and the like could never, themselves, be 
identified as physical states without recourse to a 
belief. I also think that the notion that it might be 
possible, at some future date, to locate thoughts in 
space and time to be adequately answered, as it is by 
Malcolm, by suggesting that this would simply change the 
topic. If such 'thoughts' were talked about as occurring 
here or there they would be a different sort of thing to 
the thoughts we talk about today. To insist that they are 
the same seems to beg the whole issue of identity. 
There are two further reasons, as I have 
indicated, why the central state identity thesis is 
unlikely to help an educational researcher solve his 
difficulties. The first of these is that even if it were 
to be shown to be true no translation rules would be 
available between the language of physical states and 
mental events which would enable the researcher to report 
his findings in ordinary language. The second is that in 
the event of this failure any possible science would not 
be one which could deal with educational problems. It 
would be irrelevant. 
The first question concerns the possibility of 
translating neuro-talk into ordinary language.42 I am 
assuming that identity is central to establishing common 
reference so that, for example, in intentional langauge 
(Cl) 'My reason for doing x was...' has the same 
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reference as 'X.Y.Z' (call it N1) , which is its 
neuro-talk equivalent. (Equivalence here is equivalence 
in truth conditions and not semantic synonymy.) My claim 
is that even if the identity thesis is true there is no 
possibility of making such a translation and hence no 
means of making any possible findings known to 
educationalists in terms which would be useful to them. 
The argument rests on a requirement, which is a condition 
of translation, which cannot be met. This requirement is 
an independent criterion which serves to establish that 
the reference of Cl is identical with reference of N1. 
To see why this condition cannot be met, let us 
consider Smart's supposed analogue: that an electrical 
discharge is identical with a flash of lightning.43  The 
flash is a perceptual phenomenon, while the discharge is 
a 'state' description of it. The flash derives from our 
ordinary talk of things, while the discharge from 
scientific theories about how things are. How is 
translation possible? How, that is, do we know that they 
both refer to the same thing? The answer lies in some 
form of human agreement: the scientist points to a flash 
of lightning and affirms that it is that object which he 
describes as a discharge. The 'man in the street' points 
to the lightning and asks the scientist to explain what 
it is. They agree at the start that what they are talking 
about is the same thing. Where such talk is not possible, 
as in cases of 'radical translation', Quine's thesis 
argues44that what translation there is, is at best 
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indeterminate. It is indeterminate because certain, 
unverified assumptions about another language and its 
use, are built in to the translation. (Assumptions such 
as 'They are are not like us in having interests a,b,c 
etc) Translation, put roughly, becomes more determinate 
as the ability of the language users to communicate 
increases. Indeterminacy increases as the number of 
unverified assumptions about the languages increases. 
Now, if we return to Smart's example, we can see 
why the analogy between lightning/discharge and 
sensation/brain state breaks down. It is simply this. The 
identity of the lightning/discharge is established by the 
possibility of the scientist and man in the street coming 
to an agreement over what thing constitutes the reference 
of their different descriptions. Similarly, Gavagai would 
be more determinately translated if the situation 
demanded less guess work and more communication. In the 
case of our translation however, Cl is known to all, 
because it is by definition, ordinary language, whereas 
N1 is known by a few. The question resolves itself into 
whether a determinate translation can be made between Cl 
and N1 users through their ability to come to an 
agreement over the object which constitutes the object of 
their respective talk. In the lightning example the 
scientist was able to do this because the object was 
available to both to see. In Quine's example, the rabbit 
was available to both also. This is not just coincidence, 
for a condition of our abilty to communicate is that we 
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talk about the same things. This is the main import of 
Wittgenstein's insistence on the need for 'outward 
criteria'. But it is just this which is unavailable in 
the proposed Cl - N1 translation. There is no possibility 
of agreement because there is no one, observable entity 
to agree about. 
Perhaps, a detractor might say, this is so, but 
it does not serve to show that no translation is 
possible. Such translation can be carried out at the 
level of theory and identity established by 
intertheoretic rules. Smart's flash, for example, could 
be made part of a common sense theory which told a story 
about thunder-storms and bright light combined with loud 
bangs in the sky and rain. It might include information 
about people being killed by such flashes. The 
scientist's theory includes work on electricity, how it 
jumps across gaps in a circuit when the voltage is high 
enough, that the colour of this discharge is blue and so 
on. Then, without any agreement, and nothing common to 
point to, it could be deduced, independently of the two 
theories that they were about the same thing: namely 
electrical discharge. Here again, however, the 
possibility of translation seems to depend upon common 
descriptions in both theories. The theories described, 
for example, both contain the description blue, (although 
in one case this would be expressed as a wavelength) they 
could both, presumably contain the description 'flash', 
they could both tell stories about the harmful effects 
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such discharges have on human beings and, I suspect, that 
it Lupon these intertheoretic descriptions that a 
deduction to the effect that they were about the same 
thing is made possible. Such intertheoretic descriptions 
however, do not occur between Cl and N1. We do not 
describe our reasons, nor, indeed, our sensations in 
terms which include neurone firing rates and N1, 
presumably, knows nothing of our experience of their 
firing or of our reasons for acting. In other words a 
condition which seems, at least, to be necessary in the 
making of intertheoretic rules is once more absent in the 
Cl / N1 case because there is no common ground in which 
to start. In consequence, anything that might be said by 
our researcher in N1 would be of no possible importance 
to education which is conducted in Cl. 
In saying this we have come full circle in our 
investigations regarding the possibility of a scientific 
base for educational research. The Identity Thesis 
provides, perhaps, the most likely way forward but it is 
flawed as far as educational research is concerned 
because it would speak a language unknown to and 
irrelevant to education. In any case the proponents of 
the thesis are attempting to solve rather intractable 
problems which arise within the philosophy of mind and 
consequently with the realms of possibility - it has 
never been their intention - to my knowledge, that such a 
theory carry the weight of actual research. That, it 
seems to me, is the main criterion with which 
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educational research should concern itself - that it is 
pragmatically useful in actually improving the 
educational opportunities of any population. It is to 
this task which I now turn. 
- 144 - 
Chapter Three: Footnotes. 
(1) A fairly typical account of the realist position is 
outlined by Roy Bhaskar in his book, 'The possibility of 
Naturalism', Harvester Press, 1979, pages 13 and 15. I 
include these two quotations to bring out the emphasis 
placed on (a) tendencies and (b) metaphor but not on laws 
or causal connexions. 
On the transcendental realist system a sequence A, B 
is necessary if and only if there is a natural 
mechanism M such that when stimulated by A, B tends 
to be produced. 
Typically, then, the construction of an explanation 
for, that is the production of the knowledge of the 
mechanism of the production of, some identified 
phenomenon will involve the building of a model, 
utilizing such cognitive materials and operating 
under the control of something like a logic of 
analogy and metaphor, of a mechanism, which if it 
were to exist and act in the postulated way would 
account for the phenomena in question. 
(2) C.G.Hempel, 'Philosophy of Natural Science', Prentice 
Hall, 1966. p51. 
(3) Aristotle, 'Nichomachean Ethics.' (1139b-31) 
Penguin Books, Translated by J.Thompson, 1984. p207. 
(4) A.J.Ayer, 'Man as the subject of science', Auguste 
Compte Memorial Lecture 6, Athlone Press, London, 1964. 
(5) Problems with the assumptiom that events can be said 
to be the same include the fact that, in the natural 
sciences, events are said to be the same if they have the 
same antecedent conditions and have, given the same 
circumstances, the same effects. In these conditions the 
same events may be seen to recur as many times as one 
wishes to observe them. If these occurances are found to 
be the result of non accidental associations, they may, 
if suitably universal, be described as laws. Nothing like 
this has ever been approximated by human action/events 
for at least four reasons: One, because the condition of 
'same antecedent condition' cannot be met. Two, because 
we lack an adequate ontology of events which would bring 
variously described action/events under the same 
description. Three, because changing historical 
circumstances prevent the repeat of the same action/event 
even supposing they were possible (the circumstances 
being the same is a condition of repeatability). Four, 
because even if the same action/event in the same 
circumstances were to take place there would be no reason 
to assume or expect the same effect since the people 
effected by the action/event might not react in the same 
- 145 - 
way each time. This last condition of success in 
repeatability could only be met in circumstances where 
not only were the same acts performed many times in the 
same historical circumstances,(which is impossible since 
history does not, strictly, repeat itself) but in which 
the future actions of other 'affected' individuals would 
remain the same. 
(6) Ayer, op cit. 
(7) Colin McGinn, "Action and its Explanation" in 
'Philosophical Problems in Psychology', London, 1982. 
(8) Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons and Causes" in 
'The Philosophy of Action', (Ed. A.R.White), Oxford, 
1977. p82. 
(9) McGinn, op cit, p26. 
(10) ibid, p27. 
(11) ibid, p40. 
(12) ibid, p32. 
(13) A.J.Ayer, "Rational Action" in 'Proceedings and 
addresses of the American Philosophical Association', 
Antioch, 1962. Pages 5 - 24. 
(14) Davidson, op cit, p274. 
(15) 	 D.Davidson, "Mental Events" in 'Essays on Actions 
and Events', Clarendon, 	 1982. p208. 
(16) ibid, p207ff. 
(17) ibid, p218. 
(18) ibid, p217. 
(19) ibid, p219. 
(20) ibid, p221. 
(21) Disregarding the famous, or imfamous, experiments 
along these lines which pretended to examine a patient's 
attitude to authority. While interesting, in that they 
tend to support the "anomolosness" of the intentional, 
they are not what I have in mind, which is a 
straightforward report of pain. 
(22) B.Russell, 'An Inquiry into meaning and truth', 
Penguin, 1969. pages 244 and 246. 
(23) ibid, p247. 
- 146 - 
(24) L.Wittgenstein, 'Tractatus Logico Philosophicus', 
Translated by Pears and McGuiness, RKP, 1961. para. 
2.0201. 
(25) Russell, op cit, p247. 
(26) R.Carnap, 'The Logical Syntax of Language', Harcourt 
Brace, 1937. p245. 
(27) J.Margolis, 'Philosophy of Psychology', Prentice -
Hall, 1984. p13. 
(28) W.V.O Quine, 'Word and Object', MIT Press, 1979. 
p214. 
(29) ibid, p151. 
(30) ibid, p220. 
(31) ibid, p221. 
(32) D.Dennett, 'Content and Consciousness', RKP, 1986. 
p34. 
(33) G.Ryle, 'The Concept of Mind', Penguin, 1976. p161. 
(34) These examples are given by Jenny Teichman in 'The 
Mind and the Soul', RKP, 1974. p51. 
(35) D.M.Armstrong, 'A Materialist Theory of Mind', RKP, 
1968. p85f. 
(36) J.J.C.Smart, "Sensations and Brain processes", in 
'The Mind/Brain Identity theory', (Ed C.V Borst) 
MacMillan, 1979. p56. 
(37) J.J.0 Smart, "Materiarialism" in 'The Mind Brain 
Identity theory', p165. The 'physicalist' viewpoint Smart 
has in mind is stated in the same volume ("The Nature of 
Mind" by D.M.Armstrong, p67) as the thesis that, 'We must 
try to work out an account of the nature of mind which is 
compatible with the view that man is nothing but 
physico-chemical mechanism.' 
(38) N.Malcolm, 'Scientific Materialism and the Identity 
Theory', in Borst (Ed.). p175. 
(39) R.Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy and 
Categories', in Borst (Ed.). pl87ff. 
(40) P. Feyerabend, 'Materialism and the mind-body 
problem', in Borst (Ed.). p142ff. 
(41) Malcolm, op cit, p178. 
(42) Identity theorists do not claim that this 
- 147 - 
translation is possible either. It is only required where 
the theory has a practical application as it would in 
educational research. 
(43) J.J.C.Smart, 'Sensations and brain processes' in 
Borst (Ed.). p56. 
(44) W.V.O.Quine, 'Word and Object', MIT Press, 1979. 
p27ff. 
Chapter Four.  
Preliminary thoughts on an Alternative Educational  
Research Methodology.  
4.0 
To a large extent I have devoted the last two 
chapters to the questions raised by O'Connor's 
scientistic position. The position I want to revert to 
now is the one outlined by Aristotle at the outset of the 
thesis which is basically that the methods of the natural 
sciences are inappropriate to both understanding and 
predicting human behaviour and that more appropriate 
methods involve 'phronesis'. 
That having been said I want to make it clear 
that what I have to say on the matter by no means follows 
directly from Aristotle but rather that it is inspired by 
Aristotle. Chapters five, six and seven explore and 
expound this inspiration and consequently constitute what 
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might be referred to as the second part of the thesis. 
That leaves the rather awkward question concerning the 
place, in the thesis, of the present chapter. I see it as 
'mezzanine' in that it both comes between two parts and 
undergirds the one that follows. Inasfar as it relates to 
what has already been argued, it relies on the 
irreducibility of the intentional and on the 
'anomalousness' of the mental. Inasfar as it undergirds 
what is to come, it attempts to 'unpack' some of what we 
mean by human understanding along what I shall call 
'objectivist' lines. 
I have taken it as read that understanding 
oneself and others in particular circumstances is a 
condition of taking a practical decision. Taking a 
practical decision is the subject of chapter six and I 
will not discuss it here. What necessitates the present 
chapter, in my view, is the fundamental split in 
contemporary thought over what is presupposed by 
understanding oneself and others. Some, who I refer to as 
'subjectivists', take it that such understanding is 
something like a matter of introspection which is 
then 'projected' empathetically at or 'on to' others who 
are then 'understood'. Others, who I refer to as 
'objectivists', take it that part of what is entailed by 
understanding ourselves is that we already understand 
others and that this understanding comes from being 
brought up as part of an historical community. The 
difference might be put in sharper perspective by saying 
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that the subjectivist projects private meanings on to the 
world - including the human aspect of it - while the 
objectivist comes to an understanding of the world by 
being a public part of it. In the first case meaning is 
subjective, in the second it is what I shall call 
'historically mediated'. That having been said, I use the 
terms objectivism and subjectivism to illustrate opposing 
ends of a spectrum of philosophical positions. I am less 
concerned with individual philosophers, inside or outside 
the philosophy of education, who might veer more to one 
side than to the other, than with the fundamental 
difference such 'leanings' would have on actual research 
methodology. I will spell out the implications that 
acceptance of a broadly objectivist position, which I 
argue for, lead to at the end of this chapter. (4.70) 
What these implications look like in practice I leave to 
the following three chapters. 
I shall argue, as stated, for an objectivist 
understanding, i.e of one in which our understanding is 
'mediated' by the historical context in which we find 
ourselves. I shall then, in chapter five, go on to 
suggest that such an understanding as is required for 
educational research is best, or most appropriately, 
'encapsulated' by a narrative which then becomes the 
subject of an ongoing historical process in which 
understanding is hopefully reached between people and 
resolved. Since the outcome of such a process is a 
practical recommendation and the process itself is a 
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dialogue between various groups of people with an 
interest in education, there is, in my thesis, no need 
for such a thing as an educational theory. I also argue, 
in the final chapter, that the type of research involved 
entails a breakdown in the distinction between research - 
conceived as one discrete activity - and policy making - 
conceived as another. 
To get to this point, however, I want to show 
firstly that the case for objectivism (which is broadly 
the thesis that human actions and feelings are only 
understood against a publicly defined historical 
background) is stronger than that for subjectivism (4.30 
- 4.40) and secondly that objectivism applies to 
virtually all behaviour which might be encountered in an 
educational context even though some types of behaviour 
are so complex that they appear to set a limit to the our 
intersubjective understanding of them ( 4.50f). The 
present chapter provides the groundwork for this and 
provides, to a limited extent, some reasons for utilizing 
narrative as a possible basis since it is only through 
such a medium that the requirement of including 
historical contexts is made possible. Explicit arguments 
for this together with its implications and problems, are 
examined in chapter five. 
4.01 	 Chapter Contents.  
I shall briefly indicate the major sections of 
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the chapter and then begin by briefly reflecting on two 
pertinent comments by David Wiggins. 
4.02 David Wiggins on Science and Aristotle. 
4.10 Gadamer and Dilthey: Objectivism and Subjectivism. 
4.20 Brentano and Intentionality. 
4.21 The Intentional and the Historical. 
4.30 The Case for Objectivism: Hamlyn and Wittgenstein. 
4.40 The Case for Subjectivism: A.J.Ayer. 
4.41 Conclusions. 
4.50 Putting Objectivism into practice. 
4.51 Self Deception and Lying. 
4.52 Reflex Behaviour. 
4.53 Pain and pain related behaviour. 
4.54 Emotions and their expression. 
4.60 'Frameworks' of understanding. 
4.70 Conclusions. 
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4.02 	 Some Reflections on Science and Aristotle.  
While Paul Feyerabend has no doubts about what to 
do with scientists', one of Aristotle's expositors, 
David Wiggins, provides an indication of both what is 
wrong with the scientists' projects2 and the indicators 
which Aristotle provides for any attempt to proceed3: 
I entertain the unfriendly suspicion that those who 
feel they must seek more...want a scientific theory 
of rationality not so much from a passion for 
science, even where there can be no science, but 
because they hope and desire, by some conceptual 
alchemy, to turn such a theory into a regulative or 
normative discipline, or into a system of rules by 
which to spare themselves some of the agony of 
thinking and the torment of feeling and understanding 
that is actually involved in reasoned deliberation. 
But, nevertheless: 
...if there is no prospect of an ordinary scientific 
or simply empirical theory of all action and 
deliberation as such, then the thing we should look 
for may be precisely what Aristotle provides - 
namely, a conceptual framework which we can apply to 
particular cases, which articulates the reciprocal 
relations of an agent's concerns and his perceptions 
of how things objectively are in the world; and a 
schema of description which relates the complex ideal 
the agent tries in the process of living his life to 
make real to the form that the agent impresses, both 
by way of opportunity and by way of limitation, upon 
that ideal. 
By 'conceptual framework', Wiggins is referring 
to Aristotle's work on choice, judgement, perception,4 
'situational appreciation,'5 and so on. These, 
together, form a group of concepts which play an 
important role in 'phronesis' or reasoned deliberation 
which, in turn, is the alternative he provides for 
science. I will follow Aristotle - or Wiggins - no 
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further, however, for while they provide pointers, the 
pointers themselves do not spell out what must in the end 
be a viable alternative to the naturalists' attempts at 
methodology. 
4.10 Gadamer and Dilthey: Objectivism and Subjectivism.  
I begin my positive thesis therefore with a 
question: what, to use Charles Taylor's phrase, are 'self 
interpreting animals'? I begin here because whatever we 
decide to do in the future, we do it on the basis of some 
form of understanding of ourselves in the present. There 
is controversy over this, however, as Hans-Georg Gadamer 
points out:6  
Self reflection and autobiography - Dilthey's starting 
points - are not primary and are not an adequate basis 
for the hermeneutical problem, because through them 
history is made private...In fact history does not 
belong to us, but we belong to it. Long before we 
understand ourselves through the process of self 
examination, we understand ourselves in a 
self-evident way in the family, society, and state in 
which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a 
distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual 
is only a flickering in the closed circuit of 
historical life. 
Before setting out on the actual arguments for 
and against objectivism I hope to add a little clarity by 
briefly sketching out what I intend to do. History is a 
central theme because, as I argue in the early sections, 
the meaning we ascribe to things is not private but one 
derived from the way we have been taught. Meaning, I 
shall say, is therefore mediated by history - it is 
infiltrated by how others see things. This has a bearing 
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on understanding and on the way we construe empathy. 
Dilthey, Collingwood and Ayer are all subjectivist about 
the meaning of empathy - they see it as something coming 
from ourselves, as something essentially private. I 
therefore discuss the correctness of this view by 
opposing what I have called the subjectivist with the 
objectivist represented by Hamlyn and Wittgenstein. There 
is therefore a section on the 'private language 
argument'. My aim in this is to establish Gadamer's point 
that our understanding of the world and, more especially, 
of ourselves and others is historically mediated rather 
than having its origins in some a-historical, private 
perspective in which understanding is to be found, 
ultimately within our own self-consciousness - our 
subjectivity. 
I begin with Gadamer's insight that self 
interpretation is dependent upon historical 
understanding: that the self is only understood in the 
context of its historical circumstances. The 
psychological school of introspectionism, dismissed by 
the behaviourists is here displaced by that against which 
our behaviour gains significance. The reversal is from 
the inward subjectivity of 'empathy' theory to the 
outward objectivity of circumstance. On this view, 
consequently, and ironically, understanding of the self 
is a matter of historical research. This is of crucial 
significance for the direction of the present thesis for 
if verstehen is construed on a subjectivist model then 
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educational research will, in all probability, turn out 
to be a species of 'self reflection and autobiography'; a 
view, incidentally, not too far removed from that 
adumbrated by the proponents of 'Action-Research'. If, 
however, it is construed objectively, 'self' 
understanding becomes refocused so that the self 
understands itself in that in which it 'comports itself 
proximally and for the most part': in its historical 
circumstances. I shall argue in this chapter that the 
objectivist is correct (4.30 - 40) and draw conclusions 
for educational research (4.70) having examined the scope 
of objectivism (4.50f) within an educational context. 
4.20 	 Brentano and Intentionality.  
The consequence of the arguments in Chapter Three 
regarding the irreducibility of the intentional is that a 
redescription of 'propositional attitudes' preserving the 
same truth conditions can only be carried out amongst 
synonomous descriptions which keep the intentional 
meaning of the original. This has profound implications 
for any inquiry into human action or mental states. It is 
profound because explanations of such must be given in 
terms which do not omit the intentional character. 
Intentionality may be said to have two aspects and is 
ambiguous to that extent: it may refer to what people 
intend to do or it might refer to the scholastic sense of 
intentionality, reintroduced by Brentano, as a mark of 
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the mental. Both senses are central in what I have to say 
concerning the way we understand ourselves now. The first 
sense is important because questions about what people 
intend to do are central to questions concerning both 
human actions and practical reason. The second is 
important for understanding the way in which features of 
'intentional objects' are ascribed. 
Intentionality in the second sense is the sense 
used in the present section. It is so here because I am 
not, for the moment, concerned with what people do but 
how what they do is described: this is central to our 
understanding of the human world. I will follow 
Brentano's use of intentionality, if only to pin it down 
a little. As a mark of the mental, Brentano used the word 
to distinguish the mental from the physical.7 It had, 
he argued, two characteristics: firstly that verbs 
describing activities of the mind such as beliefs, 
desires and wants characteristically take an object which 
need not exist.8 Secondly that such mental ascriptions 
have a propositional content. This content we may equate 
with the content of a propositional attitude: it is that 
which is expressed by x in wanting x, believing x, 
meaning x, desiring x, intending x, perceiving x and so 
on. It is this feature of the intentional which allows us 
to disambiguate 'opaque' reference when pointing, for 
example, is insufficient. An example might illustrate my 
meaning more clearly. A person temporarily loses his 
ability to speak and, wanting to point something out, 
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points at the centre of the landscape before him. How do 
we go about discovering what it is that he is pointing 
at? The answer is by discovering what he wants. We might, 
in the circumstances, make a list of a number of 
possibilities and then ask him questions so that he might 
nod or shake his head. As time passes and the person 
becomes evidently more frustrated at our inability to 
guess 'what he means' he gradually recovers enough to 
tell us that he was pointing at the beauty of the sunset 
which had now gone. Intentionality is illuminated in the 
example because we were denied one of the keys to 
understanding others: knowing what they desired. In this 
case
, 
knowing that he desired to point to the sunset. The 
example also serves to illustrate the way in which 
ascriptions work. The world, including the human part of 
it, takes any number of different descriptions and in 
understanding it we need to know what governs the 
selection of these descriptions. The example showed that 
a desire underwrote an appropriate description: it did so 
because it was the desire which gave sense to the 
pointing gesture. This also tells us something about the 
way we describe actions, for actions, like a gesture, are 
ambiguous when we have merely behaviour to go on. This 
element in intentionality is central to what Quine has 
written on indeterminacy9- what is needed, in order to 
know whether gavagai and rabbit are synonyms, is not that 
two people have the same stimulus or indeed that they 
act the same way, but what their beliefs are. The same 
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sort of point was made by Davidson, mentioned in the last 
chapter, that the poor fit between the physical and 
mental was that the actions or behaviour of an individual 
could only be understood with any degree of determinacy 
through an adequate knowledge of his beliefs.10 
4.21 	 The Intentional and the Historical.  
If, however, understanding the situation is a 
matter of interpreting its intentional features it is not 
those features themselves which concern us here but their 
conditions. What is it, that is, which enables us to say, 
for example, that when I knew what it was he wanted to 
point out I could see it as well? Obviously this is a 
complicated question, so I shall try to break it down. 
One seemingly fruitful way of doing this is to rephrase 
the question to read: How does A know that the object 
specified by the content of his own description is the 
same as the object construed by B's understanding of that 
description? How do we know, that is, that two 
descriptions succeed in referring to the same intentional 
object? 
According to Hamlyn11and Wittgenstein two 
conditions of agreement in judgements are, firstly, that 
there must be an object independent of both observers 
that makes it possible to point at anything at all and 
secondly, that there must be some similarity in the 
physical perceptual systems of the observers. This 
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condition is supported by the feeling of unease we might 
have when asked whether a human and an insect - with 
quite different physiological sense systems - see the 
same thing. These conditions do not seem particularly 
controversial, but neither are they jointly sufficient. 
There must be a further element, at least, which mediates 
our self understanding and this, I believe, is history. 
History, by which I mean that whole complex of culture, 
circumstance, language and beliefs in which an individual 
is 'embedded', serves to disambiguate what is seen and 
enables two or more people to 'see' the same thing. It is 
not, as is supposed by the holders of the causal theory 
of perception, a 'given'. 
4.30 The Case for Objectivism: Hamlyn and Wittgenstein.  
I come then to Hamlyn's argument that a public 
standard is indeed a presupposition of an agreement in 
judgements. 
Hamlyn's case, which I paraphrase very briefly, 
is as follows12: he asks how it is possible that we can 
claim objectivity in our assertions regarding colour 
words? Certainly it cannot be based on private experience 
because if it were, there 'could be no case for thinking 
that these were judgements concerning colour, since there 
could be no common understanding of what colour is and a 
13 fortiori no real concept of colour.' 
	 What therefore 
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makes what seems to be a private experience a public one 
is the fact that the object of perception is public and 
that we are directed to it (or as Brentano would have 
said - it becomes an intentional object) by a common 
framework of concepts. These concepts have public 
criteria and to understand the criterion is to understand 
'what constitutes the conditions in which the concept is 
properly given application'14- conditions which can be 
understood by all. Concepts such as red are only examples 
of a very wide range of concepts and which together 
provide a conceptual scheme with which we understand the 
world. The conceptual scheme is based on agreement but is 
not just conventional for it is embedded in what 
Wittgenstein called a 'form of life'. This is the 
background against which our colour judgements and all 
other judgements are made: it renders both communication 
about the same things possible and it also makes 
objectivity possible. In a later article dealing with 
knowledge about ourselves,15Hamlyn adds a further 
important point about agreement. Here he says that, 'self 
knowledge is only possible for one who has stood to 
others in the kind of relation that makes agreement 
possible...for only by so standing is it possible for him 
to know what it is to do so.'. Objectivity, therefore, 
about both the world and ourselves, entails standing in a 
form of life in which intersubjective agreement as to the 
correct application of concepts is understood. We are, 
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according to this version of objectivism, essentially 
social animals and our 'interpretation' is derivative of 
our understanding of the social context into which we 
were born. 
It is not important, I feel, at this point to 
argue with the details of the case which Hamlyn presents. 
What I do want to stress is the form of the objectivist 
case and the way it links in with what I have said about 
understanding. The form is Kantian in the sense that it 
asks how understanding is possible but unlike Kant it 
locates the 'rules' in society and not in a rational 
faculty. If Hamlyn is correct then understanding the 
situation will be a form of submersion in that situation 
- it will be an investigation of the rules which society 
has defined which cover our ascriptions. It will also 
affect our deliberations about that society for they will 
be embedded in the intentional network of the society 
itself and not be correct or incorrect by any other 
standards than those which agreements underwrite. Here it 
is important to see what I am not saying: I am not saying 
that our deliberations or our projects which result from 
them will be restricted by society, but that the very 
thoughts, desires, intentions and reasons we have are 
constituted by that society as desires, reasons etc. 
Research will therefore not be able to stand outside 
society as the positive sciences had hoped: it will be 
from within. Needless to say this is of vital importance 
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if a research scheme is to emerge in the later chapters 
of this thesis. 
The subjectivist need not accept Hamlyn's account 
of course. Consequently it needs to be supported. To do 
this it is necessary to go back to Wittgenstein's later 
work - for it is upon that which Hamlyn's thesis hangs. 
In Wittensteinian terms, what is at the centre of the 
dispute is 'privacy': whether, that is, one can say, 
without some external standard, that something is the 
same as something else. 
Wittgenstein's main writings on privacy are 
contained in the Philosophical Investigations, between 
paragraphs 243 and 315 16 and since most of his points 
are made through the use of rhetorical questions I shall 
try, after quoting them, to bring out their argumentative 
force. 
The discussion begins in 243 where Wittgenstein 
asks, 'But could we also imagine a language in which a 
person could write down or give vocal expression to his 
inner experiences - his feelings, moods, and the rest - 
for his private use?' This question leads to more: 'How 
do words refer to sensations?'17, 'In what sense are my 
sensations private?'18 and 'How do I use words to stand 
for sensations?'19 The answer, at first simply stated 
is that, 'When one says "He gave a name to his sensation" 
one forgets that a great deal of stage setting in the 
language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to 
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make sense'.20 The force of the argument supporting 
this is presented in the next paragraph21in which we 
are invited to imagine someone who writes the letter 'S' 
in a diary on each day of its occurrance. The question is 
whether a definition of the sign can be given. Certainly 
a public one cannot - for the sensation is private. So 
Wittgenstein suggests the possibility of giving an 
ostensive definition to oneself, by 'pointing' to it 
inwardly, or speaking, or writing the sign down while, 'I 
concentrate my attention on the sensation.'22 'But what 
is this ceremony for,' he asks, if by the words, 'I 
impress it on myself' I mean that the 'process brings it 
about that I remember the connexion right in the 
future'.23 The argument thus leads to the solipsistic 
conclusion that, since, 'I have no criterion of 
correctness' (apart from my own impression of rightness) 
then, 'whatever is going to seem right to me is right. 
And that only means that we can't talk about right'.24 
The force of this argument, for the 
subjectivist's position is reinforced by the remark that, 
'The essential thing about private experience is really 
not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that 
nobody knows whether other people also have this or 
something else.'25 The argument is thus two pronged. 
The first prong reduces the advocate of private 
sensations to solipsism through his inability to provide 
an independent criterion for matching sensations to 
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marks, sounds or whatever, so that one 'can't talk' of the 
'right' use of a sensation word. The second prong, which 
links with the question of language acquisition, is that 
in the absence of any outward criterion for the 
signification of a sensation nobody else has access to 
its reference. Jointly then the subjectivist position is 
shown to lead to both solipsism and an inability to 
communicate. This is finally illustrated in the well 
known passage about the beetle in the box,26  which does 
not need repeating. It's importance, however, lies in the 
fact that it does not matter what is in the box for, 
without anything public to point to, anything or indeed 
nothing could be said to be a beetle. Applied to 
sensations, the same conclusion is reached: self 
referring expressions which point 'inwardly' and have no 
'outward' manifestation may be said to be about the same 
sensation and even agreed to be so, but like the beetles, 
their reference remains indeterminate. It is the 
indeterminacy in referential propositions which leaves 
the private linguist without decidable conditions of 
truth and this is fatal because it leaves him with 
insufficient conditions of understanding another person. 
Put another way; the subjectivist's arguments lead toward 
solipsism while they ignore the necessity of some form of 
intersubjectively verifiable public criteria. It is for 
the subjectivist, as represented by A.J.Ayer, to answer 
this question and it is to that which I now turn. 
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4.40 	 The case for Subjectivism: A.J.Ayer.  
Ayer, in a paper entitled, 'Can there be a 
private language'27, attempts to refute the objectivism 
of Wittgenstein and present the subjectivist alternative. 
In it Ayer makes four distinct points. The first 
questions the need for an independent 'test for 
determining that a sign is being used correctly'.28 
Testing must end somewhere and in the end must rest 'on 
the testimony of my senses'29and on my ability to 
recognize the same again. No process of 'checking', in 
other words, can establish anything unless some acts of 
recognition are taken as valid in themselves.30 This 
does not, however, meet Wittgenstein's point. The 'idle 
ceremony' of impressing myself of the connexion between 
words may well establish what sensations I am going to 
call the same - and this may presuppose some 
recognitional capacity which validates for us that they 
are the same. Wittgenstein's point, however, concerns 
the conditions of language, one of which is undoubtedly 
a recognitional capacity, but the force of 'anything can 
count as right' is only clearly seen in the context of 
the need to communicate about the same things. That need 
presupposes a criterion available to the senses of a 
number of people so that they have a public object of 
reference and not a private one which is indeterminate. 
Ayer's point therefore only amounts to a comment about a 
necessary condition of language - what he ignores is that 
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what counts as the same is not given to our recognitional 
capacity simpliciter for what counts as the same 
presupposes a way of classifying which reflects our 
interests in classification. In recognizing the same 
again we implicitly presuppose some intentional feature 
therefore which is not contained in the sensation. The 
intentionality of the 'given' objects of perception is 
grounded in a framework which necessarily transcends our 
private experience of them. The 'necessity' of such 
transcendence derives not from our inability to recognize 
objects but from the fact that we need to agree on what 
aspect of an object we refer to when we refer. This in 
turn presupposes a language which matches different 
intentional contents to different referential intentions. 
The reason, as I argued in chapter three, is that 
intentionality is incompatible with extensionality and 
reference is an intentional term. Its intensional content 
therefore is only disambiguated by reference to a 
criterion independent of the privacy of experience and 
available to others. Hence recognizing the same 
presupposes a public framework against which what counts 
as the same is given. This framework is conventional and 
cannot be part of a sensation. 
The same argument applies, with minor amendment, 
to two of the other points Ayer makes. The first of these 
is that a hypothetical Robinson Crusoe could name the 
objects he sees31 
 while the second is that a sign does 
not presuppose, as Wittgenstein assumes, that one must be 
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able to 'observe the object that it signifies, or at 
least observe something with which this object is 
naturally associated'.32 The most a Robinson could do 
would be to make a noise in particular 'stimulus 
conditions' - naming is a convention which presupposes a 
language which contains the necessary conventions for 
being able to do it. Similarly with signs: a sign such as 
'$' says nothing unless a convention for its 
interpretation exists: then and only then does it act as 
a sign. A sign which has an indeterminate reference such 
as one which is unobservable is inadequate as a sign: for 
what is the point of a sign which points undecidably 
there. It is as if one possessed a compass that always 
pointed north in a world in which north moved so that no 
one ever knew where it was. The compass would be useless 
for setting a direction - for that presupposes both that 
the compass points north and that north stays in the same 
place. Staying in the same place, however, is something 
fixed by convention. It is certainly not the case that 
relative to the sun that north is in the same place. What 
fixes its place is therefore a context which excludes 
certain other features of the universe bearing on the 
issue. Such contexts are presupposed by signs of 
different sorts and it is this presupposition of context 
which entails their lack of privacy. 
4.41 	 Conclusions.  
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I conclude that Ayer and the subjectivists cannot 
sustain their case in the light of Wittgenstein's work on 
privacy. Fundamental to this is the fact that in order to 
talk of the same thing there must be something commonly 
available to observers - hence public - about which 
agreement in judgments may be reached. The very act of 
agreement brings with it a certain contingency which 
transcends the 'natural' but includes what Wittgenstein 
refers to as a form of life. This includes the context 
which is itself inextricably historical. 
There are two implications of this for 
educational research. The first is that in order to say 
just what is happening in any set of human events it is 
necessary to understand a considerable amount of personal 
and historical 'background' - a condition of which is an 
ability to understand that background oneself. Secondly 
that because there is no 'primary' or 'privileged' 
position from which to view events, anyone engaged in the 
interpretation of human actions, as an educational 
researcher would be, would be forced to take account of 
the meaning or significance ordinarily given to those 
events by the people involved in them. Here, of course, a 
certain degree of privilege might be allowed to the agent 
whose actions are the products of his intentions - but 
the main point remains - that even in this case the 
understanding an agent has of his own actions is 
historically mediated. The first of these, I shall argue, 
entails a lengthy description of the events under 
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consideration which take account of differing and 
sometimes conflicting points of view. The second breaks 
down the barriers between researcher and researched in 
the sense that one's own view of events is always open to 
further scrutiny and opens up the possibility of dialogue 
as an important, if not, fundamental, aspect of human 
enquiry. 
4.50 	 Putting Objectivism into practice.  
Human life and experience cover a vast area only 
part of which is relevant to educationalists. In this 
section I wish to look at the ways in which objectivism 
might be used to interpret some of the more intransigent 
features of our behaviour in order to show how wide a 
scope of understanding it allows for and hence how great 
its use might be in educational research. I will, 
however, not be dealing at this stage with substantive 
proposals but, I believe, that what emerges from the 
following provides the basis for the practical issues 
that follow. My main conclusion is, therefore, that 
objectivism provides the basis for such understanding as 
is possible at all and, as I have argued, provides a more 
suitable approach than subjectivism or science. I should 
at the outset make absolutely clear that I am not 
attempting to show how objectivism meets all possible 
cases: what I am saying is that there are areas of human 
life which are difficult to understand and that while 
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objectivism helps us to come to some conclusion as to 
what is actually going on there are also some forms of 
behaviour which may well remain obscure. I do not see 
this as a weakness of the thesis, however, but rather as 
a strength - for it seems to be a relatively 
straightforward fact about ourselves that sometimes we 
simply have no answer to questions about either what 
happened or why it happened. At such times we are quite 
simply, and properly, puzzled. 
As an introduction let me recap a little. 
Objectivism, basically, is the stance that individuals 
are understood against the significance given to them or 
the 
'conferred' uponey a community of individuals whose life 
is, of necessity, temporal. Meaning is thus 'historical'. 
Subjectivism, on the other hand, attempts to ignore the 
historical and focuses on the way an individual 
understands the world he or she finds him or herself in. 
Given this it would seem that certain aspects of human 
existence escape 'historical' significance. Broadly 
speaking these include all those private goings on which 
everyone experiences. What is at issue here is thus a 
question which concerns the extent to which objectivism 
can claim validity in educational research. It is saying 
that there might be areas of human life which are so 
difficult and complex to understand and for which there 
are few, if any, public pointers, that objectivism gives 
out and cannot explain them. An example might aid my 
explanation. Any human action might be considered a mask 
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for another action. Indeed, there is a sense in which we 
all wear masks which vary with our social situations - at 
home, in front of the children, at school and so on. A 
very practical problem for objectivism is thus the simple 
one that the public criteria by which we ascribe actions 
are misleading. They do not, however, 'tell' us either 
that they are misleading or in which ways they are 
misleading. We might thus attempt to deal with several 
layers of being - the 'exterior' and the real goings on. 
Good literature has always done this - not only in 
exposing the masks people wear but in making us reflect 
on our own masks. Not attempting to look behind overt and 
public 'criteria' leads to what one might call naive 
objectivism: it is a form of objectivism which takes 
everything at face value. My argument in this section is 
that to be of practical use objectivism must not do this, 
it must, mainly by the utilization of context, attempt to 
see actions for what they are even though this might not 
agree with what agents say they are and so on. As part of 
the attempt to 'see' beyond overt and public actions we 
must look at various areas of human experience which are 
either beyond our visual grasp (the 'inward') or 
ambiguous for some other reason. In order to do this I 
will examine five different areas as examples not only of 
such difficult areas but also as examples of how 
objectivism might begin to tackle them. The areas are as 
follows: 
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(a) Unexpressed, private experiences which might include 
emotions such as grief, remorse and guilt or simple 
sensations such as twinges and tickles. 
(b) Expressed, private experience such as the 
expression pain, the expression of anger and so on. 
(c) Behaviour which is uncontrollable such as blinking in 
a sand storm, fleeing from danger or the simple knee 
jerk and feigned copies of them. 
(d) Intentional behaviour in the sense outlined earlier; 
that is behaviour having some sort of reason, desire or 
belief behind it which gives it both meaning (to the 
individual performing it) and motivation. 
(e) Behaviour which is defined by convention such as 
'scoring a goal' or performing a curtsy. 
Since objectivism relies on the existence of a 
public object some of these are problematic. Broadly 
speaking a chart could be drawn up with the least 
problematic at one end and the most problematic at the 
other. It will be immediately apparent that those actions 
which are (i) overt and (ii) defined precisely will be 
the least problematic while those which are (i) 
unavailable to the public and (ii) ill defined will be 
the most problematic. There will of course be many 
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combinations in between. 
Since this section deals with practical limits I 
will concentrate on the problematic end of the scale. The 
reason for this is that since it is understanding we are 
seeking, those actions which are both public and well 
defined present no obvious problems. I will not, 
therefore, discuss (e). Intentional action, however, 
presents problems which arise in the form of some form of 
self deception or lies. Uncontrollable responses such as 
knee jerks or epileptic fits do not present many problems 
provided that they are recognized as such - that is they 
are not feigned. When they are,there is a problem with 
regard to their recognition. Categories (a) and (b) are 
the most problematic because, by their very nature, they 
contain either, in the case of (a) some aspect which is 
unavailable, or, in the case of (b), a difficult 'link' 
between overt behaviour and that which underlies it. A 
brief overview thus shows that at least some aspects of 
normal human life, areas such as lying, grieving and 
uncontrolled responses present practical problems for the 
objectivist and are of a type which concern 
educationalists. 
In what follows I shall attempt to take some of 
the sting out of such problematic areas by showing that 
even the most problematic aspects of human experience can 
be understood providing a good deal else is known about 
both the individual and the historical context (which 
includes social expectancies, rules, 'mores' as well as 
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what is generally accepted as 'history'). I will discuss 
the areas in turn as follows: 
4.51 Problems concerning uncontrollable behaviour. 
4.52 Problems concerning the interpretation of overt 
expressions - such as cases where some sort of self 
deception or lying are involved. 
4.53 Problems concerning the interpretation of 'inward' 
experience and its outward manifestation. I shall use 
pain and grief as contrasting examples. 
4.51 Problems concerning uncontrollable movements.  
I think that the first point to be made in this 
section is that the problem facing the objectivist is not 
whether there are innate mechanisms which give rise to 
uncontrollable behaviour but how to correctly 
i - 
characterize these where Lis proper to do so and to 
distinguish them from behaviour which is simply a 
pretence. The reasons - in the context of understanding 
human behaviour - are of tremendous importance since we 
do not, and should not treat the two types of behaviour 
as the same: uncontrollable behaviour is mere movement, 
whereas feigned 'uncontrollable' behaviour is not only 
intentional action but is, or may be, an intention to 
deceive. The differential treatment these deserve is 
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fundamental in many areas of life but is seen most 
clearly in courts of law where decisions concerning the 
intentions of an agent are often taken as paramount. The 
fact that non-intentional behaviour does not carry 
imputations of blame and so on can also be an important 
motive for pretending that one's actions are actually 
uncontrollable. An example of this would be where a 
murder resulted from what appeared to be an epileptic 
fit. If this act were committed by a person known to 
suffer from epilepsy it would constitute an extremely 
difficult case. Disruptive behaviour in the classroom is 
sometimes of this type: the school has to decide whether 
the behaviour is intentional and fully voluntary or 
whether it stems from some involuntary inner mechanism. 
It needs to know this not only for reasons of educational 
research but also to determine what remedial steps should 
be taken. Often, as is well known, 'professional' 
psychologists are called upon - but the grounds upon 
which they base their decision are dubious if, that is, 
they rely on the methods of a human science discussed 
earlier. 
For the objectivist as well there seems to be a 
problem - overt, public behaviour cannot be interpreted 
simply on the basis of the behaviour itself but must 
include some biographical material which is unavailable. 
The question is obviously complicated by the possibility 
of deception - in many law cases the crucial questions 
facing a jury concern neither behaviour nor intention but 
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the credibility of the person who says that the intention 
was lacking. 
Not all interpretation, however, is a species of 
deference. I mentioned that a jury's main concern is 
often with credibility. This seems to be central to 
understanding others in areas where some doubt has been 
cast over the origin of action. In certain but seemingly 
few areas of human behaviour it seems incontrovertible 
that a reflex has occurred. Where there is no controversy 
there is no problem for the objectivist: the action is 
classified as reflexive. It is the grey area between the 
incontrovertibly reflexive and the honestly intentional, 
which is problematic. To a certain extent deference (in 
the sense that the epileptic is referred to the proper 
medical authorities) occurs in the former but not the 
latter. 
If credibility is central to normal 
interpretation we are forced to ask just what is involved 
in it. Before this, however, it is necessary to indicate 
a few of the 'grey areas' of human life which call for 
this form of understanding. They range, I would think, 
from cases in which people have been subjected to 
indoctrination and torture to rather insignificant habits 
and 'quirks'. At the former, extreme end we interpret 
behaviour in the light of our knowledge of past history. 
A child, for example, who consistently cringes at the 
mere sight of a lifted hand might well have been the 
subject of physical abuse. The verification of such abuse 
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adds to our understanding of his behaviour and gives 
credibility to his explanations. This might be 
significant in understanding withdrawn or disruptive 
children: the explanations they give of their 'actions' 
might be found more, or less, credible in the light of 
their history. The same applies, but with decreasing 
explanatory value, with less serious behaviour such as 
flinching at the sound of a loud voice. The main point 
however, and the one I want to metaphorically underline, 
is the mere fact that in attempting to understand certain 
forms of behaviour we attempt to square the behaviour we 
observe both with explanations given and with the history 
of the individuals concerned. This having been said it is 
also by no means clear that finding something to be 
credible is any form of guarantee that the behaviour is 
either correctly explained or described. One reason for 
this is that individuals might have reasons for hiding 
their real intentions and consequently lie about 
themselves. This is the next problem for the objectivist. 
4.52 	 Lying and Self Deception.  
Finding someone's explanation to be credible 
appears to entail finding that his avowals are not, to 
the best of our knowledge, lies. There are, however, 
quite credible criminals who lie. The 'best', it might be 
suggested, are those who lie convincingly. A convincing 
lie, if what has just been said is itself credible, is 
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one in which lies are found to square with explanations 
and past history. The question thus shifts from whether 
avowals about actions square with the past to whether 
there is reason to doubt avowals in the first place. The 
problem for the objectivist is again not whether some 
Place. 
overt behaviour has takent,_ for this is not in doubt, but 
whether the behaviour is to be taken at face value or 
not. Not to do this, as I explained earlier, is to commit 
the fallacy of naive objectivism. The fallacy is in 
taking defeasible criteria as if they were 
non-defeasible. The credible liar is the most difficult 
case here because his lies about his present (or past) 
actions appear to be consistent with other aspects of his 
life. Given no further information than that everything 
about a person's life appears to be consistent would not 
in itself lead to the further question as to whether the 
person lied. The question about lies, especially in the 
case of the credible liar, arises ex hypothesi, not from 
any discrepancies in his life history but from some 
further reason which must concern motives. 
If, however, it is the case that a speech act (a 
lie) is misinterpreted as another (telling the truth) 
because it is unnoticed on the grounds of consistency 
then this seems to indicate that too small a portion of a 
person's biography has been taken into account. The match 
between lie and life history is only possible given a 
particular portion of that history. Motivation, on the 
other hand, relates to major projects which might take 
- 180 - 
decades to unfold. Credible liars such as criminals with 
perfect alibis remain undetected until their larger, 
criminal, motives are exposed. In the light of these, 
lies become both credible and explanatory. Indeed, they 
become helpful biographical material in themselves. 
Lying, even where it is difficult to detect, is 
not, consequently, an intractable problem for the 
objectivist. If it is a problem at all it is either 
because the lies are consistent with sections of 
biographical material or because larger sections are 
not taken into account. The main implications, however, 
like those of the previous section point towards a fuller 
understanding of the individual and his life history. 
Self deception is unlike lying in that the agent 
is unaware of the mismatch between what is said or done 
and other biographical material. Lying is an intentional 
act whereas self deception is not, or does not seem to 
be.33 Awareness, in the case of the liar, is an 
awareness of the falsity of a piece of behaviour. It is 
difficult to find a parallel to this conscious intention 
in the case of self deception. This makes the matter much 
more thorny. It cannot, for example, be argued that self 
deception is exposed through either an understanding of 
past history or of projected futures. Self deception is 
necessarily beyond the conscious awareness of the 
individual concerned unless some verbal trickery is 
employed to suggest that the self knowingly deceives 
itself. In the absence of the 'other' self, however, it 
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is difficult to see clearly just what self deception 
involves. It is like successful lying in that someone is 
deceived and unlike it in that it is unintended. If it 
parallels anything it thus parallels unintended but 
nonetheless false assertion or avowal. 
Ordinary usage gives some insight into the kind 
of falsehood at work here. People often use the phrase to 
denote someone who has misjudged his possibilities: an 
athlete, for example, who is reasonably able at a local 
level but who thinks himself capable of the Olympic 
Games. The kind of self deception involved is a 
misjudgement in terms of oneself and the world. The 
outcome is a false expectation about one's projects. It 
results in a set of 'unreasonable' actions. These actions 
are only 'unreasonable' in the light of the past as 
presented against the future; past athletic success at 
school leading to expectations of Olympic Gold. This 
archetypical self deception involves no problematical 
division of the self suggested by the notion of one self 
keeping something from another self-same-self. Instead it 
is a fairly unproblematical lack of accurate appraisal on 
the part of the individual. Put this way it should be 
fairly easy to see both how it fits in with our previous 
'problems' and with the way around them. If self 
deception is an inability to formulate reasonable goals 
for oneself on the basis of past experience then 
understanding self deception will involve matching 
biographical material with real-world possibilities. 
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Mismatching by individuals will reveal - to them - the 
type and extent of self deception involved. The solution 
then to what seemed a completely subjective problem is 
infact to be found in the observers rather than the 
observed for it would seem that the main problem of self 
deception includes a lack of awareness of the 
possibilities the world offers. There is here, 
consequently, a case not only for an adequate biography 
of the individual and the historical context in which 
they live out their lives but also for the considerable 
importance others have in forming reasonable expectations 
within that context. 
The more problematic type of self deception 
presents a more thorny case. This is made more difficult 
by questions about self deception itself. I have argued 
that at its most problematicf self deception is unlike 
lying in that it is unintentional. While there is 
controversy over this - and I have admitted that there is 
- I do not see quite how the objectivist deals with what, 
for all intents and purposes is an unintentional 'action' 
or 'belief' except as a piece of unintentional action or 
belief. That is, objectivism, must regard 'actions' 
carried out on the basis of 'beliefs' which appear to 
originate in consciously intentional mental states as the 
same as involuntary actions: that is as pieces of 
behaviour which do not carry with them elements of blame, 
responsibilty and so on. Children in schools who feel 
that they need do no more work for an 'A' level on the 
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basis of some rather poor GCSE results need their self 
deception put right. Children who, in the light of their 
previously poor academic performance, insist that they 
need do no further work to obtain an 'A' level and who do 
not consciously doubt in their ability appear to be 
deceived in a more problematic way. One problem is to 
differentiate between the two. The other is to treat the 
second case as if the belief and the action (taking the 
'A' level) were involuntary and not irresponsible 
behaviour. Educational policy regarding the first is 
basically pointing out the discrepancies between 
achievement and prospects. Educational policy regarding 
the second is of a totally different order and appears to 
involve some form of therapy in which the mismatch 
between perceived prospects and real prospects are 
revealed. The first appears to require some form of 
rational explanation, the second an unlocking of some 
unknown psychological factor. It would thus seem that, 
again in the second case at least, there are grounds for 
referral outside the type of counselling to be found 
within normal educational provision. 
Thus, while objectivism is basically a theory 
which explains how meaning is attributed to actions (or 
other things and events) it is of use in areas such as 
lying and different kinds of self deception in that it 
pays attention not only to the 'markers' that defeasibly 
identify actions as actions of a certain type but also, 
in taking social and biographical material into account, 
- 184 - 
allows differentiation between types of action and 
behaviour to take place. These, as indicated in the 
previous paragraph, may then form the basis of future 
action. 
4.53 The In*pretation of Expressed and Unexpressed 
Experience: Pain and Grief as examples.  
In looking at the problems facing the objectivist 
over 'inner', and possibly unexpressed experience, a good 
place to begin seems to be with Wittgenstein's 
phenomenological approach to pain language. The central 
question, as I see it, is how we know that someone is in 
pain when we cannot experience that pain? To the 
subjectivist this is an unanswerable question, or, to be 
more generous, a question with an indeterminate answer. 
The notion of an 'external criterion' however, helps to 
grasp the objectivist's solution: it is, as we said 
earlier, a public, but nevertheless, defeasible 
criterion. Put simply, if I understand another as being 
in pain, I do so on my taking certain behavioural 
manifestations as characteristic of pain. Defeasibility 
enters the picture because of further understanding such 
as feigned behaviour and so on. This element, as 
Wittgenstein points out, is not a complicating feature in 
the case of animals - although it is certainly true that 
'playing dead' is a defensive action utilized by some. 
The important link between Gadamer's assertion and 
Wittgenstein is that understanding that another is in 
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pain is mediated by certain 'characteristic' behaviours 
which are taken as indications that someone is in pain. 
This is the point at which history enters what is 
otherwise a private experience. History provides the 
means of interpreting the behaviour even though the 
sensation of pain is, one might say, a-historical. It was 
on this basis that I argued in the final section of 
chapter three that psychology cannot quantify, 
trans-individually, pain reactions: it cannot assume a 
universal reaction to given 'doses' of pain. Where it 
does, it simply begs the issue. 
More important now, however, is the need to see 
just how history mediates our empathic understanding; for 
it is not simply that we transfer our subjective 
understanding to others. What intervenes is a learnt 
interpretation of the way we express ourselves and the 
way we take the actions of another. This intervention or 
mediation is what I have referred to as historical: it 
rests upon the arbitrary and contingent rules of 
interpretation which we become initiated into as we grow 
into an historical community. Stated as baldly as this,a 
number of important questions are raised. Firstly we 
might ask whether there are not some behavioural 
manifestations which are not contingent upon historically 
derived rules. Secondly we might ask whether there is 
something 'more fundamental' than interpretation to 
understanding - interpretations which are grounded in non 
contingent factors such as our 'nature' or our innate 
- 186 - 
mechanisms. 
As for the first question there does seem to be a 
prima facie case for supposing that there are 'universal' 
forms of behaviour which develop 'out of our 
physiological make up. As far as pain and its expression 
are concerned, I have no doubt that an excess of it 
results in fairly universal forms of behaviour. This, 
however, is not to contradict what was said in the third 
chapter - for our own 'threshold' - the point at which 
the experience vents itself in outward anguish is 
characteristically peculiar to the individual. This might 
be infuriating to the torturer and torture to the 
positivist but it need not present the objectivist with 
any particular problems. Indeed - given the autobiography 
of the individual and some insight into the historical 
circumstances within which the individual is living - it 
is possible that more information of explanatory value is 
available than would otherwise be the case. A simple 
example might suffice to underline this central point. In 
traditional African initiation rites the adolescent is 
expected to show no 'overt' reaction to the infliction of 
pain because the lack of reaction is taken to be a sign 
of maturity. The same effect (though different 
circumstance) is seen in the unwillingness of prisoners 
to give vital information under extreme forms of torture. 
In both examples the historical circumstance is at least 
as important as the biography of the individual in 
explaining the expression of pain. The same is true in 
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interpreting forms of behaviour which resemble the 
expression of pain where no pain is either inflicted or 
experienced. This is true in various societies where the 
overt expression of 'pain' is expected - as in certain 
African funeral rites - because the absence of such 
behaviour is taken as insulting to the dead and to 
relatives of the dead. 
The conclusions which can be drawn from this are 
twofold. Firstly that, in extremis, pain will be 
expressed in behaviour which is virtually universal and 
that this expression will be recognized for what it is by 
any member of the human race. This expression of pain is 
as near as one can come to the a-historical and the non 
contingent. It - like the knee jerk - is involuntary. 
However and secondly, most pain is (thankfully) not of 
this order and is subject to the intervention or 
mediation of both the character of the individual 
concerned and the social circumstances in which pain is 
experienced. In a multi-cultural society it will be the 
second of these which the educator will encounter and so 
it will be to the individual and his culture that the 
educationalist will be best advised to look to understand 
what what is happening. 
Grief might be said to resemble pain in that it 
is an internal experience (albeit an emotion) which may 
or may not take an overt expression. It is unlike pain in 
at least two ways: it is not as easily identified as the 
is internal experience it isr as painLand it does not seem to 
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have an extreme form of expression which is universally 
identifiable. It shares with pain the necessity of 
understanding both historical and individual 
cicumstances. This is shown by contrasting the 
expectancies in Irish culture - where 'keening' is a 
socially acceptable and, indeed, expected way of showing 
grief - and English culture where the 'stiff upper lip' 
stifles any 'show of emotion'. 
One result of the fact that grief itself is not 
readily identifiable to the individual experiencing it is 
that it is often others who interpret their behaviour for 
them in the light of their historical circumstances. 
This is an interesting observation when it is put against 
the fact that grief is expressed differently at different 
times by the same individuals. Certain forms of 
behaviour, that is, cannot be said to be expressions of 
grief unless much more is known about the individual. 
What more needs to be known, is of course, rather 
indeterminate, and, in any case related to particular 
circumstances. This rules out two factors: (i) the 
possibility of drawing up a defeasible set of rules 
which, when appropriately applied, reveal that someone is 
suffering from grief and (ii) setting down the criteria 
which define grief behaviour. 
This lack of precision need not deter the 
objectivist - it is perhaps merely an admission of the 
complexity of the human subject - for it points towards a 
more complete understanding of both the individual and 
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the historical circumstances of their lives before 
anything of value can be said about human events and 
their significance. This appears to require something 
more extensive than the 'atomic' bits of data beloved of 
the positivist. It also seems to require a complete 
reappraisal of the methods of both observation and 
evaluation. I will suggest in the following two chapters 
that the first of these requires a narrative and that the 
second a dialogue. For the moment, however, I will 
confine myself to a more embryonic concept - that of a 
framework of understanding. 
4.60 	 Frameworks of Understanding.  
A framework - which includes the general context 
of actions, the intentions which are self ascribed, the 
admitted desires and so on, together with what Maclntyre 
refers to as the historical context - is merely a way of 
mapping out some features of the human environment which 
are pertinent to understanding another's activity. As a 
framework it is more something to be worked within rather 
than some calculating machine for deciphering other 
people. That, however, is not to say that it lacks 
importance or that it is somehow inadequate. Adequacy is 
relative to a task and the task here is merely setting 
the scene. It is important insofar as it is capable of 
dealing with the following problem. Let us say that a 
person says that they have a pain at their heart. How are 
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we to understand what they mean? What they mean is more 
easily seen when more contextual information is added. 
If, for example, I supply four pieces of extra 
information about each individual,the meaning of the 
single statement becomes disambiguated in a way which 
renders understanding possible. The four pieces of 
information are: (i) I am depressed, (ii) I suffer from 
angina, (iii) I have just eaten my dinner too quickly and 
(iv) I have been stabbed. 
Unfortunately the human condition is far more 
complex. If, following up the example of grief, I become 
drunk after my child has been run over in a traffic 
accident,can I conclude that my drunkenness is an 
avoidance of grief or an expression of it? The answer is, 
►IN 
I think, indeterminate. What makes it lessLdeterminate is 
a fuller picture of the person. In this 'fuller picture' 
it will be relevant that the person is normally drunk in 
the evenings, has never been drunk before, is of a quiet 
disposition and not given to public 'displays', is 
introverted and normally unable to express himself to 
others and so on. Indeed, even the person who is, shall 
we say, drunk, may not be able to state categorically 
that it was because of his child's death or that it was 
his way of expressing grief. These observations point to 
a level of interpretation in understanding others which 
is limited, ultimately, by a certain indeterminacy. This, 
however, in a non-positivistic context, is not 
necessarily either a bad thing nor a hindrance: it is 
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part and parcel of what it is to be human and to live 
with and alongside others. 
The example of grief is again instructive. Grief 
might be expressed by repression but its actual 
expression might be in a long series of angry fits. A 
person who does not repress grief might weep each night, 
another, however, might get drunk and after that into a 
'punch up'. The point here is that while there are fairly 
unambiguous criteria for 'punch ups', 'getting drunk', 
'weeping' and 'bottling it up'I there are no direct ways 
of saying or telling which of these, if any, are the 
results of grief. However, Wittgenstein, Davidson and 
Maclntyre are at one in providing a 'framework' in which 
understanding that someone's behaviour results from grief 
and not from a myriad of other causes or reasons is 
found. It is within these frameworks, I believe, that the 
actual behaviour of individuals becomes understandable. I 
quote from each to show what I have in mind. Wittgenstein 
says,34for example, that 
what determines our judgement, our concepts and 
reactions, is not what one man is doing now, an 
individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human 
actions, the background against which we see any 
action. 
In similar fashion Davidson writes,35 
There is no assigning beliefs to a person by one on 
the basis of his verbal behaviour, his choices, or 
other local signs no matter how plain and evident, 
for we make sense of particular beliefs only as they 
cohere with other beliefs, with preferences, with 
intentions, hopes, fears, expectations and the rest. 
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Finally, Maclntyre, who says,36 
Once we have understood its importance the claim that 
the concept of an action is secondary to that of an 
intelligible action will appear less bizarre and so 
too will the claim that 'an' action, while of the 
highest practical importance, is always a potentially 
misleading abstraction. An action is a moment in a 
possible or an actual history or in a number of such 
histories . The notion of history is as fundamental a 
notion as the notion of an action. Each requires the 
other. 
4.70 	 Conclusions.  
In this chapter I have attempted to make out a 
case for an objectivist, as opposed to a subjectivist, 
approach to understanding human behaviour. I have done so 
because I believe that a non-scientistic approach has to 
philosophically appraise its epistemological base. The 
two stark options which I have presented are admittedly 
idealized but I believe that the substantive points which 
form the conclusions remain. These are firstly, that the 
world of human actions is largely constituted by our 
agreements about them. Secondly, that even though human 
actions are typically intentional (although some may be 
characterized in conventional terms as well) they 
nevertheless have an accessible public aspect which is 
the basis of our judgements about the behaviour of 
others. Thirdly, that since it is within the historical 
context that agreements are made it is towards history 
that we must direct our attention when seeking an 
understanding of human behaviour. Finally, that in all 
but the most elementary cases human behaviour is 
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understood within the biographical context that both 
personal history and social history provide. 
The implications for research into educational 
matters is not, at this stage, immediately apparent - nor 
is it meant to be. If anything can be said it is that 
whatever educational research might be like, it requires 
some method of providing an adequate basis for 
understanding the phenomena with which it deals and that 
it (the research itself) is a corporate part of the 
constitutive historical context in which it takes place. 
I have made some embryonic moves towards 'unpacking' the 
implications of the first of these in talking about 
'frameworks of understanding'. I shall elaborate this in 
more detail in the next chapter. The second is an 
inescapable context in which everything else is embedded. 
To say this is not only to say that research partly 
constitutes its objects by virtue of its being a part of 
history itself but also that it needs to be reflexively 
aware of its constitutive role. This partly entails the 
non-reliance on so called experts since the very 
contingency of what we say about ourselves and others is 
dependent upon the corporate agreements we have made. 
In sum; educational research requires a data base which 
allows for a considerable amount of historical and 
biographical material. It is itself part of history and 
needs to be aware of that and of the context which it 
itself imposes on the objects it studies. What this 
amounts to in practice is the very important role it 
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gives to actors' self descriptions or to the descriptions 
given by others well placed to comment. It consequently 
is in opposition to that school of social theory which 
seeks to give a more adequate description and explanation 
of events by subsuming them under some category or other 
which derives not from the actors themselves but from 
some technically derived theory thought to cover all 
societies and actions. The reason for this is that in the 
absence of any foreseeable nomological framework such a 
theory would be baseless. It is also is in opposition to 
any educational theory which places too high an emphasis 
on any particular body or group as having priviledged 
status. What follows is therefore not to be seen as an 
attempt to form the basis of a social theory but an 
attempt to deal with social and individual problems in 
the absence of such a theory. 
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Chapter Five.  
5.0 	 Narrative as a Data Base.  
Although the main focus of this chapter will deal 
with narratives I want to use the opportunity of an 
introduction to 'tie up' what I have already said and 
what I am about to say. It might appear that the 
intention of this thesis is negative or destructive. This 
is not the case although I can see a number of reasons 
why it might look that way. The first is that I have been 
rather sceptical about the fruitfulness of following a 
scientistic line of thought. The second, which will 
become more obvious, is that I am not going to attempt to 
provide an alternative theory. The reason for my 
scepticism over the first of these is, as I have shown, 
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that it is is fraught with philosophical difficulties. I 
could say that the second follows from the first if, by 
'theory', one meant a nomological framework built upon 
the observations and experiments of scientific 
investigation. In this case one would not expect me to 
provide such a theory. If, however, the word 'theory' is 
taken in a wider sense - perhaps the sense used by Paul 
Hirst, John Elliott and others - one might reasonably 
expect the remainder of the thesis to provide the basis 
of some alternative. This is not to be - partly because 
the word theory does have the scientistic overtones D.J. 
O'Connor imputes to it - and partly because I am not sure 
what to make of the notion of untestable, unfalsifiable 
theories. I accept that my critics will accuse me of 
using the word in a positivist sense (and also that 
science itself is essentially positivist) but I see 
nothing but confusion arising from using words with 
scientistic overtones for work which is meant to to be in 
contrast to science. 
The contrast I wish to make is nothing more than 
the contrast Aristotle makes between Science and 
Practical Wisdom. Theoria belongs to the former, 
Phronesis to the latter. It is the application of Science 
to Education in this sense which I have rejected. 
Phronesis, which I loosely interpret as the activity of 
mind intent on resolving some practical problem, does not 
involve a theory developed through science (which is 
O'Connor's notion) but an understanding of what might be 
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called the human geography in which the problem presents 
itself and ways of resolving the problem given that 
geography. In educational terms, therefore, what is 
needed is not a theory but a means of achieving certain 
ends. Educational 'theory', on this model, is not a 
species of reflection but of rational action. What 
follows is therefore more a method for resolving 
educational problems than a set of proposals for 
understanding what is going on in education. The reason 
for the latter is that it already exists - or rather - 
various opinions as to what is going on exist. The 
problem is not so much what is going on as how to change 
what is going on to what we would like to go on. The 
question, at root, is therefore both practical and 
ethical. 
Having said that,I am now going to virtually 
contradict myself by saying that the contents of the 
present chapter deal almost exclusively with what is 
going on. This needs some explanation. Firstly, as 
Aristotle pointed out, any practical judgements will 
involve an assessment of the situation in which action is 
to be taken. The 'situation' is 'what is going on'. 
Secondlyr the attempt to say what is going on raises 
philosophical difficulties of its own. The first of these 
is illustrated by the sports writer whose descriptions of 
a football match are invariably disputed from supporters 
of either side. The second, more thorny issue, is the 
question concerning what settles the apparently 
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conflicting descriptions. This is, in brief, the type of 
question I attempted to address in the previous chapter. 
I hope that now its relevance will be seen because the 
answer given is not that there is one trans-subjective 
answer to be given, but that what there is is partly (I 
am not advocating an Hegelian Idealism) constituted by 
the presuppositions and agreements over the way in which 
what there is is described. This I have called, because 
of its ongoing nature, historical. 
There will be, if the points I have made about 
the objectivist position and the sports writer hold, two 
distinct reasons why descriptions of what goes on vary. 
The first has its roots in historical agreements and the 
second in interpretations and misinterpretations of 
intentions, reasons, purposes, conventions and so on. If 
I am right the second of these presupposes the first. To 
avoid confusion I should point out that the first - 
constitutive factors - do not correspond in any way to 
either cultures or societies although they might. Social 
reality is constituted differently within the same 
language and culture (depending on the definition of 
these). Illustrations of this abound in the areas of 
political ideology and religion. Marxists and capitalists 
give completely differing accounts of what is going on in 
society as do theists and atheists. At a less extreme 
level managers often have a different perspective on 
events to workers. Needless to say these differing views 
will affect what is said about what is happening in 
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education. They are, however, different in kind (although 
the distinction becomes very blurred at certain points) 
from descriptions which differ because of an inadequate 
understanding of someone's intentions or the rules which 
govern a social practice. 
To recap a little before proceeding with the main 
arguments; I have said that I am concerned more with 
deliberating about what to do in education than with 
theories about it and that such deliberation involves an 
understanding of the situation within which one is 
working. This, however, presents an initial problem for 
there are (for at least two reasons) differing accounts 
of situations. To help with this problem I have argued 
that from an objectivist position the only arbiter 
available in deciding between accounts is the historical 
community whose contingent decisions constitute the very 
meaning of correctness and correct application. This 
provides the answer to the question, 'What is the 
criterion by which correct descriptions are said to be 
correct?' If, therefore, the attempt to come to a 
practical solution presupposes an understanding of the 
situation, but descriptions of situations are complex 
mattersr it would seem that some vehicle with the capacity 
of taking on board such complexity is required. This, I 
suggest, is a narrative. I suggest it not as a necessary 
condition of practical reason for in everyday affairs our 
memory acts in its place. I suggest it as a pragmatic 
equivalent of memory where the affairs to be dealt with 
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are of such an order of complexity that memory alone is 
inadequate and, in a social context such as education, 
too liable to individual bias. There is a sense therefore 
in which what I have to say goes against two main trends 
in educational 'theory' - the first being atomistic and 
scientistic and the second, perhaps more suprisingly, the 
efforts of those individuals in the past who have 
attempted to write an educational theory out of their 
own experience. There is, however, a more fundamental 
reason why individual bias is to be avoided and that is 
the reason provided in the preceeding chapter: 
communities constitute meaning and therefore are the 
arbiters on any individual view of what is happening in 
education or any other social field. What the community 
says about education is therefore of first order 
importance in describing educational situations. This 
alone, however, does not either provide an argument for a 
narrative as a data base for educational research or 
solve all the problems which arise if one were to be 
written. What it does seem to suggest is that nothing of 
any great social or educational import is going to be 
said without fairly large imput from the historical 
community in whose history education takes place. This 
point I hope to make central in my main substantive 
conclusions in chapter seven. For the moment I move to 
arguments which do seem to point towards a narrative as 
an adequate form of data base. I will then tackle some of 
the benefits and problems which such a basis raises. To 
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simplify matters I will begin with a chapter breakdown. 
Thus far I have focused on the more general 
concerns which link it with both the previous work and 
future chapters. 
I now want to narrow in on the theme of the 
present chapter itself. In order to do this I have 
included a brief introduction which explains why I 
consider the rest of the chapter important. The chapter 
is therefore divided up as follows: 
5.01 An introduction. 
5.10 Narratives as possible vehicles for contextual 
information. 
5.20 The usefulness of narratives in isolating causes or 
giving explanations. 
5.30 The need for Pragmatics. 
5.40 Objectivity. 
5.50 Conclusions. 
5.01 	 Introduction.  
Before I can focus on the topic of this chapter 
- 205 - 
it needs to be given a place in the thesis as a whole. As 
is indicated in the title, the narrative is regarded as a 
data base: it is the place where the basic information is 
recorded. Most of this chapter will deal with either why 
a narrative is a suitable vehicle for this record, how 
narratives might be used in giving explanations and some 
of the problems arising around the general area of their 
objectivity. 
A data base, which, it will be argued normally 
involves a collection of contextual material, usually 
comes about as a result of some identified problem. What 
generates this 'problematic' may be various. Having 
collected information which is pertinent to the problem 
and its solution most educational research will then 
involve some form of reasoning process in which the end 
point will be some policy intended to resolve the 
problematic. Briefly then, the present chapter will deal 
with the collection of data while Chapter Six will deal 
with the reasoning process. 
The arguments contained in the present chapter 
are based on the assumption that 'collecting the 
information' is no simple matter and that, mainly as a 
consequence, a considerable amount of contextual material 
is required. It is, in a sense, a secondary argument that 
narratives are appropriate means of recording this 
information, as a person with an extraordinary memory 
could perform the same function. There is no suggestion, 
therefore, that educational research requires, as a 
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condition, a written narrative nor that large volumes of 
context are required in all educational research. 
Before I continue I will give three reasons why 
contextual material will be involved in most cases. 
Firstly, simple human actions such as digging a garden, 
bullying, disrupting a lesson or being assertive are not 
as easily identified as it would seem. The same applies 
to what people say - what words mean (in general as well 
as in the context of human actions) - is dependent 
largely on context. Secondly, where an educational 
researcher is trying to do more than just describe what 
is happening, that is, where he is attempting to give a 
cause or an explanation, he will again find the need for 
a certain amount of contextual material. Thirdly, when a 
researcher is faced, as one would be in educational 
research, with attempting to give an objective accountr it 
would not be long before the researcher would realise 
that a number of different accounts of the same events 
become possible. This may be because of various 
perlocutionary influences on the people giving 
information or it might be more to do with ideological 
preference (see 5.40f). In either case the attempt to 
become more objective would involve other points of view. 
This brief introduction allows me to explain the 
role various parts of the chapter play in attempting to 
deal with these issues. 5.10 looks at arguments for the 
importance of context in understanding what is going on. 
5.20 looks at how a large amount of contextual material 
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is helful in isolating causes or giving explanatory 
accounts. 5.30 looks at the reasons why semiotics (in 
particular pragmatics) might be helpful in reading a text 
correctly and 5.40 looks at some of the problems of 
moving towards objectivity. 
5.10 The importance of context in understanding human 
events and the possible use of narratives as a  
record  
One of the more persuasive arguments for the 
importance of context in understanding human actions and 
therefore as the basis for understanding and describing 
situations is that individual actions can only be fully 
understood or made intelligible when placed within an 
adequate biography. This was the central point I was 
trying to make at the end of the last chapter. We need, 
to be succinct, a way of making tangible those 
intangibles which together constitute the framework which 
enables us to understand others and ourselves. In order 
to make the point we need to narrow the focus of 
attention from the broad perspective taken in chapter 
four to the narrower one in which the focus becomes what 
individuals are doing and the criteria by which the way 
their actions are described are decided. 
Despite Maclntyre's comment that, 'analytical 
philosophy...(has a)...tendency to think atomistically 
about human action and to analyse complex actions and 
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transactions in terms of simple components'' analytical 
philosophers have indicated the importance of context for 
a fuller understanding generally and for the 
understanding of what we say and do in particular. (I am 
here subsuming speech under action) Strawson, for example 
says,2 
To know the meaning (or meanings) of a sentence...is 
to be at least partially equipped to understand how 
any serious utterance of it by a particular speaker 
in a particular context is to be taken...(and)... 
sentence meaning alone, without help from the context 
of utterance, will rarely reveal just at what points 
the general concepts which figure in a proposition 
are there conceived as attaching to the world... 
Similarly Frege3stresses that where the context is not 
known, (if, for example, an utterance is spoken on stage) 
it must still always be asked, about what is 
presented in the form of an indicative sentence, 
whether it really contains an assertion. And this 
question must be answered in the negative if the 
requisite seriousness is lacking. 
H.P.Grice, in attempting to give an adequate 
account of how successful communication was possible, 
supports these general remarks by suggesting that,4'for 
x to have meant/nn anything, not merely must it have been 
uttered with the intention of inducing a certain belief 
but also the utterer must have intended an 'audience' to 
recognize the intention behind the utterance.' This he 
updated in 1971 to read,5 
 'U intends to produce in A 
effect E by means of A's recognition of that intention'. 
In so doing he builds into his account the features felt 
to be necessary by Strawson and Frege. This analysis has 
been extended by John Searle in his work on speech acts, 
itself an extension of J.L.Austin's work, so that the 
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conditions presupposed by successful performance are 
themselves brought into the open.6 Of particular 
interest are the 'preparatory' conditions7  which involve 
both utterers' beliefs, intentions, expectancies and 
hearers' understanding of these. 
These philosophers provide grounds for the 
thought that any 'data base' which is to provide the 
basis for human research must be of a form which is such 
that the conditions necessary for making actions 
understandable, or, 'intelligible' as Maclntyre puts it, 
are met. That is, they must include contextual material 
which goes far beyond the utterance, whatever its 
intention and include hearers' expectancies, 
interpretations, the illocutionary and perlocutionary 
'forces' at work in the speech context and so on. These 
conditions may only be met within a longer tract in which 
the intentions of the agents together with contextual 
information surrounding their utterances including the 
beliefs and expectancies which the audience/hearer must 
have in order that communication is successful are 
contained. The argument, put another way, is to be found 
in Maclntyre's 'After Virtue.' Here Maclntyre argues that 
in order to discover which, among various descriptions 
such as, 'digging', 'taking exercise', 'preparing for 
winter', or 'pleasing his wife',8is most apt, it is 
necessary to see individual actions in their setting. In 
the examplet the descriptions all relate to a man digging 
in his garden in which there are two possible settings: 
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'a particular type of household-cum-garden setting with 
the particular narrative history of that setting...or 
...the narrative history of marriage.'9 He concludes 
from this that whether he was primarily digging the 
garden or pleasing his wife can only be told from the 
narrative setting in which his action is an episode: 'We 
cannot...characterise behaviour independently of 
intentions, and we cannot characterise intentions 
independently of the settings which make those intentions 
intelligible both to agents themselves and to 
others.'10  
A possibly stronger argument, though obviously 
related, is that only when we are in possession of a 
considerable amount of information about an agent's 
circumstances, intentions, reasons, wants, conventions, 
emotions and so on, can we even begin to understand and 
therefore correctly describe the actions of an individual 
or group. Put at its strongest the argument amounts to 
the assertion that actions cannot even be properly 
identified (put under a single, appropriate, intentional 
description) outside a narrative context. Indeed, this 
seems to be what Maclntyre seems to be pushing towards. 
My argument, stated baldly, is that it is largely 
indeterminate what a person is doing even when they are 
doing something rather simple such as 'digging' - to use 
Maclntyre's example11 - without some further 
information. To determine what they are doing, Maclntyre 
argues, is to 'place'12 their action in a 'particular 
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narrative history'13because, 'behaviour cannot be 
characterized independently of intentions and we cannot 
characterize intentions independently of the settings 
which make those intentions intelligible both to agents 
and to others.'14 
5.20 	 Explanations and the isolation of Causes.  
I have said earlier that where a researcher wants 
to do more than merely describe a situation but go on to 
explain events or provide causes for them then he will be 
aided by contextual information. If this is so then what 
I have to say about the way in which causes are sought in 
ordinary situations (that is non-nomological causes which 
we refer to in everyday speech) will support the argument 
that educational research requires a large data base 
composed mainly of contextual material. At the same time 
the following section goes some way to giving an 
educational researcher some 'food for thought' about how 
explanations and so on are gained. 
In the light of the fact that the search for 
causes and explanations can only be carried out in the 
context of narratives (and I do not mean that these need 
to be written) it seems pertinent to explore this area in 
some detail. I will not touch on the more obvious 
applications to education at this point because these 
will be made clear in the final chapter. What will be 
said about causation is not new: what might be of 
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significance is the hitherto neglected possibility of 
using a narrative to record the contexts from which 
explanations are gained and causes isolated. In chapter 
seven I will try to incorporate this aspect into a 
research scheme which might be of use in attempting to 
isolate causes such as those of truancy and racism in 
schools. For the moment, however, I will focus, with the 
aid of philosophers who have given special and 
significant attention to this area, on causality. What 
follows is therefore somewhat expository and deals, on 
the whole, with published material essentially concerned 
with the causes of physical events. I feel however, and I 
hope that it will become reasonably plain, that what is 
discussed has relevance to the explanation of actions. 
I shall begin with a fairly straightforward 
account of what Hart and Honore15say on the matter of 
causal identification and then go on to Mackie's view 
before putting the main conclusions together in terms of 
narrative context. 
Hart and Honore begin their analysis by looking 
at an example in whichl in context Al a lighted cigarette 
is seen as the cause of a factory fire while in context B 
the presence of oxygen is seen as the cause. They comment 
16 that 'The general laws which we may need to 
demonstrate the causal connexion in these cases will not 
tell us that in one case oxygen can be cited and in the 
other not.' This has the consequence that in deciding the 
cause some further principle which guides our 
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identification needs to be looked for. They stress the 
need to distinguish cause and conditions because causes 
cannot be simply equated with necessary conditions; 'for 
the contrast of cause with mere conditions is an 
inseparable feature of all causal thinking'17and is 
related more to 'the context of the enquiry, who asks 
the questions and why.' Their reasoning is that in the 
context of an insurance claim the mere presence of a 
lighted cigarette in a factory full of inflammables is 
enough to identify it as the cause (context A) while in 
context B where they may still be a lighted cigarette in 
a factory in which, because of its extremely volatile 
contents oxygen is excluded, it is the presence of 
oxygen, not the cigarette which is singled out. 
In this way Hume's analysis of cause as the 
observed 'constant conjunction' of pairs of events in 
nature 18 
 which has passed down as the logical doctrine 
'that every singular causal statement implies, by its 
very meaning, a general proposition asserting a universal 
connexion...,19does not apply in Human History, Law or 
ordinary discourse which normally includes persistent 
states, failure of events and omission of human beings to 
act. Not only is it too simple butthey add, as Mill has 
pointed out, there seldom is such a relation between a 
consequent and the single antecedent. Indeed, it is 
usually a sum of conditions. This raises the question of 
how antecedent causes are isolated and Mill himself is 
unclear on this. 
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Unlike Hume then, who thought of a cause as both 
necessary and sufficient, Mill thought of it as 
sufficient only, with the addition that such conditions 
as were said to be sufficient were joint complex sets. 
And, as well as seeing a difference between scientific 
and other causal contexts,Mill allows that the same event 
may have different causes on different occasions. 
Following this leadr the authors look again at the 
ordinary concept. They note the interesting fact that we 
do as a matter of fact agree in our judgements as to 
causes in the ordinary sense,which again seems to 
indicate a principle of choice at work. This 'principle' 
they isolate, from an examination of their examples, 
2 'something someth which interferes with or in the course 
of events which would normally take place' and which need 
not be an event or sequence of events for...21'it is 
common to speak of static conditions or negative events 
as causes.' Thus, 'what is normally the case' assumes 
significance as does our general knowledge: for it is 
this which decides what is and what is not normal. Of 
this 'general knowledge', they add that, 'it is knowledge 
of the familiar 'way' to produce, by manipulating things, 
certain types of changes which do nor occur without our 
intervention'.22 They therefore conclude, in agreement 
with Gasking23 that the causal nexus is more like a 
recipe in which generalized causes are not those which 
would be attributed through attention to invariable 
sequences. Summing up24 they say, 
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The line between cause and mere condition is drawn by 
common sense on principles which vary in a subtle and 
complex way, both with the type of causal question at 
issue and the circumstances in which these causal 
questions arise. 
Warning against Collingwood's thesis that such principles 
are attempts at control, they remark that: 
perhaps the only general observation...is that in 
distinguishing between causes and conditions two 
contrasts are of prime importance. These are 
contrasts between what is abnormal and what is 
normal...and between a free deliberate human action 
and all other conditions. 
About these final comments they make a number of 
further interesting remarks. Firstly, concerning the 
normal-abnormal distinction they say that25the 
distinction itself can only be made in a context and 
usually reflects our practical interests. Of the 
Voluntary-Involuntary distinction26they add that 
because involuntary acts such as a reflex resulting in 
breaking a glass are not usually regarded as causes, the 
need to know the conditions under which actions were 
taken is central to the assignation of a cause. 
Sometimes, therefore, it is necessary to go backwards 
through involuntary acts to discover a voluntary one 
before the cause is known. In the example above, for 
instance, while a lighted cigarette might have caused the 
. IS 
fire, it is no longer regarded as the cause if itolso 
found that it was deliberately put there.27 
In effect, in the typical case...when we ask for the 
cause, we are asking that some abnormal lapse from 
routine be rendered intelligible by being exhibited as 
an instance of certain other normalities, namely, those 
general connexions which characterize experience and 
are formulated in broad and general terms. 
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Thus a lighted cigarette is the cause of a factory fire 
in a factory where fire is not usually present and if it 
was not put there intentionally. In a factory in which 
oxygen is normally excluded owing to the inflammatory 
nature of its contents, it is the presence of oxygen which 
is the cause unless it was intentionally put there. 
Necessary conditions become causes in certain contexts. 
However, what is finally said to be the cause is a 
matter of full investigation involving knowledge of 
normal and abnormal conditions, the interests of the 
investigation, lapses, absences, intentions of human 
agents and probably quite a lot more. Even the examples 
given become more difficult when, for example, we 
discover that someone threw petrol on the cigarette, so 
displacing the original cause on the grounds that the 
fire was thus assured. What Hart and Honore do admirably 
is twofold. Firstly, they show the complexity involved in 
ascribing causes in ordinary situations and secondly,give 
some indication of how such causes are finally decided 
upon. These insights help to show the value of narratives 
in causal ascription for, without actually saying as 
much, what Hart and Honore are saying is needed in order 
to identify a cause, is a great deal of background 
information: information which, I have argued, is best 
put in narrative form. I now move to Mackie' s28 work 
which, while taking a slightly different and more formal 
approach to causation, buttresses up the necessity of 
contextual information in the identification of causes 
- 217 - 
and therefore provides more reasons for supposing that 
objectivity about causes presupposes knowing a good deal 
about their setting. 
Like Hart and Honore, Mackie also takes an 
example as his starting point. He says,29 
Suppose that a fire has broken out in a certain house, 
but has been extinguished before the house has been 
completely destroyed. Experts investigate the cause of 
the fire, and they conclude that it was caused by an 
electrical short circuit at a certain place. 
Then he asks what the force is of their statement that 
the short circuit caused this fire? Firstly, he argues, 
it is not a necessary condition because something else 
could have caused the fire. Neither, however, is it a 
sufficient condition for other factors had to obtain: 
such as the existence of nearby inflammable material. 
Yet, while the identified cause was neither necessary nor 
sufficient, there were, nevertheless a set of conditions 
which together were jointly sufficient for the fire 
including negative ones such as the absence of a 
sprinkler which are also not necessary in themselves. Of 
all the jointly sufficient conditions the short circuit, 
while not being necessary for the reasons already given 
was, as Mackie puts it, an 'indispensable part'. 
Summarizing his short, but insightful analysis he 
says,30 
In this case then, the so called cause is, and is known 
to be, an insufficient, but necessary part of a 
condition which is itself unecessary but sufficient for 
the result. 
He terms this type of condition an INUS condition. Now, 
Hart and Honore, I believe help to explain this analysis 
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in providing what we might call a rationale for it. Using 
their principles the short circuit is isolated against 
other possible antecedent conditions because, in the 
normal run of things there was no fire and that some 
abnormality, such as the short circuit,is a candidate to 
explain its recurrance. Further, in the assumed absence 
of any intentional act, which would displace the short 
circuit as the cause, and, in the further absence of any 
other abnormal conditions obtaining (such as a dropped 
cigarette) the short circuit is the only relevant 
condition to fill the bill denoted by Mackie's 
'indispensable part'. There are, indeed, other 
indispensable parts such as neglected wiring, and while 
Mackie's analysis does not go far enough to explain why 
they are excluded, Hart and Honore at least give some 
indication why they may not be so; perhaps the wires had 
been in a poor state for years and thus were not to be 
described under 'abnormal'. A similar comment could be 
said for the person normally responsible for maintenance, 
for, as was rightly pointed out, intentional acts of 
neglect displace other possible candidates. We might wish 
to say something like the fact that the wires had not 
given trouble for yearsI  acts in mitigation of intentional 
neglect. What this shows, however, more than either 
analysis, and is the point I should like to stress, is 
the thoroughgoing nature of the type of enquiry necessary 
to ascertain causes and the part played in the enquiry by 
both human judgement (for example, about the mitigating 
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circumstances) and the interests the enquirer has in 
coming to a particular conclusion about the cause. 
Mitigation is extremely relevant to this example 
because it brings with it conditions not directly related 
to the enquiry in hand, such as whether the person 
responsible for the wiring, was in good health, was 
normally responsible and so on. The questions asked on 
the other hand presuppose not only interests but also f 
further presuppositions about what sort of answer is 
permissible. These considerations are considered by 
Rescher31where he considers some of the implications 
and assumptions which go along with questioning. They are 
helpful here because they further help to illuminate why 
a particular answer is given to the question about what 
was the cause. This is made clearer when we see that, for 
example, the questioner already has an idea as what would 
count as an appropriate answer32, which is an 
interesting comment in the light of the dispute over the 
nature of causes in general for a convinced Hempelian, a 
Mill, a Hume and a Mackie who would come with different 
assumptions as to what would count as an answer. So too, 
one would expect, would an arsonist, a firemen, an 
insurance agent and the man responsible for the upkeep of 
the house. And since, as Rescher points out33, 'An 
explicit answer to a question is one that repeats the 
substance of the question itself; (eg What colour is it? 
The colour is red.)'r one could expect to find different 
answers 'repeating' differing questions. There is yet a 
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further complication with questions which are ambiguous, 
such as the question, 'Why do owls hoot?' which may be 
variously answered (a) because they don't chirp, (b) 
because they protect their territory that way or (c) 
because of the dimensions of their beak and so on. This 
is so since each question has a presupposition which 'is 
a thesis (or proposition) that is entailed by each and 
every one of its admissible answers'34and these 
'reflect precommitments and...constitute what we bring to 
the very posing of our questions...'.35Again, 
'Questions are always projected on the basis of the 
cognitive "state of the art", relative to an existing 
body of putative knowledge'.36 Since this is so y it is 
easy to see why what constitutes the 'indispensable part' 
in an INUS conditionris going to vary widely according to 
factors which outstrip the 'normalcy' conditions of Hart 
and Honore. It is because they belong to another aspect 
of the enquiry concerned far less directly with 
discovering the cause but with preconceived 
presuppositions which underwrite the 'field' of possible 
candidates and which therefore constitute possibly 
separate classes of 'admissible answers'. 
Causes are one form of explanation where human 
beings are concerned. I have attempted to give reasons 
for the belief that their identification is related to a 
number of circumstantial conditions. This conclusion may 
be broadened to include explanations, if there are any, 
which are non-causal. If the work of theorists like Hart, 
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Honore, Mackie and Rescher reveals anything, it shows 
how, given different circumstances, interests, perceived 
intentions of actors and so on, a researcher might 
identify a cause as a sufficient condition at one time 
and an insufficient condition at another. The very 
attempt, however, at isolating causes seems, because of 
its complexity, to involve us in the construction of a 
narrative in which various conditions are seen to play a 
part. Difficult as it might soundf it also seems to be a 
conclusion of this analysis that the identification of 
one thing or event as the cause and explanations in 
general maybe as much a product of ideological and other 
bias as anything which might actually be found. I hope to 
incorporate this insight into my research scheme in a 
positive way by allowing, in fact encouraging, differing 
viewpoints in as many places as possible. 
There are a number of reasons why I think work 
such as we have considered is relevant to educational 
research. Firstly let us take a contemporary example - 
the crash of the Boeing at Locherbie and compare it to 
another physical event such as a school fire; although I 
am not saying that the analysis applies only to cases 
where the initial problem is to discover whether the 
cause is human or physical. Initial research in both 
cases would attempt to isolate the cause as human or 
physical. If physical, the enquiry passes over to the 
physical sciences. Pilot error and arson, however, as 
possible causes, would take the type of research required 
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out of the physical sciences. In this case our account of 
causation and context becomes pertinent. In the case of 
the pilot, the enquiry might discover that pilots in 
general worked too long and that this impaired their 
ability to take quick, appropriate and evasive action. In 
the case of arson an educational researcher might isolate 
a number of disaffected pupils as the cause and then go 
on to look at reasons why they were disaffected. 
A second example brings out another aspect of the 
use of narratives both in providing descriptions and 
explanations. This is where a pupil complains of being 
the subject of bullying. On further investigation it is 
found that the person involved in 'bullying' describes 
his behaviour in terms of 'playing rough'. Obviously an 
investigation concerned with bullying in schools is going 
to have to look at the descriptions of actions used here 
and the way they enter into the investigation. The pupil 
who is the subject of bullying would give grounds for an 
investigation into, and, perhaps, explanation of, 
bullying. The pupil involved in 'bullying' would attempt 
to argue that the investigation was concerned with 'rough 
play' and that distinctions need to be drawn. 
Distinctions, however, are partly made in an attempt to 
defend or make a case. In this case the bully defends his 
behaviour by changing the language of the bullied. This 
type of interplay between language, action and 
locutionary factors is at the centre of 5.30. It is 
also futher argument for the inclusion of context. 
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5.30 Understanding Narratives: The Need for Pragmatics.  
It might be helpful to preface this section with 
a number of comments which are mostly reflections on some 
of the arguments put forward in the previous three 
chapters. This will, I hope, put into context what I now 
want to say and also explain why it needs to be said 
before I can even begin to discuss the issue of 
objectivity. 
In the third chapter one of the points made was 
that intentional behaviour could not easily be subsumed 
under laws. One reason for this is that unlike such 
forces as gravity intentional behaviour is extremely 
varied and difficult to predict. In the next chapter the 
difficulty of dealing with the intentional was further 
brought out and a case was made for understanding others 
within a framework. In the present chapter I have tried 
to argue that this understanding is best 'captured' 
within a narrative. However, when narratives are examined 
it starts to become clear that not only do they vary in 
content as perceptions of events vary but that attempting 
to use them to isolate causes or provide explanations is 
fraught with other problems. Some of these deal with the 
ideological underpinnings of biography, while others deal 
with the ways in which questions influence answers and so 
on. In other words the very attempt to deal with one set 
of problems has given rise to quite another set. I want 
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to say, however, that I do not think that the new set of 
problems is an insurmountable obstacle, rather that they 
call for a different approach. This approach falls mainly 
within what has been referred to in linguistics as 
'pragmatics'. This, of course, would change the whole 
emphasis of research into human behaviour away from the 
observational type discussed in chapter two towards a 
detailed biographical type - resembling case history - 
but which incorporates the tools appropriate not only to 
understanding others ('empathy' etc) but tools 
appropriate to understanding the medium in which such 
information as there is is recorded. In my view this is a 
narrative and therefore the appropriate tools are 
linguistic. 
Having put the section into context, I will now 
proceed to say why I think semiotics and pragmatics in 
particular is necessary to understanding a narrative and, 
indeed, to writing one. Earlier in the chapter I argued 
that in order to say what was happening it was necessary 
to obtain an overall view of the situation. What I did 
not say, at that point, was that part of the overall 
situation or context are the locutionary factors at play. 
This is obviously a very complex area but I think that 
its implications for educational research are fairly 
straightforward. Firstly, most, if not all educational 
research is an attempt to answer a question. This 
question, which consequently contextualises the research, 
needs to be recognised and taken into account at the 
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outset, since, as I will show, questions prescribe limits 
to possible or admissible answers. Secondly, many of the 
agents whose descriptions eventually become part of the 
narrative will have given them as answers to a question. 
What they say will therefore need to be looked at in a 
more general context which includes the speech act in 
which they are involved and (which is part of the same 
thing) at the way in which they perceive the audience. A 
Head, for example, whose school is threatened with 
closure because of low academic results - as happened 
recently at Kingsdale School in Southwark37 - has a 
completely different perception of the audience (the 
readers of the Independent newspaper, the Times 
Educational Supplement and so on) than, say, the parents 
of a pupil leaving with very low GCSE results. 
Educational research, of course, does not need to 
correct what is said, what it needs to do is to 
understand more fully the influences such factors have on 
the agents involved and incorporate these into the 
narrative itself. There appear to be two different 
activities involved in this process. The first concerns 
philosophers and the work they do which helps the 
educational researcher and there is the work the 
researcher does in incorporating such information in the 
narrative. I will look at some work which has been done 
in the former area and then attempt to see the 
implications it might have for the researcher. 
Before beginning, I think we need to recap a 
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little, if only to identify the problem or, perhaps, more 
importantly, to show that there is a problem and the type 
of problem it is. In the account given by Hart and Honore, 
causal identification has a large subjective component. 
This refers to perceptions that (a) conditions were 
normal and that (b) agents were, indeed, acting 
voluntarily. I call these 'subjective' because they 
cannot be directly obtained from the situation: they are, 
largely, the way we construe the situation. This can be 
seen more easily if we accept firstly, that what counts 
as normal is a relative judgement and secondly, that what 
counts as voluntary carries with it metaphysical 
underpinnings, the rejection of which might entail a 
different interpretation of what constitutes antecedent 
conditions. The same subjective elements are to be seen 
in Mackie's account: the cause is not sufficient and not, 
by itself, necessary. A short circuit, to repeat his 
example, cannot, without other conditions being met, 
cause a fire. On the other hand other things could start 
a fire. When, therefore, we identify something as a cause 
we are making a choice. We firstly set parameters around 
a situation and then select from among various possible 
candidates something which we call the cause. Both 
selections, the situation and the identification, have a 
subjective element. Using Mackie's example, again, we 
could, for example, widen the situational context and 
identify the electrician who renewed the wiring as the 
cause, or, to take the example further, we could identify 
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the householder who chose an unqualified electrician 
(because he was cheap) as the cause - or was it the need 
to save money? 
The question, then, is how does further 
information about the interrogative context aid us in 
either the identification of causes or in writing the 
narrative. The work of Rescher and Putnam are relevant 
here as they highlight this very point. Rescher's38  
comments illuminate the problem because they tend to show 
that the very questions we ask in an enquiry about causes 
preclude certain, otherwise possible, answers. This, I 
think is fairly easily shown if we add to my last, 
extended, example, three questioners. The first, is an 
inspector from the electricians' guild. He is trying to 
eliminate unqualified electricians from carrying out work 
by making a report which is intended to show the damage 
they cause. His question is, 'who put in the wiring and 
was he qualified to do so?' Would it be illogical or 
somehow empirically wrong for the inspector to identify 
our 'electrician' as the cause of the fire? I think not. 
The second question comes from Mackie's expert who p as 
we have seen,identifies the cause as the short circuit. 
The third comes from the wife who has always suspected 
that her husband is careless about house maintenance: she 
asks if her husband checked on the qualifications of the 
electrician and whether he regularly looked at the wiring 
to see if it was deteriorating. Would it be empirically 
L. 
wrong or logically absurd if she cameLthe conclusion that 
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her husband caused the fire through neglect? 
Hilary Putnam39argues a similar point, but in 
the wider context of questions seeking explanations as 
answers. He quotes an interesting example from the 
ethnographer Garfinkel. He cites three examples of 
questions where an explanation is expected. I will 
paraphrase them first. In the first a professor is found 
naked in a girls' dormitory and the explanation given as 
to why he was there is that he could not leave without 
exceeding the speed of light. The explanation is 
justified in terms of the covering law. In the second a 
square peg does not go through a round hole with the same 
dimensions. The explanation given is that by computation 
we find that trajectories that take the peg through the 
square hole will not take it through the round hole. (The 
covering law comes from physics.) While in the third a 
famous bank robber is asked why he robs banks by (a) a 
priest and (b) a robber. 
Putnam comments that while the first and second 
satisfy the Deductive-Nomological model of explanations, 
they are terrible explanations. They are terrible 
explanations, he argues, because in the first example we 
knew this explanation could be given before asking; what we 
wanted was another explanation. 'Why' questions, he argues, 
presuppose certain interests. Because we wanted to know, 
not what physically stopped the professor leaving, which 
should have been obvious, but why he was there at all, the 
explanation violates background interests. In the case of 
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the second example we don't know or even want to know the 
mathematics of trajectories that can be given, because 
the answer can be given in terms of one simple 
mathematical fact. This explanation therefore violates 
methodological interests. In the third example he quotes 
Garfinkel's remark that 'Why' questions always presuppose 
a 'space of relevant alternatives '.The questions are 
relative to assumptions about the questioner: priests 
want to know whypeople are driven to rob, the robber 
wants to know the reason for robbing banks as opposed 
to, say, large houses which are less well guarded etc. 
So, reinforcing Rescher's points, questions and the 
answers given are interest-relative and, without some 
prior understanding, agreement or assumptions, the 'space 
of relevant alternatives', when applied to questions 
about causes, may throw up a whole host of possible 
candidates to fill Mackie's 'indispensable part'. 
Putnam's own contribution to a form of rationalization, 
given in the context of a reply to Quine on indeterminate 
translation, is the submission that we must assume some 
familiar explanation to our own. In other words, the 
wider court of appeal to which we apply in differently 
identified causes is that of a consensus amongst people 
who share, or who have agreed, prior to the 
investigation, to share a common view. 
One aid to solving some of the difficulties 
outlined involves, as I have suggested, work in the area 
of pragmatics. What is needed, in other words, is a much 
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better understanding of the ways in which the language we 
use to record our actions and the ways we have of 
questioning and answering each other function. I include, 
in the footnotes,40a list of work along these lines 
which appears to be helpful. I also include (in a short 
41 
appendix 41) an example of my own, of the way in which 
such work could be used in the analysis of behaviour in 
an educational setting. 
The problem I attempt to deal with there looks at 
the relationship between questions and answers and the 
various factors which influence their relationship. I 
have suggested a method which utilises a notion of 
expected response. Questions which elicit a response 
which is appropriate to it are said to be convergent. 
Degrees of convergence can be gauged by the rhetorical 
relationships involved. The example is intended to show 
two things. Firstly, how a linguistic approach can go 
some way to resolving questions concerning explanations 
and causes and secondly, how this method can be applied 
to educational situations. 
As a consequence, most of what I have to say about 
the help philosophers of language can be to educational 
research is implicit in the appendix. More explicity, 
however, there seem to be a number of significant points 
which may be picked out. Firstly, a working knowledge of 
the ways in which speech and actions are contextualized 
by locutionary factors is going to be an almost necessary 
requirement for the person making the narrative. 
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Secondly, that while the answers given should not be 
altered, the locutionary context should be spelled out so 
that what is said can be seen in the light of those 
factors. The main implication is therefore that any 
researcher engaged in the collection of a narrative will 
have to have a certain level of expertise not only in 
interviewing but also in attempting to obtain information 
- including that about the speech act - which makes 
answers differ. This brings us neatly to the next section 
which deals with objectivity, for if, as is usual, 
accounts and explanations do differ, we also need to be 
aware of what makes them differ and have some possible 
solution to the question, 'which, if any, and on what 
grounds, are differing narratives true?' 
5.40 	 Narratives and Objectivity.  
I come now to one of the central questions which 
will concern those engaged in educational research: how 
can we ensure that narratives are objective. It will be 
apparent by now that this is an extremely complex 
question not only because of the difficulties raised in 
the latter part of chapter four but also because of the 
various ways narratives can be both written and read. 
What follows therefore is going to be far from definitive 
- it will only begin to address the issues. 
Before I begin let us review some of the ways 
which may make narratives differ. (a) - (e) come from 
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what has been said, (f) - (g) because of what will be 
said while (h) simply stands to reason. 
(a) Differing historical perspectives which may 
include both cultural or ideological perspectives. 
(4.10-41) 
(b) The perspective a group - such as an interest 
group might have - as opposed to that which an 
individual might have. (5.20) 
(c) Difficulties which were discussed in the latter 
parts of chapter four which arise from the 
'opacity' of intentions (or, for example, the 
ambiguity of convention.) (4.50-4) 
(d) Actual disagreements about what happened which 
might have arisen because differing narrative 
contexts have been assumed. (5.20) 
(e) Differing locutionary contexts. (5.30) 
(f) Disagreements as to what constitutes an objective 
account of events. (5.41) 
(g) The way in which historical events are put 
together. (5.42) 
(h) Biased accounts. 
In this section I shall be concerned with (f) 
and (g). This, obviously, is not because I think that 
these are the only two factors which effect objectivity, 
but because they have not yet been dealt with. It should 
be stressed, therefore, that (a) - (h) all enter into the 
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question of objectivity. What will be seen, I hope, is 
that in looking at (f) and (g) all the others fall into 
place. The reason is that when a sequence of events has 
to be written out an understanding of ideology, culture, 
intentions, conventions, audience-relativity, speech acts 
and differing views has to be taken into account. 
In looking at this area I shall use the work of 
historians. This is mainly because historians, by the 
nature of their work, have been engaged in writing out a 
sequence of events. I am not suggesting for one moment 
that they are in any sense a paradigm for the type of 
research I outline in chapter seven. To do so would 
ignore the importance I have placed on discovering actual 
agents intentions, actual social conventions, actual 
disagreements and so on all of which would be unavailable 
to all but contemporary historians. I shall attempt to 
show the importance of agency, locutionary factors and so 
on in what I have to say by underlining them in the 
context of what I have to say about (f) and (g). I hope 
that this will underline their importance without going 
over the same ground again. 
I will begin with (f), which is the objectivity 
of historical events. My main argument will be that 
any narrator, historian or other, who thinks that one can 
simply provide a sequenced set of events or chronicle is 
sadly mistaken. The mistake is that it ignores the 
importance of most of the factors I have listed as (a) - 
(e). I shall refer, where necessary, to this as naive 
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historiography. I shall then move on to a second section 
which centres on (g) where the opposite appears to be the 
case. This is where history has become - because of the 
insurmountable problems inherent in naive historiography 
- a fiction: an author's imposition of a story where the 
events which occur play little or no role at all. This I 
shall refer to as fictive historiography. I refer to the 
first section as 5.41 and to the second as 5.42. The 
attempt to find a middle path is outlined in 5.43 which 
is then followed by my main conclusions regarding 
objectivity in 5.60. 
5.41 	 Naive Historiography 
History has been traditionally divided into two 
(broad) parts or stages. The first is the collection - or 
examination - of a chronicle of events while the second 
is an explanation of the events. My argument is that this 
simple division cannot be sustained. The reason, already, 
indicated is that the questions asked by the narrators 
and their contextual setting, together with the 
perceptions those narrators have of possible or 
admissible explanations is already at work in the 
construction of the narrative and its content. This 
influences the work of historians - or contemporary 
researchers - in two distinct ways. Firstly, in the case 
of the modern historian who is engaged in writing 
history, it influences the way that historian perceives 
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his or her own work. In the case of modern historians 
attempting to work on historical texts the influence is 
more subtle. It is subtle to the extent that the (modern) 
historian must examine the interrogative contexts of 
the (ancient) historian with whom he or she is dealing. I 
shall take an example of the latter to lead into a 
discussion of the objectivity of contemporary narratives. 
The example comes from Caesar's 'Gallic Wars'.42 In it 
Caesar 'describes' the Gauls as, 'extremely 
superstitious; and so any person who is suffering from 
serious diseases, as well as those who are exposed to the 
perils of battle, offer or vow to offer, human 
sacrifices, for the performance of which they employ 
Druids.' He continues, 'Some tribes have colossal images 
made of wickerwork, the limbs of which they fill with 
living men; they are then set on fire, and the victims 
burnt to death.' 
I have enclosed the word 'describes' in speech 
marks to indicate the speech act which it implies: an 
objective account. Yet, if one looks at the 
interrogative context of the narrative, one finds 
that its audience is Rome and that its intention is 
justificatory not descriptive per se. It is a 
justification - to detractors at home - for the Gallic 
War, for the conquest of Europe. It operates as a 
justification by trying to show the miserable state of 
the barbarians and the benefits that could be gained by 
Roman control. Put, however, in its interrogative context, 
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what might be taken as objective narrative becomes mere 
propaganda: its truth value an indeterminate quantity. 
Now, returning to what I said above, if the method 
espoused by naive historians is correct and events are to 
be left as Caesar described them (which is an 
assumption) then it will appear to later generations that 
what Caesar said, was said as if he were acting as a mere 
chronicler of events - which, qua politician, he was not. 
Morton White, who would, on the criteria I have 
provided be a naive historian states his case as follows. 
43
. Firstly there is a distinction to be made between 
the narrative, which he explains as a conjunction of 
non-explanatory empirical statements, and history, which 
is the explanation of the narrative. 
Secondly, that the main problem for the historian 
is how to decide from among competing narratives of the 
same events, which is the better. After discussing and 
dismissing their selection on either subjective grounds 
such as interest and morality or on essentialist grounds 
such as the 'spirit' of the times he formulates his own 
ideas. These he describes as broadly relativistic in that 
they allow the choice of events to be made with reference 
to the aims of the historian. Further on he suggests that 
in the process of writing history the historian must both 
select facts in accord with his aim and 'colligate' them. 
By this latter feature he appears to be indicating a 
principle by which the collected events are organized - a 
- 237 - 
principle which he regards as resting on a value 
judgement that will sometimes be relative to differing 
standards of importance. Returning to his original 
question, he then suggests that both the principle of 
organisation and the selection of facts are subject to a 
judgement of worth by professional peers. 
The problems with this approach are twofold. 
Firstly, even though recourse is made to other 
historians, there is the presumption that a set of events 
can be collected independently and before an explanation 
of them is given. Secondly, what are seen as individual 
events are organized after their collection. The first of 
these seems to suffer from what I have referred to as 
naivity. The second relies on a circularity, the basic 
assumptions of which are hidden. The circularity, using 
the Caesar example, is to be found as follows. If it is 
assumed that Caesar was describing Britain then the 
account is descriptive. If it is assumed that the account 
was ideologically motivated then it is justificatory. 
Either way the chronicle must make an assumption. The 
circularity comes in when it is asked just how the 
historian knows which assumption is true. In order to do 
this Caesar's intentions need to be understood before 
anything that Caesar wrote can be used in a 
reconstruction of the times. This places the narrative as 
the outcome of sequencing events. But, and this is the 
crux, if our earlier arguments concerning the necessity 
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of a narrative context in order to 'place' such things 
as intentions, then that context is a presupposition 
of sequencing events. The narrative underwrites the 
chronicle - not as naive historiography would have it - 
the other way round. 
5.42 	 Fictive Historiography 
If the naive historian's approach is fraught with 
the problems we have outlined, so is its opponents'. The 
opponents view is that given the problems of settling 
which events actually took place (and here I suppose such 
things as intentionality count as mental events) and 
given the problem of sequencing them it is better to 
regard history as a form of literature. At its extreme, 
history is a story. 
An example of this approach is seen in Hayden 
White's book 'Metahistory'44where he class ifies the 
work of Michelet, Ranke, Tocqueville and Burckhardt in 
terms of literary styles or story forms. He identifies 
them respectively as Romance, Comedy, Tragedy and Satire. 
Similarly in 'Fables of Identity', Northrop Frye45  
identifies 'mythic' forms in the work of Hegel, Marx, 
Nietzsche, Spengler, Toynbee and Sartre. These two 
philosophers, however, differ in their attitude to this. 
Northrop Frye takes what might be called a realist view 
of narrative when he says of the historian46that he, 
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works inductively, collecting his facts and trying to 
avoid any informing patterns except those that he sees, 
or is honestly convinced he sees, in the facts 
themselves. 
For Hayden White, however, Frye is wrong to castigate 
historians for their 'mythic' style and even more wrong 
to say that this deadens their sensitivity to 'found 
data for in Hayden White's view  
...histories gain their explanatory effect by their 
success in making stories out of mere chronicles...(for 
they are) 'emplottements': the encodation of the facts 
contained in the chronicle as components of specific 
kinds of plot-structures, in precisely the way that 
Frye has suggested is the case with 'fiction' in 
general. 
The dilemma, then, for 'fictive historiography' 
may be summarized as follows: for Frye, historical 
explanations are plausible when they succeed in 
discovering the story implicitly contained in 
historical events; while for Hayden White they are,'made 
into a story (by) all the techniques that we would 
normally expect to find in a novel or play.' 
Ankersmit48takes an overview of this debate and 
argues against Frye's position (which is also that of 
Collingwood49). This he characterizes as a 'picture 
theory' similar to that in the Tractatus. He argues that 
it has 'a built in tendency to confuse things which 
should be kept apart'5° This tendency, he says, 
consists in the assumption that the 'translation rules' 
by which the object world is mapped into the narrative 
are provided by the social sciences and that this confers 
an unwarranted epistemological privilege on the methods 
of those sciences. A more fundamental objection, he 
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thinks, is that the 'translation rules', which are 
earlier likened to those used in cartography, 'will never 
be more than arbitrary selection rules...for the past is 
by no means like a machine...nor is (it) like a 
landscape: the "historical landscape" is not given to the 
historian; (for) he has to construct it.'51 
The second of these arguments seems straight-
forwardly convincing. It seems convincing for the reason 
that Hayden White gives52in response to Benveniste's 
conclusion that,53 'The events seem to tell 
themselves'. He remarks:54 
But real events should not speak, should not tell 
themselves. Real events should simply be; they can 
perfectly well serve as the referents of a discourse, 
can be spoken about, but they should not pose as the 
tellers of a narrative. 
The compelling aspect of this argument, apart from its 
simplicity, is the apparent absurdity in its denial, for 
we are dealing with a literary form when we deal with 
recorded history and not with events which 'speak for 
themselves'. 
These sentiments are echoed by Louis Mink55  . 
He comments that while it might be a presupposition of 
common sense, 'that historical actuality itself has a 
narrative form, which the historian does not invent but 
i discovers, or attempts to discover',56it s mistaken. 
The mistake lies in the futher assumption, which is the 
belief in the possibility of a 'Universal History'57  
which is the claim that, 'the ensemble of human events 
belongs to a single story (with) a single central subject 
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or theme in the unfolding of the plot of history.'58 
 
The narrative, however, for Mink, because it does not 
reflect the story history tells, cannot itself be either 
true or false. The reason Mink gives is that,59 
the same event, under the same description or different 
descriptions, may belong to different stories...its 
particular significance will vary with its place in 
these different...narratives. But just as 'evidence' 
does not dictate which story is to be constructed, so 
it does not bear on the preference of one story to 
another. When it comes to the narrative treatment of an 
ensemble of interrelationships, we credit the 
imagination of the sensibility or the insight of the 
individual historian. This must be so, since there are 
no rules for the construction of a narrative..(and)..so 
narrative form in history, as in fiction, is an 
artifice, the product of individual imagination. 
The situation, and conclusions, outlined here bear 
remarkable resemblance to both Hayden White's insistence 
that, 'historical sequences...be emplotted in a number of 
different ways so as to provide different interpretations 
of those events and to endow them with different 
meanings,60 
 and to McIntyre's comments on the importance 
of narrative context to desciptions quoted earlier. The 
main problem, as I see it, is in the fictive historian's 
use of 'imagination', 'myth', 'story', 'emplottment' and 
so on, all of which point to idealism. 
5.43 	 Can Objectivity be preserved?  
Firstly I will restate the problem as I see it. 
Morton White, Collingwood and Frye do not see the problem 
because they 'cut into' it at an arbitrary point. This 
point is located where events are seen as events without 
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the requirement of a further narrative in which to embed 
them. That this point is arbitrary is only seen when its 
circularity is exposed: intentions and actions are only 
understood in contexts and these are understood only in 
terms of earlier historical circumstances. Where, 
however, does the regress into the past stop? This 
question, I think, is analogous to the question about the 
proper context of an enquiry into causes. There is no 
'right' place to stop - there is only a question to be 
answered. Naive historiography is committed to an 
unsubstantiated assumption at some point and it is this 
point which is arbitrary. 
Mink and Hayden White admit this but do not see 
it as a problem: that there is literally no place to stop 
the 'emplottments' or the 'mapping' of events by the 
imagination is the way history is. It is a story. If they 
do stop then it is for reasons of literary style or 
imaginative flair, reasons which are, it seems to me, 
equally arbitrary. 
The main difference between the two groups over 
where to stop is not that one is less arbitrary than the 
other but that the second group does not mind being 
arbitrary: their world is pluralistic and the choice 
between Homer and Marx a matter of taste. Yet it cannot 
be just a matter of taste: there are reasons for 
supposing that 'Bright eyed Athena' never came among 
mortals as an eagle which are different in type from 
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reasons which question the notion of historical 
necessity. 
If we have grounds for supposing this then these 
grounds are not to be found in the nature of things but 
in what we find intelligible. We do not, as a matter of 
fact, really believe in Homer's gods but this does not 
hinder our enjoyment of Homer. At the same time I have 
reservations about the actuality of historical necessity. 
My reasons for being sceptical of the existence of the 
latter are, however, based on various historical factors 
which can be intersubjectively verified which have not 
pertained as Marx, on one reading, might have predicted. 
My reasons for being sceptical of a visitation of Athena, 
however, are not based on historical events - after all, 
no one denies that there were eagles in ancient Greece - 
my reasons are that I find the idea unintelligible. The 
problem, which will now become evident, is that I also 
find reasons - described earlier - to be sceptical of the 
findings of a positivist human science. The difference, 
however, is that I can give reasons which are 
intersubjectively understood for my scepticism - reasons 
which are ultimately grounded in a commonly accepted 
'intelligibility'. There is a problem remaining - 
although it is only a problem which exists within a 
transient historical community - and that is that we do 
not agree as to what is intelligible. Yet, there is no 
further criterion by which to judge intelligibility as 
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far as I can see, other than by as complete an 
understanding as can be acquired by a diligent gathering 
of various kinds of information about the circumstances 
which are the focus of our attention. 
This breaks out of the impasse not by grounding 
it in some unsupported assumption nor by losing sight of 
events altogether. It does so by a recognition of the 
limits of our ability to understand. It stops the search 
for Caesar's intentions from disappearing into Roman or 
British studies by admitting the indeterminacy of the 
search but affirming what seems to make the most sense. 
In the same way, contemporary narratives - such as the 
one I will outline in the final chapter - are limited by 
the attempt to make as much intelligible sense out of 
what people say and do, as is possible. It is in the 
attempt to make sense that agreement will be reached or 
not reached, as the case may be, and so what is necessary 
is not agreement but the possibility of agreement and 
this, I shall argue, is wrung out of a dialogue between 
the historical agents themselves and those who wish to 
understand them. It is my thesis, therefore, that the 
incorporation of many and various points of view, 
dialogue between them and an attempt between individuals 
- possibly with differing points of view - to come to an 
agreed and intelligible understanding of events, is the 
Os  
best we can do to be(objective as possible about a set of 
historical events which are recorded in a narrative. 
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5.50 	 Conclusions.  
There are four main conclusions I wish to draw 
from the discussion in chapters four and five. The first 
two are concerned with the role of the narrative, the 
third with the use of the narrative and the fourth with 
its objectivity. 
The first conclusion deals with the narrative 
itself. While it is tempting to say that a narrative is 
somehow a necessary part of educational research it will 
have been obvious that I have not seen it in this light. 
All my arguments point to its pragmatic use as a research 
tool. The reasons why I think that it makes pragmatic 
good sense to use a narrative as opposed to a more 
atomistic basis are as follows. Firstly for the reasons 
aduced in 5.10 which are, broadly, that a wider 
understanding of context is required if we wish to say 
what, if any, actions are taking place. This was also 
central to the arguments about the difficulty of saying 
what was taking place in the second part of chapter four. 
The conclusion is also supported by the role the 
historical community takes in deciding on appropriate 
descriptions - a narrative which consists in what people 
say is happening, is as near as we can get to the 
judgements upon which agreements are based. Secondly, 
non-nomological causes (agent causation etc) and 
explanations dealing with human events normally require a 
considerable amount of background material before they 
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begin to make sense. Thus the arguments put forward for 
the usefulness of narratives in order to discover causes 
and provide explanations is also an argument for the use 
of narratives as part of the investigation. Thirdly the 
arguments put in 5.30 and appendix A suggest that the 
speech acts which contextualise actions and descriptions 
are themselves an important part of understanding what is 
done or said. Indeed, I have argued that much valuable 
work can be done in understanding actions by 
understanding the locutionary factors which encapsulate 
them. Finally, the need for objectivity involves, almost 
as a necessary condition, a number of human perspectives 
on events. (I am not here attempting to define 
objectivity although I would subscribe to some such view 
as that put forward by D.W.Hamlyn in his paper on 
objectivity.61) As outlined at the beginning of section 
5.40, I feel that there are a large number of factors 
which influence the ways in which events are perceived 
and all, or as many as is practically possible, need to 
be taken into account. I have also given reasons why I 
think that certain points of view (Athena appearing as an 
eagle) are less acceptable than others. The upshot, 
however, is that again we are forced to take in a large 
amount of context if objectivity is to be sought. 
The second conclusion, mentioned above, is that 
narratives, if used in educational research, provide an 
excellent basis for the discovery of causes and in the 
provision of explanations. I do not need to repeat the 
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arguments of chapter three to say that cause, as used 
here, refers to an efficient condition which is not 
nomological in the ordinary sense in which they are used. 
Thirdly, as I have tried to show in section 5.30 
and appendix A, much can be gained by the application of 
various branches of semiotics to the interplay of 
locutionary factors within texts which aid in the 
ultimate understanding of the events they record. 
Fourthly, while I have not spelled out exactly 
what is meant by objectivity, (see the note above and 
footnote 56) I have suggested that a more objective 
viewpoint is reached if we take into account various 
points of view. I have also suggested, with McIntyre, 
that viewpoints which make intelligible sense are of more 
value than those which do not. This needs some 
elaboration although, of course, it would be impossible 
to do the subject justice in a thesis in which 
objectivity is not the central theme. Basically the 
rationale for what I have suggested in 5.40 is grounded 
in the arguments of chapter four. That is they are 
grounded in Wittgenstein's arguments about agreements 
in well founded judgements as the basis for objectivity. 
The objectivist, it seems to me, is committed to at least 
two positions. The first is that the grounds for 
judgement are found in the 'public' domain: that which is 
intersubjectively verifiable. The second is that while 
truth itself is not negotiable our descriptions of it and 
our explanations of it are. Objectivity is thus reached 
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through a process of negotiation and this process needs 
to take in various viewpoints in order to allow for those 
factors which account for the differences in judgements. 
Ultimately, of course, there may well be no agreement. 
The arguments I have put forward allow for this in that 
they only require a pragmatic conclusion. This might 
sound less than exciting for those engaged in 'pure' 
philosophy but in education, as in other political 
spheres where policies are required to remedy real 
situations, pragmatic agreements might be all there is. 
The last of these points was suggested at the end 
of section 5.40 and will be taken up again in the final 
chapter where it plays a central role. That role, which 
involves the participation of the historical community in 
helping to write its own biography can be seen both as an 
attempt (from 5.40) to make the narrative objective and 
as a direct consequence of the constitutive role the 
community has in making its own history (4.30). 
Before I come to the practical and substantive 
conclusions concerning the role of the narrative in 
educational research there is one further topic to be 
discussed. If, as Aristotle suggests, we use practical 
reason to solve practical problems then not only will it 
be necessary to have an overview of the situation about 
which we are reasoning (which was the point of the 
narrative) but we will need to understand the nature of 
reasoning itself. Thus, in the next chapter, I address 
the problem of whether or not there are rules of 
- 249 - 
practical reason and whether actions - which Aristotle 
thought to be the outcomes of such reason - can be 
deduced from any given set of premises. 
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Chapter Six 
6.0 	 Practical Reason: its use in Education.  
I introduced the topic of the thesis, in the 
first chapter, by way of a discussion between Paul Hirst 
and D.J.O'Connor. In that chapter I was concerned to 
bring out the scientism of O'Connor and contrast it with 
Aristotle's comments on what was the proper province of 
science. We have now discussed what might be called the 
fact finding element in the process and I have argued 
that the scientific method is inappropriate. I now want 
to move on to the second stage in an applied science - 
which is its application. O'Connor's arguments on this 
were that the application of educational research 
resembled engineering and he compared education to 
medicine in this respect. I have argued in the second 
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chapter that the concept of engineering in the context of 
applying the findings of educational research is also 
inappropriate. I thus wish to return to Aristotle for 
help. He suggests that the appropriate method of thinking 
out what to do in human affairs is to deliberate about it 
and having deliberated, act. Indeed, Aristotle considers 
action to be the end result of deliberation. 
This chapter thus follows on from the fifth in 
that it looks at how educationalists might apply the 
notion of practical reason - or deliberation - to their 
research. I argue that the use of various forms of 
logical reasoning - usually referred to as deductivism - 
are inadequate to the job in hand and suggest that there 
are 'ordinary' sorts of practical reasoning already in 
public use which are far more suited and able to solve 
practical problems. I do not claim, however, that such 
forms of practical reasoning are infallible. Rather, like 
the narrative, they take into account a great deal of 
relevant information and in various ways manage to take 
much of this information into account before a policy 
decision is made. The 'rationale' of the chapter is thus 
to provide a working basis upon which educational 
problems recorded in the narrative might be resolved. In 
the final chapter I will attempt to incorporate both 
chapters five and six into a substantive method for use 
in some educational research. The contents of the present 
chapter break down as follows: 
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6.10 Deductivism. 
6.20 Some Problems with Deductivism 
6.30 Practical Reason and Educational Research. 
6.40 Conclusions. 
6.10 	 Deductivism 
I have included this section, not out of a pure 
interest in the theoretical intricacies of practical 
reason, but because there is a real sense in which 
solutions to practical problems may result from the 
pursuit of a formalised system. If this were to be the 
case then educationalists could utilise this in order to 
to formulate policies which were directly deduced from a 
given set of premises. Having said this I must state 
that I feel that practical reason in everyday affairs 
seems far too complex a business to be reduced to a 
simple formula. Indeed, given what has been said about 
the complexities of merely describing and understanding 
human affairs, I feel that practical reasoners would 
spend their time more profitably looking at this 
complexity and seeing how we in fact reason in a complex 
world. However, I think it only fair to look at some of 
the more theoretical work done on practical reason, 
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perhaps because it may solve some of the complexities by 
reducing them or simplifying them. Having said that, it 
must also be said that I cannot do the whole area justice 
and thus confine myself to the work of Roderick Chisholm 
and a number of his critics as a fine example of the work 
going on in the field of practical reason. 
To begin (rather at the deep end) I will cite one 
of Chisholm's examples which illustrates, for him, how 
practical reason can be formalised:1 
(A) (1) p occurs 
(2) p requires that S perform A 
therefore (3) S has a duty to perform A 
(B) (1) q occurs 
(2) q requires that S perform an act 
incompatible with his performing A 
therefore (3) S has a duty not to perform A 
(C) (1) r, as well as q, occurs 
(2) r and p does not require that S 
perform A 
therefore (3) The requirement, imposed by p, that 
S perform A has been overridden. 
Of this argument form he says it is both a 'significant 
part of our practical reasoning' and 'a valid logical 
argument.' Von Wright, on the other hand, thinks that 
this is oversimplistic and that a fourth mode of modal 
logic: the deontic mode or mode of obligation,2needs to 
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be developed to handle complex human interactions. A mode 
he thinks would form the basis of, 'a schema of 
explanation...comparable...in the human sciences to that 
of the deductive nomological explanation in the natural 
sciences.13  
Anscombe remarks that she is 'out of sympathy' 
with the 'assimilation of practical reasoning to a 
trivial move of speculative reasoning'.4 In similar 
vein Raz comments that he, 'is not convinced by (the) 
implicit claim that the principles of the logic of 
requirement...go a long way towards solving the main 
problems of practical reason'.5 These 'main problems', 
as he explains, are to do with how we, in ordinary life, 
normally go about making decisions, weighing 
alternatives, resolving conflicts and so on. The question 
therefore (which somehow transcends Chisholm's treatment) 
is to what extent can a deductive account of reasoning do 
justice to the vagaries of day to day decisions about 
what to do. Since Chisholm thinks that it forms a 
significant part of our 'exhorting, justifying and 
excusing'6 let us see how well his treatment stands up 
to its claims. The central concepts Chisholm uses are 
those of duty, requirement, fittingness and overriding. 
Each of these, with the exception of fittingness, is 
mentioned in his example. Consequently I shall discuss 
these before attempting to deal with the wider question. 
Requirement is central and so I will make a start with 
it. In his example requirement entails a duty, indeed, 
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this relationship is the missing 'fittingness'. Examples 
of requirement, he tells us, include such things as: 
'making a promise requires keeping the promise; wronging 
a person requires compensating the person; virtue (if 
Kant is right) requires being rewarded' and so on. 
Further to this he formulates a general principle which 
'tells us that the relation of requirement is like the 
relations of logic: if it holds between any two states of 
affairs, then it holds necessarily between those states 
of affairs'.7 From this and an existential principle 
asserting the actual existence of such states of affairs 
between which 'R' (requirement) relations hold,a further 
five general principles are derived. These principles 
spell out when states of affairs are or are not logically 
compatible, are disjunctive or conjunctive. The 
conclusion, if we are permitted to jump over the detail 
which includes five axioms for right practical or moral 
reasoning, is that, 'a valid practical argument, with 
premises referring to requirement, and a conclusion 
referring to what one ought to do, would have the form: 
a's occurring requires me to do b; a has occurred; and 
nothing has occurred to override this requirement; 
therefore I ought to do a'.8 A 'valid practical 
argument', incidentally, will countenance no alternative, 
for, 'if, as often happens, two people agree on all the 
facts and accept the same principles of morality and yet 
find themselves in disagreement...then at least one of 
the people has failed to see that...some requirement has 
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been overridden'.9 
Anscombe, Raz and Watkins make different, if 
related points, about the use of requirement. I shall 
briefly state what these are and then add a few 
observations of my own. Anscombe's comments concern the 
logical status of the relation expressed by Chisholm's 
'aRb' where R stands for 'requires'. In the example, the 
relation is that between an event and a duty; but what 
event, asks Anscombe, requires mercy as an 
obligation?10 Raz makes the point more vividly11by 
asking why we should not act with malice even though 
malice might be wrong in itself? The point may be widened 
to question Chisholm's own examples: what 'necessity' 
holds between promising and keeping a promise or between 
wronging and compensating? The only necessity there is, 
even in Raz's case, is a conventional one: not one which 
is 'like logic'. Watkins asks just that when he says, 
'but which logical relations is it (the requirement 
relation) like?' Not, he adds,12'the relation of 
logical implication; for that obeys the...principle of 
augmentation...for it is a conspicuous feature of 
Chisholm's requirement relation that...it can easily 
happen that p requires q but p&r does not.' We are left 
then with a spurious use of the word logic which is 
brought in, one suspects, to cover the informality of 
convention with a respectable face of formality. Indeed, 
Chisholm's 'logic' presupposes a set of agreements which 
hold universally. This thought is belied by Chisholm's 
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quotation of Samuel Clarke13when he says, 'We may say 
with Samuel Clarke, "that our duties are a function of 
the eternal relations of fitness that hold among 
things."' One is tempted to add with Gilbert and 
Sullivan, 'Let the punishment fit the crime': the 
problem, of course, is that what punishment fits which 
crime is unspecified. Fittingness, which expresses the 
relation, is only made specific within particular 
cultures and times. 
We can now see why Chisholm's optimistic 
conclusion, that moral or other disagreement is 
essentially settlable, is wrong. The claim that 'at 
least one person...has failed to see that some 
requirement has been overridden' ignores or overlooks the 
culture dependence of overriding. It does this for two 
reasons. The first, already mentioned, is its 
contingency; the second, its intentionality. Chisholm 
presupposes a truth functional logic with all the 
extensionality which that requires. Unfortunately the 
resolution of moral disagreement through practical reason 
involves intentionality and that presupposes intensional 
logic. Whatever states of affairs Chisholm has in mind 
when he talks of relevancy, when they are human states 
they are 'under a description' and not substitutable 
salva veritate as he supposes. Consequently, disagreement 
may go deeper than the mere failure on the part of one 
person to see that overriding has taken place: there may 
well be a failure to see that the same event has taken 
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place. Two solutions seem possible as a solution to this 
lacuna: neither helpful to Chisholm. The first is that 
all cultures adopt the same stance to every practical 
issue and included in that is a weighting procedure for 
'overriding'. The second is that an extensional logic is 
developed for human actions so that for whatever x is a 
fitting desert for whatever y (given that what is 
fitting is agreed upon), x and y remain identifiably 
identical x's and y's in all possible worlds and 
narratives. 
Two further and somewhat surprising things about 
Chisholm's account are that it says little or nothing 
about what we usually mean by practical reason and, 
partly as a consequence, omits completely any mention of 
the 'springs of action'. Commenting on the first of these 
Raz14spells out what he feels a more adequate account 
must include:15 
A comprehensive theory may well include a set of 
technical concepts...but to show that they fulfil 
their function one must, firstly, analyse the logic 
of ordinary discourse on matters involving conflict 
of reasons and, secondly, show that the proposed 
conceptual framework can be used for the same 
purposes. 
This seems good, common sense, but, to revert to my 
initial question, can such a theory cope with the 
compexities of ordinary life and remain within the 
domain of logic. What I have to say next points to the 
fact that it cannot. 
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6.20 	 Problems with Deductivism.  
I move on then to more general problems with a 
broadly deductive approach to practical reason. 
Anscombe puts one of the main problems with Chisholm's 
account quite caustically. She offers a practical 
syllogism: 'Nicotine is a deadly poison, what's in this 
bottle is nicotine' and draws the 'wrong' conclusion - 
'so I'll drink it.'16 I say 'caustic' because it 
reveals a complete inadequacy in Chisholm's work which is 
that it has no account of agency or intentionality. One 
presupposition of making the correct 'deduction' in a 
syllogism is knowing what the agent's intentions are: in 
this case, suicide. Without that the formal system is 
vacuous. A further point, related to my comments on 
narrativity, is made by David Milligan17who shows how 
important the context is for understanding an agent's 
reasons. The context, he says, presupposed by most 
logicians working on practical reason is one in which 
there is 'a clearly established purpose and only one 
means of achieving it.,18  This context however is very 
unusual, even in simple cases, it being far more usual 
for the agent to have to make a choice between 
alternative means or, since ends are appropriate to a 
decision, between alternative ends. He provides an 
example which could easily find parallels in an 
educational context:19 
Suppose someone is faced with choosing among 
candidates in an election...He might, in such a 
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situation, be fairly sure about what he wants the 
government or committee to achieve, and thus all he 
has to decide is which of the candidates seems most 
likely the achievement of that end. On the other hand 
he might not be so sure, and yet feel he has an 
obligation to vote. Before he deliberates he might be 
uncertain about what the government or committee 
should be trying to do, and part of his deliberation 
would involve deciding about just that. Indeed it 
could be argued that no reasonable decision about 
voting could be made until that question was settled. 
Another example brings Milligan20very close to a 
comment by David Wiggins (see below) referring to the 
same problem: 
...before setting out on a drive we have no definite 
plan. We first decide where we want to go, and in 
making that decision we may not have any definite 
purpose, such as finding some rare plant. All we know 
is that we want an enjoyable outing and that many 
different ones would be enjoyable. 
Wiggins, who calls such examples 'non-technical', says of 
them:21 
that I shall have an extremely vague description of 
something I want - a good life, a satisfying 
profession, an interesting holiday, an amusing 
evening - and the problem is not to see what will be 
causally efficacious in bringing this about but to 
see what really qualifies as an adequate and 
practically realizable specification of what would 
satisfy this want. Deliberation is still zetesis, a 
search, but it is not primarily a search for means. 
Adding that there will be a coming and going between the 
end and the means until both an adequate specification of 
the end and practically realizable means are found. 
The main point of these examples is twofold. 
Firstly they bring out some of those elements of day to 
day practical reasoning which make it so different from 
the 'technical' account. The second, more philosophically 
important point is that it is difficult to see how a 
formal deductive account could be given of them. 
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David Milligan offers a number of reasons why, 
even for simpler cases, it cannot. His first point is 
that even where an agent seems to have a definite end and 
only has to calculate the means the situation is still 
less simple than it appears. The reason is that 'at every 
stage of the reasoning other factors than the tendency to 
achieve the one given end may be relevant'.22 The 
bridge builder, for example, might have very specific 
designs, very definite ideas about how the bridge might 
look and so on, but other, possibly suppressed, factors 
are relevant: what will be its effect on the ecology; is 
it, after all, too small for the expected volume of 
traffic; is it worth the extra expense as opposed to a 
smaller bridge higher up the river and so on. To this a 
deductivist might reply by suggesting the addition of all 
the other factors as augmentations of the original 
premiss. This, however, presupposes that 'all the wants 
can be known or fixed in advance',23which cannot be the 
case: consider, for example, that after the bridge is 
built it is found to have serious consequences on the 
local ecology and attracts far more traffic than 
expected. These results were not known before the bridge 
was built and cannot therefore be built into the premiss. 
Milligan admits that extra premisses might be built in as 
the deliberation proceeds and that this might preserve 
its deductive claim. However, in a further example, (in 
which someone is forced to give up his original end and 
hence the whole project because of a moral reason), 
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Milligan challenges the deductivist to show how such a 
non-deliberative preference could be built in to the set 
of premisses. He suggests that they cannot, arguing that 
deductivism cannot, in the end, cope with deliberation 
which involves choice, ordering of preferences or coming 
to a decision about what one wants in a particular 
situation. 
An appeal to decision theory is also dismissed as 
a possible answer on the grounds that it 'has little or 
nothing to say about preferences' and is only applicable 
where the outcomes of actions can be reasonably well 
predicted' .24 Still less, he argues, can it cope with 
a choice such as that faced by a school leaver for, just 
as in the case mentioned by Wiggins, deliberation is not 
merely of means but of ends in a dialogical sort of way 
in which little is decided until some specification is 
settled on. 
I shall focus on two reasons, both compelling, 
which Milligan gives for his suspicion that deductivism 
cannot cope with choice and decision. The first focuses 
on the addition of a further premiss. Using an example of 
a syllogism in which the first, true, premiss is, 
'Medicine is a good career for John because it is well 
paid' he shows that the addition of a false premiss such 
as, 'All careers which are well-paid are good careers for 
John' renders, as valid, the conclusion that medicine is 
a good career for John. On the other hand, the addition 
of a true premiss such as, 'Some careers which are 
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well-paid are good careers for John' renders the argument 
invalid. Further still, the addition of a more likely 
premiss such as 'Careers which are well-paid are likely 
to be good careers for John' only justifies the 
conclusion that medicine is likely to be a good career 
for John - which is not the stated conclusion. Summing 
up, Milligan suggests that no additional premiss which 
tries to turn an argument into a deductive form will 
reveal the real structure and in many cases simply change 
the argument.25 
The second argument focuses on the deductivist's 
account of mistakes in argument: mistakes which can only 
arise because the agent has inadequate premisses or 
reasons incorrectly. It has obvious force and 
consequently I shall quote it in full.26 
Suppose two social workers...have to decide whether a 
mentally handicapped child should be admitted to an 
institution. They agree about what should be done. 
Each might claim that they had made a responsible 
decision for which they could be held to account: 
they had reasons which justified the decision and 
which would enable them to criticise the alternative 
decision. Each might claim that, given the facts, 
their conclusion was inevitable. But they could 
criticise each other's reasoning - agreeing about the 
facts and not about what followed from them. 
What would be the grounds of the criticism and 
at what point in their decision making do they make 
the choices necessary for there to be responsibility? 
To try and settle their differences they go through 
the stages by which the decision was reached. They 
agree about the extent of the handicap, the effects 
on the different members of the child's family of 
having him at home or in the institution, the 
facilities and the quality of the caring at the 
institution, the effect of each alternative on the 
child's happiness and on his development. They agree 
that both the child's interests and the family's 
interests are important. Their disagreement lies in 
their assessment of the ways in which the interests 
of the child, the parents and the other children are 
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affected and of the relative importance of the 
interests of each. 
The challenge, insurmountable, as far as I can see, to 
the deductivist is how to give an account of this piece 
of reasoning: reasoning which is all the more important 
here because it typifies the sort of reasoning which is 
at the centre of attempts to solve educational problems. 
I think these arguments show that no formal, 
structural or logical, account can be given of practical 
reason. This poses a problem for anyone given the task of 
trying to say something substantive with regard to it. 
However, I do not think this is an insurmountable 
problem: logic is not the only possible solution and it 
was always an unlikely candidate for dealing with Kant's 
'mother wit'. The problem we are left with is whether a 
non-technical approach to practical reason either fares 
any better or, more significantly from a pragmatic point 
of view, has anything of value to say about better 
deliberation. 
I believe that Donald Davidson was right to point 
to beliefs and desires as the key to understanding both 
other people and ourselves. The point is reinforced by 
Anscombe's 'poison' example: no conclusion can be drawn 
from a practical syllogism unless something is known of 
the beliefs, intentions or state of mind of the agent. 
Anthony Kenny27makes the same point whilst trying to 
persuade us of the logic of satisfaction: he says, 'the 
defeasibility of practical reasoning comes about because 
of satisfactoriness being - like explanation - a relative 
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notion: something is not satisfactory simpliciter, but 
satisfactory relative to a given set of wants.'28 
Milligan fastens on to the importance of this and makes 
'feature wants' central to his explanation of 
deliberation.29 He lists five conditions of such wants: 
they have an object, the object has a specific feature, 
the agent has some 'pro-attitude' to the feature, the 
agent will try to bring about a state of affairs which 
has the feature and the state of affairs must 
non-incidentally contain the feature. Deliberation is 
thus, for him, a rational yet non-deductive method by 
which the agent sets about obtaining what he wants. I 
will utilize this using Anscombe's example in order to 
see how it works: the 'nicotine' has the 'feature', 
'poison'; the agent wants to commit suicide; nicotine has 
the 'feature' required of the object, namely, it creates 
the state of affairs in which death is the outcome, and 
so it is not incidental that the agent drinks the poison. 
So far so good; but does it work with Milligan's 'Social 
Worker' example? 
Let us, for the moment, unpack some of the 
complicating features of the social worker example. The 
first thing to be noted is the obscurity of the feature 
wanted. Indeed, it is a specification, to use Wiggins' 
expression, of the desired feature which is required. The 
two social workers have to come to some conclusion about 
what eventual state of affairs will best specify the 
desired feature of the want. What that feature is, 
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however, is not, as it were, given by the want: wants do 
not contain directions for actions - just as 
Wittgenstein's rules do not contain their applications. 
In this example, however, we are not even sure what it is 
which is wanted; except the totally vague want which is 
wanting to do the best - not even for whom is obvious. 
The common expression for this is wanting to do the best 
in the circumstances. 'In the circumstances' there are a 
number of people for whom the social workers want to do 
the best: the child, his parents and his friends. There 
are also many other factors; factors which, I believe, 
are not merely a backdrop to deliberation, but are 
powerful influences on the decision itself. These 
'circumstantial' factors - which are by no means 
determinative - include various groups, or 'interested 
parties'. In Appendix B30I explore, in greater detail, 
how these 'parties' might effect the decisions of agents. 
There I identify, as the most significant, three 
particular groups: those to whom a justification must be 
given, those concerned and those held in esteem. Although 
I will not go into any detail here one of the main points 
which I think needs to be made - and which links back to 
the previous chapter - is that such contextualizing 
factors affect the narrative in which actions are taken. 
Practical decisions made on the basis of personal 
benefit, for example, may be different from those made on 
the basis of the moral consequences. However, I think 
enough has been said to provide a pointer to further 
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considerations. Before that, and by way of introduction, 
I offer a brief summary. 
I mention, firstly, a number of 'negative' 
conclusions which are helpful in the sense that they keep 
in perspective the problems to avoid. These are that 
attempts such as Chisholm's to reduce and formalise 
practical syllogisms are too simplistic for use in 'real 
life' situations and that practical reasoning is not a 
class of theoretical reasoning which, in any case, says 
little or nothing about what we usually mean by practical 
reason. 
The 'positive' conclusions, upon which I believe 
we can build, are as follows. Firstly, what we normally 
mean by practical reason includes such factors as agents' 
intentions, beliefs 'pro-attitudes', relevant 'objects' 
of such attitudes and understanding of circumstances and 
so on. Secondly, that there is often a complex dialectic 
between means and ends which sometimes brings about 
either a different specification of the end or an 
alteration of means during the process. Thirdly, the type 
of reasoning employed in practical reason is not 
typically logical (according to the canons of logic 
books) and is more of the type referred to by Kant as 
'mother wit' and, further, as the 'social worker' example 
shows, is liable to differing weightings according to the 
emphasis given to various interests, interest groups and 
moral considerations. Finally that, while no 'standard 
case' of practical reasoning exists, the best examples 
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are to be found in pieces of actual practical reasoning 
where cases are put, weighed, contrasted, argued for and 
so on. It is to this that I now turn. 
6.30 	 Practical Reason and Educational Research.  
The key question that now arises is thus how do 
we find a more adequate method of practical reason which 
is of use in educational research. The question brings 
the thesis back to its origins outlined at the very 
beginning of the first chapter. These, it will be 
recalled, stem from Aristotle's warning against the use 
of scientific methods to either predict or determine our 
future. The correct methodology for Aristotle, where 
human affairs were concerned, was Phronesis - Practical 
Reason. I have taken some time to outline my reasons why 
a formalized, reductive form of practical reason - such 
as that proposed by philosophers such as Chisholm - is 
inadequate. Practical reason, even in the simpler cases, 
such as whether to catch a bus or a train to work, is 
often much more complex than it appears: are there any 
roadworks, will the 8.43 be cancelled again, will I be 
able to get a seat, will I make my appointment at 10 
o'clock, wasn't there something about a train strike on 
the news last night? Whatever the decision in human 
affairs something has to be done because I have to get 
there somehow! 
Having to get there somehow is a rather essential 
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question when faced with the legal obligation placed on 
schools and education authorities to implement the 
Education Reform Act! In this context the quest for a 
'more adequate' form of practical reason becomes at once 
both more urgent and more perplexing. Some ends, it 
seems, have been specified - assessments for pupils at 7, 
11, 13 and 16 years. Specified attainment targets for 
each level. The transfer of major educational 
responsibilities from the government and local 
authorities to schools, parents, governers and teachers. 
A timescale by which various parts of the Reform Act are to 
be implemented and various working bodies to aid and 
prescribe that implementation. It seems as if ends have 
been specified and that only means need to be deliberated 
about. This however is not the case. It appears that 
while there are to be attainment targets for all core and 
foundation subjects these need not be the same as the 
national criteria which prescribe the standards expected 
for GCSE grades. A number of interesting scenarios arise 
from this. One possibility is that pupils will have to 
take two examinations, another is that attainment targets 
will replace GCSE, another is that pupils taking four or 
five GCSE subjects which are not part of the national 
curriculum will have to spend less time on GCSE work than 
on the compulsory component. Needless to say the 
timetabling problems are daunting but, and which is 
worse, they are subject to variables which are not 
prescribed by the act. In other words, ends are not 
- 274- - 
specified - many of them will simply be decided by 
individual timetablers and individual schools. 
If it were possible to use the practical 
reasoning involved in the implementation of the national 
curriculum and then use this as an exemplar of other 
pieces of reasoning in public policy matters, then that 
paradigm might have been useful. However, as is patently 
the case, it is not a particularly helpful example. 
The conclusions of 6.20 help us to see why. Firstly,the 
reasoning process has not taken into account the 
intentions, beliefs and attitudes of those most affected. 
Secondly, it has not asked those most involved with the 
practical outcomes of the policies to be involved in the 
period of policy formation. Thirdly,it appears to ignore 
the enormous complexity of such radical policies and the 
effects they might have. Fourthlyr its implementation is 
not merely the clearcut technical matter which phrases 
such as 'phased introduction' lead us to believe. 
Fifthly, its carefully constructed terminology supporting 
its case is often no more than a clever use of rhetoric 
which actually distracts from possibly important 
educational considerations. Finally, as suggested, while 
it appears to have specified ends these are not at all 
clear and need to be clarified if chaos is not to ensue. 
These comments, however, do bring out some of the 
issues that are central to practical reasoning relevant 
to the formation of public policies. They highlight the 
need to look at alternative policies. They highlight the 
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need to expose rhetoric as against reasoned argument. 
They highlight the need to consult, at various stages, 
those who are involved in the actual implementation of 
the policy. They highlight the need for consensus and 
openness in important public policy and the need to 
identify practical problems arising from such a policy 
before they arise in practice. Of course, comments such 
as these presuppose a prior commitment to various 
democratic ideals such as equality of respect and 
personal autonomy which, while not constitutive elements 
of practical reason in general, do seem to be required as 
a matter of ethical propriety by the fact that they are 
fundamentally matters of public concern. They also help 
to prescribe some parameters around the notion of 
practical reason in public affairs even though such 
parameters might, in themselves, be unnecessary in all 
cases. Having said that, however, there does seem to be 
- from what has been said of the importance of historical 
practice - some justification for looking at the 
'methodology' within a public debate. Not, however, as an 
exemplar for Educational Research - for it contains many 
weaknesses as well as strengths - but as an example of 
how we do, as a matter of fact, go about resolving major 
policy issues. 
6.31 	 The Energy Debate and Practical Reason.  
As stated,I look at the public debate over 
- 276 - 
various forms of energy not as an exemplar or paradigm 
for practical reason in educational contexts but rather 
as a means of exploring some of the intricacies of an 
actual rather than a ficticious debate. I make no 
apologies for not using the deliberations which have gone 
into the introduction of the national curriculum instead 
for the reasons outlined. I hope to show, however, both 
how the following discussion might be of use to a wide 
range of educational problems and how, ultimately, it 
might provide the basis for a more adequate basis for 
specific areas of educational research. At the same time 
I am conscious that the energy debate itself is not 
central to my thesis and will therefore make every 
attempt to keep the detail to a minimum whilst 
highlighting the main features of the deliberative 
process which is central to the thesis. 
The issue which generates the need for 
deliberation concerns the necessity of providing a nation 
with energy and the alternative forms available. These 
are, in the main: coal, oil, gas, nuclear power or some 
new form such as wind or wave power. The largest context 
of the debate is not about ends or means but of the 
ultimate benefit to society. This then is where I make my 
beginning. The group we earlier termed those of concern 
are the members of society and their heirs, they also 
constitute the group to whom those responsible for making 
a decision are accountable. I will not reiterate the 
contextual factors outlined in appendix B except to say 
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that any decision must, in addition to these, be made 
within parameters already set within the society. These 
include land and property rights, conventions which exist 
within the tradition over rights of way, beauty spots and 
so on. 
I shall argue that in the process of the debate 
the central characteristic which has emerged is the 
formation of defensible arguments supporting various 
courses of action which constitute the means. These are 
then examined together and weighed. 
I begin with the end under discussion. It will be 
obvious that various answers can be given to the question 
as to what constitutes the greatest benefit to society. 
The particular answer given, it is interesting to note, 
plays an important role in the formation of the case. 
What sorts of answers can be given or, to revert to 
Wiggins' terminology, how is the end best specified? The 
most prominent ones which are given are broadly as 
follows: (a) that which is most cost efficient, (b) that 
which ensures the least environmental damage and a 
dependable source of energy, (c) that which ensures a 
lasting source of energy and provides work for our people 
and (d) that which utilises unlimited and free sources of 
energy. The features I have built into these specifi - 
cations might be equated with Milligan's 'feature wants'. 
Debate over which of these different ends is most 
desirable may take place at several levels. Firstly, it 
might take place at the level of the case brought forward 
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to support it. I will look at how a case might be made 
below. Secondly,it might take place at a more 
philosophical level in which the various features 
mentioned are contrasted and evaluated. 
6.32 	 The Public Use of Cases to Structure Debate.  
As has been noted,the public debate has generated 
cases. These cases usually consist in a compilation of 
facts, various arguments designed both to support the 
case and bring out the weaknesses of other cases and so 
on. What then goes into making a case? We might choose 
the case for and against nuclear power as the best 
known in the energy debate. The proponent of the nuclear 
case might think that it supports (a); it is the most 
cost effective. It has a number of drawbacks however with 
respect to the features demanded by (b) to (d), so its 
case might take on a double aspect - the first presenting 
the positive need for it and the second showing the 
weaknesses of other cases which are met. Let us explore 
how it might respond to this. 
Before we can do this it is well to remind 
ourselves that cases have a 'locutionary' context - here 
a justificatory one relative to a perceived audience. (A 
point which I tried to stress in my Caesar example in the 
previous chapter). In this instance we have identified 
the audience, the group to whom justification is owed, as 
the society at large. The notion that a case is not just 
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facts and reasons but is audience related and out to 
persuade is an important factor which I will return to at 
a later stage. It is in areas such as these, however, 
that the need to remain objective becomes paramount. This 
underlies my emphasis on objectivity in the previous 
chapter. 
6.33 	 Competing Cases.  
The case for a particular desired end may have a 
number of aspects and we have already sloughed off one. 
Other aspects might be classified broadly as the case for 
the particular end and the case against its competitors. 
Both cases often rely on a selection of facts seen as of 
relevance and both cases often seek to construct an 
argument around those facts. Initially, therefore, a 
selection procedure takes place: facts are chosen for 
their relevance to a case whether they are for or 
against. This selection presupposes a number of criteria. 
Firstly, criteria of relevance and secondly, criteria 
which identify 'pro-attitudes' in the audience. 
Relevance, in our example, might be determined by various 
other factors such as whether the fuel is readily 
available, cheap, dangerous and/or unlimited. They might 
include manpower and whether that is readily available 
and efficiently utilisable. They might include 
environmental issues such as whether the power station is 
unsightly or gives off a poisonous gas and they might 
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include such factors as the danger of the work place and 
so on. Indeed the list could be quite lengthy. Given all 
this, the facts which are relevant are chosen and, given 
that the audience has, or is perceived to have, certain 
pro-attitudes,the relevant facts are sorted to present 
the brightest picture. Justification, however, also 
demands defensive arguments which answer criticism. Here 
further facts are sorted to counter arguments likely to 
be brought against the case. These, at least in our 
example, will include research findings showing the 
almost negligible harm brought about by radiation, 
examples of low radiation readings and so on. At the same 
time, and for the same reason, the case will contain all 
the weaknesses it can find in the competing cases: acid 
rain, ruined moorland and estuaries, a high mortality 
rate amongst coal miners, unsightly pit waste, ugly oil 
rigs which are also a shipping hazard and so on. Again, 
facts are selected for a purpose and that purpose is 
determined both by the feature desired, the beliefs which 
give rise to it and the need to present the case to an 
audience. 
The second feature of the case mentioned was its 
attempt to show how many of the desirable features of the 
competitors' case it could accommodate. Here again there 
is careful selection of factual information and an 
argument framed so as to show how this case fits all or 
as many of the bills as possible. Opposed to the 
environmentalists its power stations are few and far 
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between and safe; opposed to the proponents of wind and 
wave it leaves areas of natural beauty as they are; 
opposed to the coal mining lobby it is much safer and 
cleaner and so on. Much the same could 	 be said 
about a further aspect of any case - which is the case it 
makes against its opponents' case - pointing out 
weaknesses, deficiencies and so on. 
So far we have only dealt with what might be 
called the first stage of the deliberative process. The 
second and most vital stage follows on and is that in 
which the various cases are evaluated before a decision 
can be made. In order to facilitate an easier 'unpacking' 
of this stage I shall summarise what has been said thus 
far concerning the making and structure of a case. We 
began by assuming that some unquestioned end was 
accepted: this we stated as a general requirement 
concerning the energy necessary to the benefit of 
society. However, such 'ends', as we have seen, do not 
determine the means - indeed, it is this which gives rise 
to competing cases. Cases consisted of arguments, built 
around factual information, which did one of three 
things. They provided direct and positive arguments for 
the project, a defense against possible counter 
arguments, an attack on rival arguments and they 
attempted to show how they met, within a degree of 
reasonableness, the most desirable features of the other 
cases. Within these arguments we noted that facts were 
selected by various criteria related to the type of 
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argument (defensive, positive etc) and by reference to 
what were perceived to be pro-attitudes amongst those to 
whom the arguments were directed. Choice is then made 
upon all the available information which includes various 
cases and counter cases. The decision - which is 
hypothetical in the present example - is then made by 
weighing one case against another. 
6.34 	 Case Evaluation and Weighting Procedures.  
How then are cases weighted? I think that it is 
fair, because of various interests and values, to assume 
that individuals will have pre-formed beliefs about which 
ends best specify whatever end is most beneficial to 
society. Any weighting will therefore take the form of an 
interplay between beliefs already formed and the 
arguments presented. I shall not here comment on the 
beliefs formed and will mention them only as they arise 
in the context of the case presented. 
In our example public deliberation is a form of 
thought based on the comparison of carefully constructed 
cases: it consists in a rational evaluation of the 
arguments presented. However, in the case as I have 
described it, cases themselves are neither rational nor 
fair. They are not rational (unless rationality is 
reduced to rhetoric) in the sense that they present only 
their own best case and they are not fair in the sense 
that no cognizance is taken of the value of possible 
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alternatives. This is why, if the deliberative process is 
to be rational and objective, it needs to take into 
account various cases and the rhetorical ploys each 
utilises. This aspect serves to underline my earlier 
statement that the example I am using is not a paradigm 
for any form of educational research but is useful 
insofar as it highlights structural elements - some of 
which are far from constructive or conducive to rational 
policy making. Weighting as a fundamental feature of 
evaluation is therefore central to rational policy 
formation. 
It will be obvious that, at this point in time, I 
cannot use the present example to illustrate how 
evaluation has taken place - for it has not been 
resolved. What I have to say about evaluation is thus 
prescriptive rather than descriptive. Its rationale is 
based simply on the fact that it would seem to be good 
sense to look at various cases, weigh them against each 
other and then make what would be, by this point, an 
informed decision. 
What then is weighting? Not wishing to fall into 
some form of essentialism I defer the answer to ordinary 
discourse where what is usually meant is the attribution 
of some form of value. Weights are normally allotted in 
the context of all the cases considered together. What we 
say about our methods of weighting often seem mundane. We 
say such things as, 'All things considered' or, 'I don't 
think A's argument was very good - he seemed to leave out 
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the fact that...' and, 'He was having us on', 'He might 
think that x has been shown to be safe but I don't 
believe him' and so on. Hidden below these blithe 
comments, however, are serious worries which a 
philosopher would classify as fallacious arguments, 
arguments with unsupported premisses, insufficient 
inductive evidence, and non sequiturs. And indeed, 
whether lay person or philosopher, these are the very 
ways in which arguments are evaluated and weights given. 
In the context of deliberation however, and even 
supposing that a philosopher had gone through all the 
arguments pointing out their inadequacies, I doubt 
whether a conclusion could be drawn from that alone. The 
reason is that all the cases will contain these elements 
(except in exceptional cases - but how many philosophical 
arguments at the highest level of abstraction are ever 
completely watertight?) and they will contain pejorative 
elements too, with little or no weight at all. Now it 
might be tempting to conclude from this that deliberation 
is merely a cover for opting or plumping but I do not 
think it is. The informality of the weighting system 
contains its own rationality and while it does not 
conform to the laws of propositional calculus it does 
contain its 'mother wit'. There are, after all, different 
arguments, different facts used in support, cases put and 
cases answered, justifications given and defenses made. 
There are also good reasons why some arguments are 
spurious, why some facts are not established, why some 
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statistics have alternative interpretations and by and 
large it can be seen whether any one case has a larger or 
smaller quantity of these than the others. It may well be 
that the inadequacies are fairly evenly spread but this 
points to the most important factor in deliberation: 
there is no simple formula, no calculus, no single rule 
which determines what the correct solution to a piece of 
practical reasoning is and because of this we are forced 
to rely on our experience of the past, our intuitions and 
our imagination, aswell as our rational faculties to 
guide us. This, if I am not mistaken, is the very reason 
Aristotle marks it off from theoria; the theory of the 
invariable. Deliberation contrasts with it because it 
deals with possibilities and not certainties. The person 
described as having practical wisdom does not need to 
know the laws of logic or the discoveries of science for 
his deliberation is a product of his understanding in the 
widest sense of the term and that wisdom, as Kant rightly 
says, 'cannot be taught in school.' 
6.40 	 Concluding Remarks.  
There is a reason why chapters five and six have 
been divided into two chapters although they both deal 
with the deliberative process. Separating them, as I have 
done, may have given the false impression - which may 
find its origins in the legacy of scientism - that the 
collection of facts or data is one discrete activity 
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while the formulation of a policy is another. This, 
however, is not my view. It seems to me that, given an 
educational problem and given that a policy - in the form 
of a set of recommended actions - is to be the outcome of 
a piece of educational research, the 'collector of facts' 
is of necessity well aware both of the problem and of the 
possible actions which may be taken. The necessity 
derives from the notion of relevance, mentioned earlier, 
for facts are, almost literally, endless and so, 
consequently, are narratives. Thus, a requirement of the 
compilation of an adequate narrative upon which 
deliberation can take place is that the narrator - the 
collector - is a deliberator. Deliberation, at this early 
stage, takes the form of looking into the problem, 
thinking which circumstances may or may not be pertinent 
to it and keeping in mind the possible solutions which 
may be practicable. Fact finding, therefore, even in its 
most elementary form, has a context and this context is 
the problem and its possible solution. The division 
between chapter five and six is thus somewhat misleading, 
especially if it is taken to reinforce the scientistic 
differentiation between research and policy. Educational 
research, if it is to take on board the complexities of 
human personality, society, history and so on, must work 
within a wide framework of practical reason and not just 
attempt to simplify it through science or some form of 
simplistic process of reasoning. At the same time it must 
recognise the relationship between the ends it endeavours 
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to achieve and the means it employs to achieve them. 
Policy cannot be hived off from research any more than 
research can be hived off from practice. Education is 
about people, and educational change is brought about in 
an educationally beneficial way when the people being 
educated, as well as the educators, are involved from the 
outset in the process of change. At the present time we 
have four distinct groups: the taught, the teachers, the 
researchers and the policy makers. Given this, the lack 
of dialogue between them, the all pervasive ethos of 
scientism and the absence a critical reflection on 
matters such as rhetoric, new policies, if successful, 
would seem to be more likely the outcome of chance than 
of reason. The final chapter is thus dedicated to 
fundamental reform so that reason, and not chance, is the 
dominant force in educational policy and research. 
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Chapter Seven.  
7.0 	 Substantive Proposals for Educational Research.  
Introduction.  
The thesis I have presented so far might, up to 
this point, be said to have three parts. The first, in 
chapters one and two, presents a possible mode of 
educational research which I have characterised as 
'scientistic'. This mode consists in two discrete 
activities:(a) experimental research after the model of 
the positive natural sciences and (b) the application of 
the findings of such research to educational situations. 
The second of these - which I earlier referred to as a 
type of engineering - is probably, though not 
necessarily, the sort of activity envisaged by a science 
of management. The second part, elements of which were 
- 292 - 
found in chapters two, three and four, was concerned to 
show how, for one reason or another, this model of 
research and application does not work, or, as I should 
prefer to say, is inappropriate. The third part might be 
said to have two components. Of these, the first 
attempted, in chapters two, three and four, to see what 
hinders the scientistic programme while the second, in 
chapters four, five and six, attempted to find what one 
might consider 'building blocks' which avoid the problems 
of the scientific endeavour and provide, at the same 
time, a firm foundation for a more appropriate means of 
making educationally beneficial policy decisions. 
This final chapter therefore constitutes the 
fourth part and attempts to create one viable, 
educationally beneficial alternative to what science has 
attempted to do. This, I consider fundamental to the 
thesis as a whole, for it has never been my intention to 
say that because scientism is an inadequate basis for 
education research that there is no adequate basis for 
educational research. Indeed, throughout the thesis I 
have kept in mind the possibility of providing a more 
appropriate basis for an actual research model taking 
into account the weaknesses exposed in scientism. In 
order to do this, 	 I have divided the chapter into 
three sections. The first (7.1) is a reflection on 
scientism. The second (7.2) is a bringing together of the 
'building blocks' and the third (7.3 - 7.5) is a proposal 
for a substantive model of educational research which 
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avoids the pitfalls of scientism and incorporates what 
seems to be necessary when dealing with human beings. The 
chapter breakdown is therefore as follows: 
7.1 Reflections on the implications for the scientistic 
model such as those proposed by O'Connor. 
7.11 Summary of the main conclusions concerning the 
scientistic model. 
7.2 Introduction to the main substantive proposals. 
7.3 The Research Proposal. 
7.4 Collecting a Narrative. 
7.41 The Range and Scope of Narratives. 
7.42 The role of the narrator. 
7.43 The role of the narrative in practical deliberation. 
7.5 The Panel and its role in Practical Reasoning. 
7.6 Concluding Remarks. 
What I propose, it must be said, is not meant to 
be a standard model for all educational research, but 
rather an example of how educational research might be 
carried out in a way which is not scientific. Many 
questions of both a philosophical and a practical nature 
will not be answered. Indeed, this thesis generates many 
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philosophical problems (about the nature of democracy, 
the objectivity of narratives, the best mode of 
deliberation and so on) for quite a few more theses. It 
also can be tested in that it concludes with proposals 
which are intended to be practised and not just left on a 
library shelf. I begin with a short reflection which 
relates my concerns in the first chapter to the present. 
It concerns the scientific approach to educational 
research and policy as advocated so eloquently by 
D.J.O'Connor. 
7.1 Reflections on the implications for the scientistic  
model such as those proposed by O'Connor. 
The major implication for the type of scientism 
advocated by D.J.O'Connor is that in the light of my 
enquiry (if conceded) it will no longer be possible to 
presume that a human science - including the so called 
'applied' branches, such as 'management science'- forms 
an explanatory background (in the case of the former), or 
a method of implementation (in the latter). A corollary 
of this is that the the roles of those involved in 
scientistic research and management cease to have a 
function. It follows also that in the absence of any well 
established 'laws' or known causal chains which might 
have been the products of such a science, decision makers 
have nothing on which to base their decisions. Where once 
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a policy maker might have based a decision on a known 
causal connection between, say, truancy and poor 
employment prospects, now no such 'hard' information is 
available. If our arguments in chapter three, at least, 
hold good there is no possible way of experimentally 
verifying any such links, be they reductive laws stated 
in terms of an advanced physics or laws of a 
psycho-physical type. Nor, if our arguments in chapter 
two hold, is there a way of constructing the inductive 
basis for such laws. 
As things stand at the moment, however, the 
'technico-rational' paradigm is accepted - on the whole - 
and policy makers rely on such information. Because this 
is the case, information produced by methods outlined in 
chapter two is regarded as knowledge and is consequently 
seen as a legitimate basis for technological - or 
'managerial' (in the human sphere) - application. We 
have, for the most part, and increasingly so in the 
present political climate, an overriding interest in 
technical control based on the findings of the human 
sciences and an unexamined belief in the efficacy of a 
managerial counterpart of the type of engineering 
developed, significantly by the Victorians, in the 
context of building bridges, railways and other 
industrial projects. Information in this paradigm is 
treated much as it might be by an engineer: given that x 
is the breaking strain of metal Y, the supports of the 
bridge ought to be z inches in diameter. Throughout the 
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first part of the thesis I was concerned to say, 
centrally, that the phrase 'given that x' cannot be 
assumed in human contexts. This, however, has the 
consequence of making the engineering model of applied 
human science redundant. The reason is that the 
manager-engineer must always begin her calculations with 
some given (See the crane example in Chapter Two where 
such assumptions had to be made.) Suppose, however, 
that it had been shown that children with a certain kind 
of personality and a certain home background always 
failed to get a G.C.S.E grade A then it should follow 
that a manager could use the information to help those 
children. He would have to start with what is given: 
children with characteristics s and t always fail Z. 
Policy would then be reached by considering which of the 
characteristics could be changed. On changing, say, the 
home background (with help from the welfare services!) so 
that it was not an s, she might then expect the child to 
pass Z - or at least have a better chance. But how is 
that kind of managerial function to operate? My answer - 
as outlined in chapter two - is that it cannot because 
the manager-cum-technocrat has no 'givens', in the form 
of hard scientific data, which might be 'applied'. 
This radical difference, which is central to the 
human and natural sciences, gives reason to question the 
distinctive roles of researcher and policy maker which 
have historically accompanied the practice of the 
scientific investigation. If I am right, although it will 
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not form a central part of this thesis, these roles have 
mistakenly been carried over into attempts at human 
science and failed. They have failed at the practical 
level for the very reasons spelled out in the second 
chapter, that the researcher who provides the 'givens' is 
not actually producing anything like scientific givens 
and that the policy maker - attempting to apply these 
'givens' - doubly fails; firstly because of the 
inadequacy of the 'given' and secondly because of the 
mistaken notion that management in education is an 
applied science just like engineering. A strong thesis 
which might be made is that the distinct roles of 
researcher and manager derive from an inadequate 
scientism and therefore ought to be dropped. I shall be 
content, at this point, to be wary of a hard distinction. 
My wariness, however, will become apparent in what I have 
to say later. The main difference being in the 
relationship between what is understood about the 
situation to be changed and the way it is to be changed. 
This intimacy is well understood by parents and teachers 
who want their children to change some aspect of their 
behaviour: it involves an understanding of the child 
because whatever change is sought is only brought to 
fruition by allowing the child to retain his identity and 
self respect throughout. What constitutes that self 
respect and identity has therefore to be known to the 
parent and teacher beforehand. Failure in this respect 
often leads to rebellion and, of course, failure to 
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change the child in the manner originally sought. The 
parallel to this in educational research - as I shall 
outline it - is in the appreciation the researchers have 
of the situation to be changed. Managers therefore, or 
policy makers generally, cannot act independently of that 
awareness. Where they do - and at the moment they try to 
- it will not be surprising to the parents, at least, if 
their policies lead in a direction which was unintended. 
I will incorporate the lesson in this into my proposals 
by beginning to break down the distinction between 
researcher and policy maker but also between public and 
researcher and between researcher and researched. 
7.11 Summary of the main conclusions concerning the  
scientistic model.  
I move now to a summary of what has been said so 
far. The points we have been making might be restated as 
follows. 
1. The distinction between research as one activity and 
policy making as another may well be a rather unhelpful 
scientistic dualism which needs careful consideration in 
future. 
2. Any model of policy making which presupposes some 
'given', resulting from the enquiries of a supposed 
science of humanity and which is in that sense 'applied 
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science', is ungrounded. It is ungrounded for two 
reasons: 
(a) It has no ground in the so called human sciences 
because they are not epistemologically sound and are not 
productive of knowledge about ourselves. 
(b) In human affairs, policy presupposes an understanding 
of that into which the policy is to be implemented and 
cannot act independently of those methods by which such 
understanding is brought about. Policy makers, in other 
words, must be aware of the initial process of 
information gathering - in the process of what has been 
called research. 
3. In the absence of a basis in 'given' information, the 
notion of 'applied' is inappropriate since it carries 
with it the concept of something - the given - which is 
to be applied. 
4. The notion of 'applied', construed mechanistically is 
equally inadequate, for reasons which are independent of 
its ungroundedness. These, as illustrated, derive at root 
from the inability of the practi tioner of applied 
science to mathematicize and quantify the objects of 
enquiry resulting in a fallacious analogue to the 
paradigm of engineering as applied in the non human 
world. (Or even, non animate world.) 
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Together these implications more or less render 
the scientistic model of educational research, policy and 
theory, both redundant and inappropriate. However, the 
present thesis is not nihilistic either in intent or in 
conclusion - for there are other ways of helping 
ourselves improve our educational system besides those of 
scientism. 
7.2 	 Introduction to the main substantive proposals.  
In broad outline any educational research will be 
generated by a concern - something is perceived to be not 
quite right, or, something appears to work so well that 
there appears to be a need to try to find out more about 
it. Educational research and policy decisions are 
therefore inexorably bound up to some view of educational 
practice or theory - it is, in other words, linked with 
aims and through aims to politics and ethics. Just what 
it is which generates educational research is not dealt 
with in this thesis because this is a matter of 
contingent, historical circumstance. However, without 
someone, somewhere, wanting to improve what goes on in 
education or the educational system, there would be no 
perceived need for research and change. 
What then is involved in this process? Firstly, 
there must be the identification of a need - some 
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practice, for example, which obviously works well in one 
school and could be beneficial to others. This situation 
we might refer to as the targeted situation. Secondly, 
there must be some account of that situation. In our 
example this might entail going into the school, seeing 
what is going on and writing it down. It is at this 
second stage that the beliefs, desires, intentions and 
so on of the people involved (a dimension which I argued 
in chapter three were so difficult for human science to 
accomodate) may be taken into account. I have suggested 
in chapter five, that a narrative might be an appropriate 
means of doing this. Thirdly, there must be some form of 
consideration about the situation: how, for example, 
could the teaching methods employed be satisfactorily 
transferred to another school with a different intake of 
pupils and different staff. This involves the process of 
deliberation which was the subject of the previous 
chapter. In this context it involves both a situation and 
a policy - the situation is the good practice and the 
policy is its implementation in other schools. 
The two things we have dismissed as possible 
methods in this type of enquiry - and which are central 
to the deductive-nomological scheme - are the possibility 
of discovering laws of human behaviour and the 
possibility of using logical deduction to arrive at 
policy statements. I have, however, provided some 
building blocks which can be used to build another 
structure. I do not argue that this 'structure' is the 
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only possible or even best possible means of arriving at 
educationally beneficial policies. What I do say is that 
because it takes into account the intentionality of 
actions and their context and attempts to work towards 
educationally preferable goals by a type of practical 
reason which is generally in use in day to day affairs 
rather than that which would otherwise be the province of 
expert logicians, it has a better chance of actually 
improving the education of people than other methods. Of 
course, since the thesis has direct consequences for 
actual research, this claim could be substantiated in 
practice. In this sense it meets one of Karl Popper's 
criteria for a theory, in that it is testable. 
The following list summarises the main blocks 
with which I intend to build. Their inclusion also acts 
as an explanation, if it was not given, of work in 
earlier chapters. I mention the chapters where it seems 
appropriate. 
1. The avoidance of some of the more blatant fallacies of 
scientism. (Chapters two and three.) 
2. The importance of historical context in understanding 
a situation. (Chapter four.) 
3. The intentional nature of human actions and the 
associated problems arising from attempts to make them 
compatible with extensionalism. (Chapter three.) 
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4. The 'embeddedness' of human actions in a contextual 
nexus the intelligibility of which presupposes the 
knowledge of a considerable amount of biographical 
material. (Chapters four and five.) 
5. The pragmatic need for some such 'tool' (in research 
contexts) as a narrative to 'contain' the complexities 
implicit in the understanding of human actions. These 
'complexities' include, minimally, intentions, 
intentionality, desires, beliefs, emotions, habits, 
innate reactions and historical context. (Chapter five) 
6. The difficulties inherent in constructing and 
analysing a narrative whether concerned with pure, 
objective description or explanation. 
7. The need for further work on the interrogative and 
rhetorical settings of narrative (and within narratives). 
I envisage that this type of work would build upon 
existing work both in pragmatics and speech act theory 
and attempt to contexturalise it within political, 
ideological or more general historical settings. 
8. The equal need for more work on the ways in which 
causes and explanations are identified, particularly with 
respect to the interests of the groups involved in 
identification. 
- 304 - 
9. The importance of the activity of deliberation in 
making practical decisions. (Chapter six.) 
10. The impossibility of deliberating about human affairs 
in a purely deductive manner and the consequential need 
for human dialogue to be (a) aware of its own processes, 
contextual influences and constraints, and (b) 
reflectively creative in its attempts to resolve human 
issues. 
7.3 	 The Research Proposal.  
I will now state briefly the type of model I 
envisage for educational research and policy. It centres 
around two institutions - the 'narrator' and the 'panel', 
terms which I shall be expaining below. There is no sense 
in which it could be said to follow from the building 
blocks I have outlined; there are, I am sure, other ways 
of combining them. 
In any enquiry there are at least four basic 
aspects to be considered. These are the perceived need 
for enquiry which is contextualised by some view of 
education and how it ought to be. In this sense, as both 
John White and Richard Peters have argued, ethics is 
central to education. Then there is the situation in 
which the 'targeted' educational activity takes place, 
whether it be mixed ability teaching, anti-racist 
teaching, the implementation of the national curriculum 
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or simply the behaviour of a particular pupil. Thirdly, 
there has to be some thought given to what is going on 
and how it might be going on. Lastly, there is the 
activity of implementing a set of actions intended to 
alter the situation in such a way as to make it more in 
accord with what was perceived in the first place. 
Given this framework I will now show how the 
notions of narrative and practical reasoning can be made 
to work together to provide a viable method of not only 
doing research in education but also of tying it up 
closely with policy and its implementation. As I have 
already stated I have not touched the first issue 
mentioned above, which deals with how education might be, 
because this arises in real life situations and is 
related to how educational practice is perceived and it's 
aims. We must assume, however, that some educational 
practice has been isolated for some good educational 
reason. We must also assume that it has been isolated 
because it either needs remedial attention or requires 
further understanding or explanation so that it can be 
implemented elsewhere. I have argued in chapters four and 
five that human actions are such that an adequate account 
of them, which is required if something is to be done, 
can only be achieved in something broad and flexible 
enough to provide a whole picture of events. While I did 
not argue that this necessitated a narrative, I did argue 
that, for pragmatic reasons, a written narrative of 
events which recorded differing views, most closely 
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approximated what was required. A well written narrative 
thus provides a convenient description of the set of 
human events which constitute the subject of 
investigation. A narrator is thus also required. 
The third of our basic parameters is that thought 
is given to the situation - thought which is directed 
toward some practical end. Practical reasoning about what 
to do within a living history requires that the narrative 
be read, the situation considered and possible courses of 
remedial, or other action be taken. It could be argued 
that one person could conceivably take on all these roles 
but - and it is a very important but - this would create 
unpropitious circumstances for both objectivity and 
explanation. The way around this, it seems to me, is that 
the roles of narrator and deliberator are not only 
separated but that during the process of deliberation the 
narrator herself has to defend or explain some or all of 
what has been written. The researcher becomes the 
researched. Deliberation is thus undertaken by either 
another person or, for reasons that again promote the 
greatest opportunity for obectivity, by a group. This 
group (which in very small scale or uncontroversial 
research might be one) I refer to as the panel. The word 
'panel' seemed the least innocuous of the various choices 
available. 
The role of the panel is to assimilate the 
situation, ponder it, argue between themselves what to do 
with it and provide a set of policies which when acted 
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upon put things right. In order to do this I imagine, but 
do not prescribe, that they will set up cases for and 
against various courses of action much as was discussed 
in chapter six. At the same time they might wish to 
either get a clearer picture of events or attempt to 
provide explanations for them in the sense of causes. In 
order to facilitate this, I suggest that they would be 
aided if they had the ability to talk both to the 
narrator and to some of the people described in the 
narrative. The end of the policy stage would come when 
the panel felt that the actions it proposed would change 
the situation with which they were concerned in accord 
with their brief (which takes it back to the original, 
motivating factor). The situation could be assessed by a 
similar process at a later date. 
This then, in broad outline, is the process by 
which I conceive beneficial educational policies could be 
decided upon and implemented. I go on now to look at some 
of the problems this method might raise. I look firstly 
at the narrative and narrator (7.4) and secondly at the 
panel and the deliberative process (7.5). I shall then 
make a few concluding remarks which look ahead to the 
possibilty of further work (7.6) 
7.4 	 Collecting a Narrative.  
Having a question to answer, the narrator is 
essentially free to put in the narrative whatever she 
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considers relevant. This demands deliberation at the 
outset, and since the deliberation derives from a 
policy-to-be-formulated, its parameters are set within 
that brief or desirable end. The narrator is therefore 
not merely a chronicler or one who passively collects 
facts; she exercises Aristotle's 'aisthetic' faculty in 
judging what is relevant, telling or of other 
significance from the otherwise infinite possibilities 
latent in the situation. It is this interplay mentioned 
earlier which is absent in the sciences which also causes 
a fracture in the distinction between researcher and 
decision maker, between scientist and technocrat. The 
exercise of that freedom is, however, obviously 
constrained both by the brief and the sensitivity of the 
narrator to discern something of significance in the 
situation-of-concern. To the extent that this 
'discernment' is a necessary condition of the compilation 
of a relevant narrative which is ultimately also 
comprehensive the narrator must possess some degree of 
proven sensitivity in human affairs together with the 
necessary intelligence to utilize such information as is 
collected in such a way that it is organized into a 
readable story about the historical tract forming the 
object. At the same time I do not want to arbitrarily 
prescribe that narrative contents should consist only of 
records of contemporary historical conditions whether 
these be in the form of autobiographical statements or 
general social desciptions. Indeed I think that past 
- 309 - 
events as well as non contemporary biographical 
information and even photographs of damaged property, 
weaponry and so on might well contribute to the text as 
well and as importantly as those taken from the present. 
The Collection of an Anti-Racist Narrative as an 
Example.  
In this example I will imagine that a narrator 
has the brief to provide a narrative which will form the 
basis for the deliberation of an anti-racist policy to 
be implemented in schools. 
The question which dominates the researcher and 
'guides' her selection of material is the production of a 
policy which, when put into practice, will hopefully 
diminish racism in society, perhaps with the school as 
chief medium. 'Guide' is an unfortunate word to use in 
this context because she is given nothing to go by except 
her experience, her best intuitions and, probably the 
advice of friends and colleagues. Since it is a policy 
which is to be formulated, past policies might be of 
importance together with the effects they have had or 
were thought to have had. This might involve looking at 
other educational systems such as the American attempt at 
bussing. Writers, such as Chinua Achebe, N'Gugi Wa 
Thiongo, Leopold Sengor and V.S.Naipal together with 
biographical information about those who have taken part 
in an active struggle for the emancipation of a 
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subjugated people such as Gandhi, Martin Luther King, 
Robert Mugabe and Nelson Mandela might also provide 
material for the text insofar as they have thought deeply 
on the subject or have first hand experience of racism 
and its political manifestations. The insights into the 
nature of racism in its overt and violent form in 
countries where it is institutional rascism or its more 
benign paternalistic form practised by British, French 
and Portugese administrators in pre-independent Africa, 
as well as certain forms of missionary work, can be 
derived from literary sources. Contemporary sources are 
unfortunately easy to come by, in the form of 
biographical material from British blacks in Toxteth and 
Brixton and from members of the various 'National Front' 
organizations which are increasingly influential with 
white working class youth who live in our inner cities. 
The experiences, successes and failures of the activists 
we have mentioned are also relevant to an overall picture 
apart from the intimate knowledge they have. Mahatma 
Gandhi and Martin Luther King, for example, believed and 
practised non violent protest and non co-operation. They 
were largely successful in the United States and India. 
President Mugabe and Nelson Mandela however, while 
holding the other two in high regard, do not believe 
passive resistance to be a viable policy in their 
context. The researcher might therefore be led to look at 
different historical contexts which are favourable to 
policies of various kinds before asking about the context 
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in which her policy is to be enacted. 
In order to record the narrative in her own 
context the researcher must compile biographical data, as 
already indicated, from contemporary sources which must 
include a wider spectrum of participants than those 
mentioned above in order to get a perspective beyond any 
one group or individual. To this end she must collect 
autobiographical material from not merely Brixton black 
people or even the Brixton police, but other people in 
Brixton who are, as it were spectators and may provide a 
means of synthesizing the disparate accounts from more 
involved participants. 
The general racism in society is a background 
against which the more specific issue of racism in 
schools is examined. Again autobiographies of pupils, 
teachers, social workers and parents give a fairly wide 
perspective on 'what goes on' at school. Presuppositions, 
especially of the perlocutions of reports, are of extreme 
importance in these areas, for each individual has 
reasons for saying more than 'just' what happened. The 
headmaster, for example, has the 'image' of his school to 
think about, the parents do not want their children 
'tarnished', the pupils themselves might feel that 
exaggerated reports will help their cause and so on. At 
this initial stage of enquiry it is necessary only that 
the narrator records what is, to the best of her 
knowledge, a truthful account and one which she thinks 
accurately records the beliefs and observations of the 
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people - various though they may be - who have supplied 
avowed information in the first or third person. 
7.41 	 The Range and Scope of Narratives.  
Narratives may be used in a wide variety of 
educational contexts and the example above is not 
intended to place research within a large socio-political 
framework and that alone. Narratives might be compiled 
for quite isolated and local problems concerning, for 
example, a single school, class or child. A school, to 
illustrate the point, might wonder why one particular 
class is unmotivated, disruptive and difficult to teach. 
In this case the narrative's generativity derives from a 
desire to see a change for the better in that particular 
class; it derives from an educational desire to see 
happy, responsive children learning and enjoying the 
process. There is no reason why a parallel conjunctive 
narrative should not be written which concerns children 
in the same school with similar social backgrounds but 
who 'gel' well together and enjoy learning. With this 
brief the narrator will obviously want to record 
biographical material from both sets of children and 
teachers. The children themselves will produce accounts 
of behaviour and theories about that behaviour which vary 
one with another. This raises the philosophical issues I 
have already mentioned about the difficulties of 
adequately describing educational (and other) situations. 
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The same will be true of the teacher's accounts - one 
reason for this will be their differing experiences with 
the class, some, for example will be amazed at the 
problems others have and vice versa. The narrator needs 
also to be sensitive to other factors at work within 
differing social contexts such as a class. One of these 
will be peer group arrangement and the major peer 
influences exerted on the class as a whole. Another will 
be detailed case studies of individual children and home 
backgrounds together with parental attitudes to schooling 
and the child's reflection or non reflection of these. 
In a similar way to the first example, 
'extraneous' material in the form of books written by 
teachers or others qualified by experience to have some 
insight into these kinds of situation are of relevance 
and might be included in the narrative. Additions such as 
these add a dimension to what seems a local problem but 
which is in fact a common phenomenon in schools. Included 
in the narrative there might well be a comparison between 
schools with both similar and dissimilar problems. It is 
a well known phenomenon, for example, that two 
comprehensive schools in the same locality and with 
otherwise 'identical' intakes have completely different 
problems. One, for example, has good discipline, happy 
and hard working pupils while the other seems to suffer a 
blight of disruptive pupils, unmotivated classes and so 
on. Hence, besides a conjunctive narrative about 
differing classes there might well be another parallel 
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and conjunctive narrative about other schools in the same 
area. These will presumably include biographical material 
concerning the actual behaviour experienced and 
theoretical material from pupils, teachers and parents 
concerning the differences. One reason, for example, why 
parents choose particular comprehensives is based on 
their perception of these differences. These perceptions 
need to be recorded and possibly squared against 
actuality. The correlation between parents with positive 
attitudes to school and the general atmosphere of the 
school to which they send their children needs to be 
teased out. 
7.42 	 The role of the narrator.  
From the foregoing it will be apparent that the 
narrator's role is both wide and to a large extent 
uncircumscribed. It is, however, related to a question 
which comes from the problematic as perceived; from 
another desired end to the one which is presently 
perceived to be the outcome of current educational 
policy. This may range from isolated disruptive pupils in 
particular schools or it might, as I have mentioned, 
cover the attempt to instantiate new policies such as an 
anti-racist policy, an egalitarian one or something like 
a national attempt to raise the level of literacy. In 
performing the activity of collecting information 
relevant to whichever brief generates the research I do 
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not think that there are general principles which govern 
such a collection, determine criteria of relevancy or 
stipulate completeness, comprehensivenees or adequacy. I 
do think that the researcher-narrator does need to 
reflect seriously about these factors but unfortunately I 
cannot envisage any guidelines, other than intuitively 
obvious ones such as asking truants why they truant, 
where the brief asks about truancy. Consequently the 
narrator's 'role' is ill-defined, except where it 
concerns the production of a narrative. It is as 
ill-defined as the war correspondent's role and almost 
for the same reasons: the educational situation, like the 
war, begins to reveal its own secrets and these lead 
where they will. Determining or attempting to stipulate a 
precise role would, in these conditions, be 
counterproductive. To balance this there seems to be a 
consequential need for particulary sensitive people in 
the role. Such sensitivity parallels Aristotle's notion 
of the practically wise. 
The narrator's role has a double aspect: the 
collection of information and the writing of the 
narrative. This, however, presupposes that a considerable 
amount of theorizing has gone on beforehand. Theorizing 
of this sort might include thought about such things as 
what is relevant, revealing or significant and about who 
should be interviewed, whose views provide an alternative 
perspective, what literature on the subject is available, 
what historical or contemporary figures have thought 
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deeply, taken part in or written about their experiences, 
and so on and so on. This, not inconsiderable aspect is 
not a temporally prior condition of writing, for it would 
probably develop as the narrative developed - but inasfar 
as the narrative is something like a novel, albeit, an 
historical one, such theorizing is logically necessary to 
it. This input will involve the narrator's perceptions of 
the world and will therefore involve her own values and 
ideological preferences, however consciously restrained, 
and will give the narrative an idiosyncrasy which the 
panel (in their deliberations) must take into account. 
This aspect of the narrator's role parallels the 
debate over value-freedom in orthodox discussions of 
human research models. I do not think that any discussion 
of that debate is either called for or necessary here, 
for I do not think that narrators can produce 
unintentional narratives. At the same time I do not think 
that narratives can be read as if they were unintentional 
objects and open to various compatible, yet 
incommensurable readings or 'misreadings', as is 
suggested in some work on narrativity and recent literary 
theory. 
7.43 	 The role of the narrative in practical  
deliberation.  
In this section I wish to bring together three 
strands in the thesis and explain how they work together 
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in the deliberative act. The first of these is the 
written narrative. The second concerns the context of the 
narrative and the third is the way these two enter into 
deliberation. 
Our starting point assumes some panel of 
deliberators who are presented with the written narrative 
which, as indicated, is the result of some question which 
was generative to the research, and who are able to 
question the agents who are themselves quoted in the 
narrative. The narrative is a text and qua text is the 
work of an author whose intentionality is of supreme 
importance. This fact immediately raises philosophical 
problems which I have looked at in chapter four. In this 
thesis, questions concerning the intentionality of the 
text replace the rather outmoded discussion of value 
freedom. The question, as I phrased it, is not whether 
value free research is possible, because the notion of 
value freedom itself presupposes an ontology of events, 
but whether texts can be non-intentional and whether 
actions can be identified as actions of a certain sort 
independently of their narrative context. The 
characteristic of actions I argued for, is that they are 
not identifiable independently of context and therefore 
exhibit what I refer to as 'narrativity'. 
The intentionality of the text will betray the 
narrator's identification of the three 'interested 
groups'. (These are briefly mentioned in 6.20 and more 
thoroughly in Appendix B) The 'interested parties' are 
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various groups in society who, for some reason or other, 
have an interest in the research or its findings. They 
include, as examples, groups who are concerned directly, 
such as those affected by the research or policies 
stemming from it, they also include those who have the 
final responsibilty for educational policy and possibly a 
group or person who is held in some esteem, perhaps 
because of experience or previous research. A narrator, 
for example, who is thoroughly convinced that her work 
has to 'come up' to the standards set by the Human 
Sciences (presuming she believes in their validity) might 
see the professional group who represent those sciences 
as the group of esteem. Alternatively she might see the 
group to whom she is responsible, and to whom 
justification must ultimately be given, as the dominant 
group. In this case her perceptions of the reasons they 
accept as reasons, explanations or approriate or adequate 
descriptions will influence the content and 
comprehensiveness of the text. If the group of concern is 
dominant,the narrative intentionality might be influenced 
by the knowledge that the panel of deliberators are at 
liberty to interview any or all of the agents who provide 
autobiographical material which she has recorded in the 
narrative. The fact of this twin interview does not 
guarantee objectivity but it ensures that the text, in 
intention, is accurate and it does so because both the 
narrator and the subjects who are the real historical 
agents whose 'voices' inform the text are themselves 
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liable to cross questioning from the panel. In this way 
the researcher becomes researched, the researched become 
researchers and narrator and narrated become 
co-participants in the deliberative process: they enter 
into deliberative dialogue with the panel and in so doing 
take part in policy making. 
Research and Policy as two distinct elements 
collapse, within this schema, into research/policy which, 
while dependent on the narrative, is itself a single 
activity which is fundamentaly one of dialogue. This 
to 
central feature brings usLthe heart of the methodology 
which is proposed: the instantiation of practical reason 
through the dialogical relationship which exists between 
the 'panel', the narrator and the subjects of the text 
who become voices in the dialogue. What then may be said 
of the 'panel'? 
From what has already been said, the panel are a 
group whose function it is to deliberate and come to a 
practical conclusion (i.e a specification of actions to 
be carried out) in response to the question which was 
generative to the project. There is no precedent for the 
make up of this 'panel', since no such body exists. 
Consequently, what I have to say is open to debate, 
reflection, criticism, revision and whatever else anyone 
else with an interest in it has to add. The closest 
analogue I can think of would be something like the way 
in which Lord Scarman conducted his enquiry into 
racialism. However the analogy breaks down at a number of 
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points which may be worth mentioning. Firstly, although 
agents who were perceived as 'interested parties' were 
interviewed, the narrativity of their descriptions and 
explanations was overlooked, with the consequence that a 
scientistic 'atomicity' pervaded the 'data' from which 
the report was ultimately drawn up. Secondly, while a 
report bearing some similarity to a narrative was drawn 
up, it came as a result of deliberation and not as a 
condition of it and it was viewed as if the narrative 
'contained' its applications - i.e its policies. Thirdly, 
the compilation of the report and the onus of drawing 
conclusions from it was left to the intuitions of a 
person who was perceived to be (qua Judge) an expert in 
practical deliberation. It was consequently and fourthly, 
not an instantiation of dialogical deliberation - the 
main criticism of which is that the report which resulted 
was, from an intentionalist point of view, author 
dominated. Nothing equivalent to an isolation of the 
factors influencing that intentionality was thought 
pertinent and nothing equivalent to a cross examination 
of the report which is performed by the 'panel' and in 
which the narrator becomes the subject of research was 
thought substantially necessary. This all leaves the 
report open to frustrated criticism - police who think 
their case is inadequately represented and black people 
who feel aggrieved because certain police powers were not 
taken away but merely verbally condemned. Perhaps most 
sigificantly however, the report has not become 
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substantive policy. There would be no point to the 
research I propose if there were neither intention nor 
power to implement the policies advocated. The thesis 
therefore has not inconsiderable implications for the 
power structures which govern the implementation of 
policy. Indeed, while no overt political stance has been 
taken, the research presupposes - both in its intentional 
lack of social theory and in its democratic requirements 
- a form of liberal democracy. One of the major reasons 
for this is the implicit necessity of a shift in power 
away from both 'experts' and centralised government and 
towards those who are sometimes referred to (in 
figuratively 'flowery' language) as the 'grass roots'. 
7.5 The Panel and its role in Practical Reasoning.  
I have argued that it is a panel that deliberates 
about what to do in the circumstances. I have also said 
that the panel has a description of the 'problematic' in 
the form of a narrative and is at liberty to request the 
'voices' in that narrative to appear before them to 
explain further what they said, why they acted as they 
did and so on. In this way I hope to have made room for 
the possibility of open and creative dialogue. What I 
have not said anything about, is who this panel is and 
how they are chosen or, indeed, who is qualified and by 
what, to chose. This is what I now intend to look at. 
The first question to be answered, it seems to 
- 322 - 
me, is whether there are any groups who, by virtue of 
some recognized expertise, have some sort of prior claim. 
There is, as I intimated earlier, some precedent for 
this approach as is indicated by the various reports 
produced by teams of experts usually headed by someone 
with publicly recognized abilities in relevant areas and 
by whose name the report is generally remembered. Mary 
Warnock is an obvious example here - having at least two 
reports: the first on the integration of children with 
special needs into main stream schools and the second on 
the possibilities and moral constraints of genetic 
engineering on the embryo. Lord Scarman I have mentioned 
and others include Newsom, Swann, Brandt, Plowden and 
Hargreaves. These might be regarded as the group of 
esteem by virtue of their expertise but not either the 
group to whom justification was owed or those who are of 
concern. (See Appendix B for a clarification of these 
terms). The single outstanding fact, so it seems, about 
the deliberations of the panels headed up by experts in 
this way is that the decision making procedure lacks the 
conflict necessary for creative dialogue. This is not to 
say that those interviewed, the barren women, the 
disadvantaged and so on, were all in harmony with the 
reports' findings. It is to say that because they were 
not made part of the decision procedures whose outcome 
was the report, their input made no vital impact on the 
processes of the dialogue. The concern, one might say, 
was taken away from those with the concern (to improve, 
- 323 - 
say, their own circumstances) and given to those with, at 
best, a professional concern. 
Is this defensible? I have argued in the sixth 
chapter that the type of practical reason adequate to the 
task of solving practical syllogisms is not analogous to 
a calculus but must take into account the complexities of 
human affairs. I argued, further, that in at least some 
human debates opposing sides conducted their dialogue by 
means of constructed cases which contained positive and 
negative elements. These, when put against each other, 
create, although I have not expressed this in such strong 
terms previously, a conflict of ideas which, when argued 
out, engender a creative dialogue. It is creative because 
ideas which appear uncontroversial to one group are 
picked up and questioned by others with different 
perspectives. A case, for example, might be made out by 
some staff at a difficult inner city school that the 
solution to the problem is in enforcement of a strict 
'law and order' policy. Others, however, might vehemently 
oppose this, suggesting that such a policy alienates the 
children, exacerbates the problem and leads ultimately to 
an upward spiral of anti-social behaviour countered by 
stricter 'laws'. The answer, they might suggest, is the 
staff-pupil relationships, constructive and relevant 
teaching methods and so on. The report system above takes 
this dialogue out of the hands of those to whom it is of 
vital concern and renders its concern lifeless by putting 
it into the hands of those for whom it is no concern. 
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My concern, as is becoming more obvious, is to 
make vital dialogue the centre of the deliberative 
process and this means involving those for whom it is of 
vital concern. There are a number of problems here, 
however. Firstly, it is possible that this group, while 
obviously at the centre of the problem, might, 
nevertheless have no real idea as to the solution of the 
problem. Secondly, it might be difficult to identify any 
such group. Which group, for example, is to be most 
affected by the introduction of economic awareness as a 
cross curricular 'subject'? Thirdly, there might be 
factors beyond the reach of those most concerned but 
which nevertheless effect the type of decision to be 
made. Fourthly, certain skills might be required which 
call for expertise. I will look at each of these in turn 
and as I do so it will become evident that the panel will 
require more that a particularly interested group for its 
functioning. 
The first problem - that no real solution is to 
be found - corresponds to what we referred to earlier as 
a practical syllogism with unspecified ends. Debate, as 
in Wiggins' car journey' example, is not about how to 
achieve a certain, specified end, but about how to 
specify the end. This sort of question is typified by 
debates concerning what we want from an educational 
system: the ends are not already specified. The problem 
appears in different guises at different levels in the 
educational system: philosophers wonder about the 
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qualities of the 'educated man' and about the most 
appropriate means of achieving 'him'. Parents wonder what 
teachers are teaching and why it is so different from 
what it was in their day. Here, I believe, is where the 
Warnocks, Plowdens, Scarmans should reappear, not in the 
driving seat, but as people who have spent some time 
reflecting on the sorts of issues at stake. Brought back 
in this wayl expertise can be helpful in deliberation 
without usurping it. 
Bringing in people who have reflected on 
particular educational problems and who, therefore, bring 
with them a certain amount of expertise does not solve 
the second question however - the question as to who is 
most affected. The group who are most concerned or 
affected by the introduction of a new policy cannot be 
involved in dialogue if they cannot be identified. There 
are certain issues in education which do not seem to 
concern any one identifiable group but society in general 
by its effects. This leaves the question as to who the 
group of concern is, very open. The sorts of issues I 
have in mind are questions about truancy rates, vandalism 
and physical violence. Society 'thinks' it has a problem 
with these and yet 'thinks' also that they are someone 
else's problem. Yet whose problem they are is not at all 
obvious and nor is it obvious who is or should be 
concerned about them. Teachers and parents are candidates 
for those who are mostly concerned with such things but 
whether they are the only groups is contentious. A 
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teacher, for example, may find half her fifth form 
missing and is in that sense concerned. But that they are 
missing is something which goes far beyond the teachers 
competence to either control or explain. Many, for 
example, would put the blame for a rising tide of apathy 
in the upper forms of secondary schools at the feet of 
the government. In practice, unfortunately, blame is 
often allotted by ideological preference. Teachers are 
blamed by both press and media while teachers blame 
economic policy. Parents - who, after all, are 
responsible for rearing their children - seem to get off 
lightly. The solution, however, may be in leaving the 
issue about concern and concentrating on what might aid a 
constructive dialogue and replace the present idea of 
pushing the blame on whoever looks least attractive. We 
argued, after all, that the identification of causes - 
linked in everyday conversation with blame - can only be 
carried out within a wider context of accepted norms and 
questions. It is the acceptance of different frameworks 
of just these features which makes the 'game' possible. 
Constructively the cases ought to be made to come into 
conflict - not on the streets but in dialogue. Those who 
are of concern in issues with wider social settings must 
reflect that width and include teachers, parents and 
government representatives. Expertise, in these issues, 
might be gained from those most closely involved with 
young people at school leaving age such as careers 
officers, probation officers, employers, statisticians 
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familiar with unemployment figures and so on. 
An example of the sort of problem I have in mind 
in the third of our areas, where certain elements of a 
possible answer lie beyond the reach of the immediately 
affected groups, might be the accountant who 
submits the cost of any proposals to the panel. This 
pragmatic but important area involves all those cases in 
which, for some reason or another, there are important 
factors outside the competence of those who are most 
concerned and which nevertheless need to be taken into 
account. Costing is one example. Others might include the 
implementation of certain teaching techniques, the 
architecture of schools, the setting up of a long term 
case study or the legal constraints to a recommended 
policy. Here, quite plainly, there are reasons why a 
panel might need specialist advice on certain, very 
specific, issues. Thus, while the basis of the panel 
should be those mostly concerned7 the type of decision or 
its implications will sometimes necessitate other people 
who alone can make reliable estimates. 
The last problem - where certain skills are 
required - could be construed to mean the same as the 
third: that outside expertise is needed on certain 
occasions. I do not have this in mind, however, but 
rather a more general set of skills which are intrinsic 
to the participation in dialogue per se. In some way 
questions in this area resemble those which ask whether 
the population of a democracy need some form of 
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democratic education. What, then does participation in 
democratic dialogue presuppose? Firstly, and, I suppose, 
foremost, is an epistemological requirement that the 
participants understand both the narrative, the issues 
and something about presenting and defending a case. 
This, as I have argued, is not the acquisition of 
numerous logical skills but rather an understanding of 
what sorts of facts support particular conclusions, how 
facts can be both for and against a case, what are mere 
rhetorical moves, how arguments are put together and so 
on. Further to this and, in a sense, underpinning the 
whole project, is an ability to understand people - the 
reasons people have for actions, the role emotions have 
in taking decisions, the part beliefs play in forming 
'pro-attitudes' and so on. Skilled inter-personal 
understanding requires something than a mere thesis could 
explain. It is consequently not something over which I 
have spent time. There are, of course, philosophical 
insights in this area which are helpful to understanding 
the complexities of human actions: intentions, reasons, 
motives, beliefs and so on. But an ability to use such 
knowledge to understand others in real settings is not a 
philosophical skill but something quite different. 
Neither can it be assumed to exist within others who 
qualify, for various reasons, to be members of the panel. 
Indeed, it cannot be presupposed as a possession of 
anyone qua their profession and/or background. Those who 
seem to have it to a high degree are usually recognised 
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as such by their communities but do not thereby acquire 
great fame or fortune. Those who have might include 
certain poets, novelists or playwrights - such as 
Shakespeare - although this is by no means a clear guide 
since poets of great sensitivity such as Wordsworth were 
reported to be almost unable to communicate with the very 
folk they seemingly understood so well. 
The outstanding question which remains is 
whether anything substantive can be said of the 
constitution of the panel. My answer is that there is, 
but the substantive content will not, of itself, decide 
whether specific persons or types of person will sit but 
will provide guidelines by which appropriateness of 
membership can be decided. 
Without retreating into actual cases or examples, 
in broad outline, what I have in mind is this. The 
membership of any panel will largely be decided by what I 
have referred to as 'the brief': what it is they are 
given to do. It will also be determined by the size and 
type of enquiry: whether, that is, it is a rather small 
scale local enquiry such as the way in which a school 
allocates its funds or a large scale one of national 
importance such as the best means of implementing the 
national curriculum. It will also depend on the complex 
factors which enter into the creation of a dialogical 
situation which is creative, on the identification, if 
possible of the groups of concern and responsibility and 
on whether or not certain types of expertise such as 
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accounting are necessary. My main claim, however, is that 
such considerations are, at best, only defeasible 
criteria for the selection of a panel. In practice the 
'criteria' would probably only operate 'behind the 
scenes' in what would otherwise be a negotiated 
arrangement between those who, in the real world, felt 
ha& 
that they La right or a duty to take part. 
7.6 	 Concluding Remarks.  
It will have been obvious that despite my 
attempts in chapters four, five and six, to forsee 
problems of both a philosophical and practical nature, 
there remain large areas where more needs to be said and 
done. Some of them only arise in the context of the 
methodology outlined above. Others are of a more general 
nature. Of the first sort there is much more to be said 
on the nature of dialogue, of the ethical issues arising 
out of the constitution of the panel, of the actual role 
of the narrator and the relationship between her and the 
panel, of the legal issues arising from the panel's need 
to talk to those involved and of evaluation procedures 
which might again involve a panel. Of the second sort, 
there are, as I have indicated, large areas of work 
required in understanding narrativity, intentionality - 
particularly in relation to texts, rhetoric, semiotics 
and speech act theory in particular, ideology and the way 
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it influences descriptions and texts, the specification 
of ends, in education, and who is responsible for it and 
the relationship between the researchers, the researched 
and the policy makers. Both lists could be extended 
depending on what seemed most appropriate but many 
require a separate thesis by themselves and could not be 
summarised here. There is then much more that could be 
said but which could only be said in some future work. At 
the same time, the model which I have proposed, which is 
only one among many possible models, is a working model: 
it could, without much more theoretical work, be tried 
out. I have, to the extent that I have succeeded at all 
in providing a substantive conclusion to what is 
essentially a philosophical thesis, succeeded in one 
other aim, which is that philosophy of education has a 
vital function in educational research, underestimated I 
feel, by some, in that it can have practical implications 
as well as theoretical ones. I feel also, in this 
context, that I have attempted to carry out what Richard 
Peters was indicating when he wrote, in the introduction 
to 'Ethics and Education', that:1  
Assumptions about transmission also raise ... 
fundamental problems in philosophical psychology 
about the conceptual schemes employed by educational 
psychologists and the types of procedures by which 
their assumptions can be tested...which are 
particular problems in the philosophy of science. 
Philosophy of Education may take the form of a second 
order enquiry but where it finds that conceptual 
confusion underlies the conceptual schemes employed by 
educational research, then it has first order 
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implications. The conceptual confusions we have located 
beneath the assumptions of scientistic research in 
education call for a radical restructuring of the actual 
process of research. My attempt to describe one such 
model may run into practical problems but its 
assumptions, at least, seem less questionable than those 
of a more scientistic bent and consequently more 
appropriate as a basis for educational research. 
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Chapter Seven: Footnotes.  
(1) R.S.Peters, 'Ethics and Education', Unwin, 1970. p18. 
Epilogue.  
In the prologue I outlined three aims in this 
thesis. The first of these was central to the thesis and 
concerned the place and role of scientific method in 
educational research. The second concerned the role 
philosophy of education might have in providing a 
critique of this, while the third was the intention to 
adapt philosophy of education in such a way that it had 
practical and substantive implications. 
I did not work on the assumption that science 
might, if implemented, have damaging effects on 
educational policy; indeed chapter two set out to show 
both that scientific method was well established in 
educational research and that its concepts and 
assumptions were problematic. I also tried to show that 
this was also the case for an 'applied science' whose 
paradigm was something similar to that envisaged by 
engineers. 
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Part of the first chapter was concerned to show 
the importance that science had in educational thinking 
and educational philosophy in particular. There I 
outlined what some may consider the most important 
defence of the use of scientific method in education. At 
the same time it was a concern of mine that writers on 
the philosophy of education had not really provided an 
appropriate framework from which to both provide a 
critique of these practices but also propose a practical 
and substantive alternative. This, it seemed to me was 
vital, both for the practice of education and for 
philosophy of education. Thus I attempted to set down 
some of my views on the philosophy of education which 
would enable me to carry through the task set by the main 
aim of the thesis which was to provide not merely a 
critique, although that would have been a large enough 
job, but to provide a working philosophical framework in 
which a practical conclusion could be reached. The thesis 
could thus be be seen as an outworking of a rather 
Aristotelean piece of practical reason with practical 
proposals rather than actions as conclusions. 
The first part of the thesis was thus concerned 
either with providing a philosophical framework within 
which to work or with a critique of the research 
practices which I felt could lead to damaging practical 
proposals. The third chapter became necessary as soon as 
it became clear in the second that the whole basis of the 
nomological enterprise rested on the possibility of 
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finding a way of expressing a lawful relationship between 
variables which were antecedent and consequent. As a 
result of this it became necessary, for reasons which I 
hope were sufficiently clear, to leave the philosophy of 
education as such and enter into the realms of what has 
been referred to as 'pure' philosophy. 
As I have mentioned in the prologue, the thesis 
itself, in exploring the problems inherent in the 
scientific enterprise began, at the same time, to provide 
clues to a way forward. These came in two forms: positive 
and negative. The negative aspects appeared as pitfalls 
to be avoided and include such things as atomism and 
reductionism. The positive aspects, which sometimes 
appeared as the other side of thecoin, appeared as points 
to be remembered and included. These include the 
importance of context for understanding, the significance 
of public criteria and agreement and the centrality of 
intentions, beliefs and purposes to understanding 
individual actions. All of these factors led to the idea 
that, at a practical level which would be necessary in a 
research scheme, some all-encompassing data base would be 
required which would be holistic as opposed to atomistic. 
A narrative seemed to be the most obvious candidate for 
such a basis. 
Having got so far it was becoming apparent that 
any remnants of scientism in my own thinking would be 
radically challenged since the data base from which 
research started was so unlike anything in the sciences. 
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I therefore felt compelled to examine the narrative as a 
possible research tool. This gave rise to sections such 
as the use of a narrative in isolating causes and also 
the possibility of narrative objectivity. The second of 
these is a particularly difficult area philosophically 
since all the problems encountered by the proponents of 
atomism (the truth value of atomic propositions etc) and 
of extensionalism seemed compounded by a exponential 
growth of biographical and social information. The way 
ahead, it seemed, could not possibly involve the relation 
of variables for such variables as there were could no 
longer be taken in isolation from their context. At this 
point the polar opposite of the aims of positivism seem 
to have been reached. 
One way out of this seeming impasse was to rely 
of the intuitions of the everyday reasoner. In daily life 
we all come to practical conclusions about what to do 
even though we have a mass of information which may be 
regarded as a set of premisses in a practical syllogism. 
Before I could take this form of thinking as a way 
forward however, I had to look at the possiblility of 
formulating such a set of premisses in such a way that a 
practical conclusion could be reached deductively. This, 
as I hope I showed in chapter six, is not possible. The 
conclusion was thus that if such a large data base was to 
act as the basis of a piece of practical deliberation 
then a research scheme incorporating it would require a 
group of deliberators who would be set a practical 
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problem to solve. The narrative, and indeed the narrator, 
would thus become an intregal part of the deliberative 
act which, unlike science, would attempt to reach 
practically feasible goals rather than 'the truth'. It is 
partly this philosophy which informs the seventh chapter 
in that it is agreement as to what to do which is in 
question not what may or may not be the case. I hope that 
this is not misunderstood as being the thesis that truth 
is too expensive a luxury for education. It is rather 
that our agreements are an important aspect on what we 
say is an objective view of how things are. What truth is 
in itself is quite another question and one to which a 
thesis such as this could not even begin to do justice. 
Appendix A 
Using Pragmatics.  
What I wish to examine in the first appendix is 
the possibility of using some form of pragmatics to aid 
the researcher understand the situation recorded in the 
narrative. Briefly, this method will centre around the 
relationship between question and answer. The 
relationships I am interested in are basically those in 
which questions are answered in the way expected 
(convergence) and those which are not (divergence). An 
example of convergence is where a question asking for an 
explanation is answered by an explanation. An example of 
divergence is where a question asking for an explanation 
is answered by a justification (or excuse). The 
implications of this for education will be well 
understood by those who constantly deal with children who 
make excuses rather than give explanations of their 
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actions. 
In order to examine the issue,I will provide a 
number of contexts in which questions might be asked and 
then look at whether convergence or divergence is to be 
expected. I will then give an example of how such a 
method might be used in educational research. I have 
given a letter to four different aspects of the context 
to help with clarity. There are, of course, far more 
aspects to the ones I have mentioned. It would be part of 
the pragmatics I envisage to work out details of 
influential contextual factors. The contexts are as 
follows: 
(r) An unambiguous question seeking an explanation is 
asked. 
(s) The person questioned perceives that an explanation 
is required. 
(t) There is a high degree of agreement over 
'fundamental' moral, political or ideological issues. 
(u) The overall context is non-confrontational. 
In contexts in which (r), (s), (t), and (u) are 
all met (which I characterise with a (+)) there would be 
every likelihood of a high degree of convergence. Where 
some or all are not met there will be higher degrees of 
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divergence. For the sake of simplicity I will call highly 
convergent contexts X and highly divergent contexts Y. To 
give an example of a highly convergent situation I will 
use the present ambulance workers strike. If a striking 
ambulance worker asks another striking ambulance worker 
why they are on strike there is a high degree of 
convergence because an unambiguous question seeking an 
explanation has been asked to someone who perceives it to 
be a request for an explanation and, because there is 
ideological and moral agreement in a non-confrontational 
context, an explanation is given. This might be 
symbolised as follows: X (+r),(+s),(+t),(+u). If, 
however, as often happens, there is a lack of trust or 
ideological difference between the questioner and the 
questioned, then we have a less convergent situation. 
This might occur, in the present example, where a member 
of the press questions a striking worker in a manner 
which indicates confrontation. The lack of shared 
ideology and the confrontational manner of the question 
leads towards a divergence between the type of answer 
asked for and the type given. In this case the type given 
will more probably be more in the form of a justification 
than an explanation. This might be symbolised as: Y 
(+r),(+s),(-t),(-u). There is, perhaps, another divergent 
context (call it Z) in which it is less determinate 
whether explanations or justifications are given as 
answers. These might include situations in which emotions 
such as anger 'interfere' in the relationship. This is 
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sometimes seen in strike situations (as at present in 
Germiston, Johannesbourg) where workers disagree with the 
actions of fellow workers as to the action taken which 
results in the total breakdown of dialogue. Symbolically, 
however, the situation appears to be the same as other 
situations which give rise to justifications. The main 
difference would seem to be in the degree of ideological 
disagreement or confrontation. 
The three situations X, Y, and Z all presuppose 
knowledge about the questioner by the questioned. To 
these we may add a fourth context in which such knowledge 
does not exist. In these circumstances (u) is 
indeterminate and therefore most likely gives rise to an 
evasive answer. The ideological presuppositions of the 
questioner, however, might be guessed or deduced from the 
tone of voice or form of question given by the 
questioner. There seem to be at least two of these types 
of context: V and W. Since in both cases the 
confrontational aspect and the questioners intentions 
might be unclear (r), (s) and (u) are somewhat 
indeterminate. I have symbolised this with a question 
mark. What, therefore, distinguishes V and W is the 
perception the person questioned has concerning the 
ideological position of the questioner. Thus V might be 
symbolised as: (?r),(?s),(+t),(?u) and W as: 
(?r),(?s),(-t),(?u). Since there is the basis of trust in 
V there is also the possibility of some convergence. In 
W, however, no such basis exists and since the 
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confrontational aspect is also indeterminate the most 
likely outcome is a divergent evasiveness. 
In the following example I hope to show the use 
to which this may be put in educational research by 
providing part of a narrative in which a certain pupil is 
suspected of stealing a pen. The narrative includes the 
pupils answers to questions put by various people who 
represent (by their roles, attitudes or relationships) 
examples of the contextual features outlined above. To 
avoid complication I have oversimplified the questions 
and answers in order to highlight the main points. The 
main idea here is to see to what extent such a technique 
might be useful in understanding the text. The text 
(which is 'idealised') is as follows: 
Headteacher: I have good reasons to think that you have 
stolen a pen. What do you say? 
Pupil: I don't know what your talking about. 
Mother: I have a letter from your Headteacher saying that 
he has good reasons to suppose that you have stolen a 
pen. While I believe that the Headteacher would not 
accuse you of this without good grounds,I want to know 
your side of the story. 
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Pupil: I won't lie to you, I did steal the pen, but it 
was only because a teacher threatened to punish me if I 
didn't do the work properly and I couldn't find my other 
pen. 
Pupil's friend: Did you really steal the pen? 
Pupil: Yes, of course I did, but it was only old snobby's 
and he's got hundreds. 
'Snobby': I'm going to get you after school! You stole my 
pen! 
Pupil: I didn't steal your pen and my mates will make 
mincemeat out of you if you say I did! 
Narrator: Did you steal the pen? 
Pupil: Who are you? 
Friendly Teacher: I heard that the Headteacher has 
accused you of stealing a pen. Yod'renot like that are 
you? 
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Pupil: I only did it because that horrible teacher in the 
science department said he would belt me if I didn't 
finish my work. I was scared. 
Given this text, the researcher is able to 
allocate, using the symbols above, positive and negative 
features of the context to the various aspects of it. The 
results might look something like this: 
Headteacher: 	 Y 	 (+r), 	 (+s), 	 (-t), 	 (-u). 
Mother: X (+r) , (+s) , (+t) , (+u) . 
Pupil's Friend: X (+r), (+s), (+t), (+u). 
'Snobby': Z (+r), (+s) , (-t) , (-u). 
Narrator: W (?r) , (?s) , (-t) , (?u). 
Friendly Teacher: X (+r), (+s), (+t), (+u). 
A well worked out scheme would be one in which 
convergent (X) and divergent (Y) situations could be 
'extracted' from the text. The advantage would be that it 
would be fairly clear where to expect difffering types of 
answer. Interestingly (though of course this is not 
palpable proof) one of the outcomes of our examination of 
what is an oversimplified and somewhat unrealistic 
'narrative' is that the context created by the narrator's 
question is highly divergent and therefore unlikely to 
reveal anything resembling an appropriate answer. The two 
contexts more likely to 'succeed' (in the sense that they 
- 346 - 
most nearly elicit the type of answer asked for) are 
created by the two friends, the pupil and the teacher, 
and the mother. This, if explored in greater depth than I 
have space for here, would, I am sure, reveal much more 
about the role of the narrator and the way the narrators 
questions might be framed, and, at the same time, about 
the importance of other biographical material - such as 
conversations with friends and the like. 
Appendix B 
In order to examine the context and the factors 
in it which play an important role in decision making I 
shall employ a device analogous to changing the scenery 
in a play. Firstly I shall outline some of the possible 
circumstances in which any public decision must be made. 
Then I shall change various elements in the circumstances 
in order to throw the predicament of the decision into 
relief and thereby identify, tentatively, some of the 
major influences in ordinary public decision making. In 
so doing I hope to cast some light not only on the way in 
which circumstances enter into the decision but also on 
the various groups involved. Those groups, or 'interested 
parties' as I refer to them are: those who are of 
concern, those to whom justification is owed and those 
whose opinion is, for one reason or another, held in 
esteem. These might be broadly characterised as follows: 
those of concern as the group amongst whom the action is 
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to be taken; those to whom justification is owed as those 
to whom one is responsible and those whose opinion is 
esteemed as those for whom there is respect in practical 
matters. It should not be thought that I am saying that 
these are or should be the only groups affecting the 
decision process only that they appear to be the most 
prominent. 
I offer here six circumstantial factors which are 
likely to influence, in one way or another, the decisions 
which the social workers (mentioned in chapter six) have 
to make. I have underlined the word or words which seem 
to indicate, in each case, the type of circumstantial 
factors. 
We may presume firstly that the social workers 
work within a brief and that this brief sets parameters 
around the circumstances with which they are dealing. Let 
us say, for example, that this brief comes from a head 
teacher, who, in liaison with social workers and others, 
forms the opinion that a certain child is not coping at 
school or at home because of what is perceived as a 
mental handicap. Having come to such a conclusion, and 
having gone through the appropriate legal channels, a 
certain welfare office is informed of its duty to resolve 
the problem in some satisfactory way. Now, if we consider 
these circumstances together with the question of 
appropriate criteria concerning 'those of concern', a 
number of significant circumstantial factors become 
evident. To begin with, the law, within any given 
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society, might prescabe who are deemed 'interested 
parties' and specify how they should be treated. 
Secondly, the social workers themselves work within 
pragmatic constraints such as time, effort and so on. 
Thirdly, there is 'informed' opinion as to what 
constitutes a mental handicap, what are the most 
appropriate remedies, who has rights over what and what 
the role of social workers is in cases such as these. We 
might include in this group professional psychologists, 
lawyers, social and psychological scientists, 
educationalists and whoever else, for whatever reason, 
has an authority which is invested by position. Fourthly, 
there are the physical options available; the number of 
institutional places, the number of home helps, the 
financial situation both of the family and the state and 
so on. Fifthly, there are those to whom the social  
workers are responsible and must justify their actions: 
the school, the parents, the 'law', colleagues and those 
who for other reasons have a professional interest. 
Finally, there must be some element of moral judgement  
which belongs to the social workers and to them alone; 
they, after all are ultimately responsible for making the 
decision and that duty carries with it a certain invested 
authority which cannot be overridden for 'academic' 
reasons. 
I will now provide three variations in the 
background and speculate how, for each, the change might 
affect the social workers' beliefs about what constitutes 
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the most approriate action. The first context is that of 
an underfunded welfare state, the people are suspicious 
of 'western' techniques and practices and the word family 
applies to a large group of relatives who accept 
responsibility for each other. The second is a society in 
which psychiatrists are opposed to institutionalisation 
as the appropriate means of caring for the mentally 
handicapped. The third is a society in which the rights 
of parents legally override any decision concerning their 
family whatsoever. My aim here, as stated above, is 
simply to see (hypothetically) how the three sets of 
circumstances might influence the way in which the social 
workers think and hence decide what to do with the child. 
In the first example the social workers have no 
authority to make any decision, indeed, they have no role 
in the tradition. However, since the state finances a 
health service of sorts we may presume that they are 
obliged to intervene in what is otherwise none of their 
concern. Given their lack of authority and the hostility 
of the people the factor which is likely to influence 
their beliefs most is an avoidance of conflict. The 
overriding need not to offend the tradition isolates the 
group of concern as the extended family. The dominant 
reason for this might be related to the group whom the 
social workers perceive as the group to whom 
c.kio, justification is due who would beL the extended family. 
It might be argued, contrary to this, that regardless of 
what tradition might say society at large has the 
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ultimate responsibilty for the welfare of its people. 
This view, if it were held, would raise the question as 
to how, given competing claims, any decision could be 
satisfactorily made. Whatever the result there do seem to 
be a number of significant factors at work. These may be 
put as follows: 
(a) The group perceived as those to whom justification is 
owed dominates the identification of the group who are of 
concern. It would eradicate, for example, the moral 
claims of any institution which were at variance with the 
views of the extended family. The underlying reason for 
this dominance would be a fear that any decision made by 
the welfare state or its representatives would be deeply 
offensive to the rights of the family bestowed on them by 
tradition. 
(b) A respect for what is perceived to be the tradition. 
(c) A sensitive awareness of roles within the 
circumstances and the way that role is perceived by 
others. 
In the second example we might hypthesize that a 
prestigious science has pronounced to a western audience, 
including the social workers, that institutionalisation 
is inappropriate. Again the fundamental factor 
influencing belief is likely to be the group the social 
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workers perceive as those to whom justification is due. 
This, however, need not determine their decision. Their 
decision, for example, will not be affected if, for some 
reason, they do not have any respect for such a science 
as psychiatry. However, those to whom they must justify 
themselves might well have a great deal of respect for 
it. Thus a dilemma is created where opinions differ. If, 
for example, the social workers believe strongly that 
institutionalisation is good they must weigh that belief 
against their need to justify themselves to authorities 
who are influenced by the pronouncements of the world of 
science. This weighing is further complicated by the fact 
that the reasons they give will have to be acceptable but 
are not those which are generally accepted. The dilemma 
thus takes on the form of a difference over what 
constitutes a good or acceptable reason. How might the 
dilemma effect the social workers decision? If they put 
the group whose opinions are (generally) esteemed above 
the group of concern because of a fear that they cannot 
justify their action, they sacrifice, for pragmatic 
reasons, their own opinion. If, on the other hand they 
choose to act in accord with their own beliefs, they 
relegate both the group of respected opinion and the 
group to whom justification is due below those of 
concern. Which hierarchy is chosen will rest on such 
factors as confidence to present alternative types of 
justification, the relative stress put on care for those 
concerned and those to whom justification is due and the 
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balance between them, respect for 'expert' opinion and 
much else including strength of character. What is more, 
connected with any disagreement over rationality, there 
is a difference as to what are taken to be facts. As we 
have described the situation the social workers do not 
accept one fact, alleged by psychiatric publication, that 
institutions are not appropriate methods for treating the 
mentally handicapped. 
Although the situation is complicated I think 
that enough has been said to highlight two further 
factors: 
(d) The importance of a hierarchy of groups, the exact 
order of which depends upon a multitude of other factors 
ranging from a respect for experts to a confidence to 
state personal views. 
(e) The criteria which, for any individual, persuades 
them of what are and what are not to count as 'the 
facts'. 
In the third example we have imagined that the 
rights of parents outweigh any other considerations. This 
has the effect of making the parents the group to whom 
justification is owed while leaving the group of concern 
open. It might also have the effect of making the group 
of 'experts' of greater importance than we have hitherto 
allowed them to have. The reason is that the social 
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workers might, in their attempt to justify what might be 
an unpopular decision to the parents, appeal to a 
'higher' authority. The situation is different from the 
first two in that the situation is essentially less 
public. This allows for a wider interpretation of 'giving 
a justification' than would be the case in a more public 
context. How the social workers persuade the parents 
highlights another circumstantial factor (f). This would 
be the ethical dimension of decision making - in this 
case whether it is ever right for someone acting in an 
official capacity to take children away from their 
parents and how the social workers might justify this to 
themlves. 
In conclusion it must be stated that the above is 
merely exploratory in nature. The important issues are 
not, in a sense, what circumstantial features play a part 
in decision making. They are, rather, that decisions 
cannot be understood fully unless circumstances are also 
understood. There is thus here a further argument for a 
narrative as the basis for educational research. 
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